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Abstract 
Throughout the reading process, a narrative text produces various sensations of immediacy 
or distance. One important reason for this is that a narrative will in some places present 
situtations from a particular perspective, with which the reader is implicitly invited to iden- 
tify, while in other places it will describe situations as independent of any perspective. If 
a perspective (that of the narrator, or that of a character in the text) is introduced, the 
narrative reflects an individual's (potentially fallible) perceptions, attitudes or beliefs; and 
this creates the impression of perspectival immediacy. If no perspective is introduced, on 
the other hand, the narrative pretends to relate "objective facts" within the fiction; and this 
creates the impression of perspectival distance. 
Thus the contrast between perepectivally situated and perepectivally non-situated sentences in 
a narrative produces perspectival refractions. The difference between both types of sentences, 
however, is often felt to be recalcitrant to a full linguistic analysis. For example, it is generally 
assumed that the perspectival status of a sentence is determined by the presence or absence of 
aubject-oriented elements in the sentence. But although such elements play an important role 
in focusing perspective, they need not occur in a sentence for the sentence to be perspectivally 
situated. 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, we draw attention to an observation which has received very 
little attention in the existing literature on perspective: per pectivally non-situated sentences 
typically move narrative time forward (in the sense that the order of the sentences on the page 
mimics temporal progression on the imaginary time line of the narrative), while perspectivally 
situated sentences do not convey forward movement in time. In other words, there appears to 
be a relationship between temporal ordering and perspective. Our aim is to specify the precise 
nature of this relationship. 
iv 
To do so, we first of all try to establish what determines the temporal relationship between 
consecutive sentences in narrative. We take as the starting point for our discussion some 
recent theories in the field of formal semantics which define this relationship in terms of the 
aspectual type a sentence belongs to. In Chapter 2, we explore to what extent these theories 
enable us to explain the apparent correlation between temporal ordering and perspective in 
narrative texts. 
In Chapters 3-5, we propose a detailed analysis of the relationship between the aspectual 
properties of sentences and their perspectival characteristics. Our central claim is that sen- 
tences exhibiting a state profile always introduce a perspective into a narrative. We try to 
make explicit why this is the case. 
In Chapter 6, the conclusions of this analysis are integrated into a more general theory of 
perspective in narrative fiction. 
v 
Notational Conventions 
In this thesis, the following notational conventions are used: 
Example of Convention Description of Convention 
a linguistic example 
A displayed example 
This is an example 
Linguistic examples in the body of the text are in 
italics. 
However, in displays, linguistic examples appear 
in roman ty pe 
In displayed examples, the particular item of in- 
terest appears underlined. Underlining wilSl also 
be used to indicate an anaphor and its antecedent. 
[The dog] suddenly (...] died Material that has been added to make a real-text 
example easier to understand appears in square 
brackets; where material has been excised, three 
dots appear between square brackets. 
(She looked up.) Dark clouds were gathering In real-text examples, clauses that introduce per- 
spectivally situated clauses will be put between 
normal brackets. 
*The horses is brown A sentence or phrase which is ungrammatical is 
denoted by a preceding `*'. 
?I haven't an oat A sentence or phrase whose well-formedness is 
questionable is denoted by a preceding `?'. 
#"_r°ed ho' h4-Gwdho A sentence or phrase which is grammatical but 
unacceptable in the given context is denoted by a 
preceding `#'. 
The readers, writers, narrators, and other dramatic personae in this text will all be referred 
to by means of feminine pronouns. 
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Chapter 1 
Perspective in Narrative Fiction 
Texts are lazy machineries that ask someone to do part of their job. Umberto 
Eco: The Role of the Reader. 
1.1 Introduction 
Questions concerning the nature of the observations readers make about narrative texts have 
never ceased to plague literary theory, and it has recently been argued, with increasing in- 
sistence, that rather than producing studies of individual texts as objects which are assigned 
a particular meaning, one should instead study the process of interaction between texts and 
their readers (e.g. Dillon 1978; Iser 1978; Eco 1979; Meyer 1981; Ruthrof 1981; Crossman 
1983). The idea underlying this type of approach is that textual meaning is not a static text- 
immanent property, but a changing construct which gradually emerges as the reader extracts 
information from the text. 
Part of this information concerns the perspective, or point of view from which situations in a 
narrative are presented. By perspective we mean a position within the imaginary reality of the 
narrative which serves as a kind of angle on what is being described. As in its everyday use, the 
term is not restricted to perception (from which angle is the fictional world being perceived?)- 
it may also denote a conceptual or psychological position (who is thinking, feeling, judging...?).1 
'More fine-grained distinctions are made in the literature, the most influential being the one coined by 
Uspensky (1973). Uspensky analyses point of view in terms of different "planes" or "dimensions"; he distin- 
guishes between point of view on the ideological or evaluative plane, on the psychological or perceptual plane, 
1 
The identification of the perspective or point of view which governs a narrative constitutes 
an important part of text understanding since 
our understanding of point of view determines to a large extent our perceptions 
of the novel's value system and its complex of attitudes. (Stevick 1967: 86) 
1.2 Perspective at text level 
In the study of perspective there are three main tendencies: the typological one (of which 
Stanzel and Friedman are the most influential exponents), the formalist one (represented by 
the work of Genette and Prince), and the post-formalist one (found, for example, in the work 
of Lanser). 
In the first two types of work, the focus is on general distinctions between different types 
of narrative transmission, which are typically formulated in terms of (some of) the following 
criteria: 
Is the narrator personalised (as in first person narratives) or not personalised (as in third 
person narratives)? 
Does the narrator situate herself inside or outside the fictional world-in other words 
are the worlds of the characters in the narrative and the narrator identical or not? 
Is the narrative perspective internal (thoughts, feelings and perceptions are reported) 
or external (the narrative restricts itself to what is visible to an observer)? 
On the basis of criteria like these, various classifications of perspective in narrative have been 
proposed over the years. 
Friedman (1955) provides a description of eight types of narrative transmission, ranging from 
editorial omniscience (the narrator's point of view is not restricted in any way), via I-witness 
on the spatial and temporal plane, and on the phraseological plane. Although these categories may in practice 
blur or overlap the distinction provides a useful starting point for a stylistic analysis of point of view. Fowler 
(1982) updates Uapensky's account and applies it to English. 
2 
and I-protagoni8t (the narrator is a character in the text whose point of view is by definition 
restricted) to camera-eye (everything in the narrative is presented from the outside). 
Stanzel (1969) develops a "grammar of fiction" which distinguishes between three types of 
narrative mediation, namely first person narration (the narrator is personalised and visible 
as a character within the fictional world), authorial narration (the narrator is personalised 
and visible but outside the fictional world), and figural narration (the narrator is invisible 
and her place is taken by a figural medium). 
Genette (1972) introduces a distinction between heterodiegetic narratives (the narrator is not 
personalised), homodiegetic narratives (the narrator is personalised but outside the fictional 
world), and autodiegetic narratives (the narrator is personalised as a character within the 
fictional world). 
Prince (1982) proposes to distinguish between an unrestricted point of view (the narrator has 
complete freedom and privilege), an internal point of view (everything in the narrative is 
presented in terms of the knowledge, feelings and perceptions of one of the characters) and 
an external point of view (everything in the narrative is presented from the outside). 
In all of these works, point of view is viewed as a relatively stable text-immanent property. A 
third approach to perspective, in the post-formalist tradition, attempts to open up perspective 
to a more dynamic description by defining it as a relationship. Lancer (1981) does so by 
applying some of the central concepts of speech act theory to literary texts:2 
Every speech act [...] implies a point of view, a relationship between the speaker 
and the context, the listener, or the context of the communicative act. (Lancer 
1981: 64) 
Viewed in this framework, perspective can be defined as 
a complex network of interaction between author, narrator(s), characters and 
audiences both real and implied. (Lancer 1981: 13) 
2 Other studies of literary texts as speech act include Ohman (1973) and Pratt (1977). 
3 
Lanser's analysis of perspective relies on three types of relationships: status (the relation of 
the narrator to the speech act), contact (the relation between the narrator and the (implied) 
reader), and stance (the relation between the narrator and the textual world). Status, contact 
and stance are characterised as "dialectically intertwined" (Lanser 1981: 94). 
1.3 Perspective at sentence level 
As in the typological and formalist work on perspective Lancer's main concern is with identify- 
ing the perspectival characteristics of a text (novel or short story). If narrative understanding 
is viewed as a dynamic process of interaction between reader and text, however, perspectival 
issues can also be approached at a different level. 
When reading a narrative, a reader encounters a string of clauses or sentences3 each of which 
present her with a situation or state of affairs. The reader has to build a structured rep- 
resentation of these states of affairs, and determine for each state of affairs how it is to be 
integrated into the model she is building of the narrative. One of the relevant tasks in this 
respect is to determine the perspective which governs each sentence. 
In general, statements in narrative fiction are immune to judgments of truth or falsity, because 
they lack actual reference. One of the typical genre characteristics of a narrative, however, is 
that it presents the reader with an alternative world, in which judgments of truth and falsity 
do apply. 
As a result of this, situations in a narrative can be described in two ways. They may either be 
presented as facts within the fiction, in the sense that their truth status within the fictional 
world is inferred to be independent of the (potentially distorting) presence of a subject. We 
will call sentences in narrative which portray situations in this way objective. Alternatively, 
situations may be presented as reflecting a subject's (potentially mistaken or unreliable) 
perceptions, opinions or judgments. Sentences in narrative which describe situations in this 
31 use the term clause or sentence to refer to a syntactically non-embedded tensed clause. A sentence may, 
of course, consist of more than one clause. I assume that Edward got up and then he brushed his teeth is one 
sentence containing two clauses; and I shall assume the same of Edward got up and then brushed his teeth; the 
absence of a subject in the second conjunct is less important than the presence of a tensed verb. In general I 
shall confine my attention to main clauses; however nothing of importance hangs on this. 
4 
way will be referred to as subjective. 
As all statements in a narrative are ultimately assigned to the text's narrator, a narrator 
can thus assume two roles: that of a narrative authority, which presents situations in the 
narrative as independent of any perspective; and that of a subject whose (spatial, temporal 
and attitudinal) situatedness always by definition implies a particular perspective. 
Clearly the authority assigned to a narrator will to some extent depend on some of the textual 
characteristics referred to in the previous section. If a narrator is omniscient, for example, 
the reader will assign greater authority to her than in the case of a personalised narrator with 
limited privilege. But even if a narrator is a protagonist in the story, so that her point of view 
is by definition restricted, the reader will interpret some of her statements as more objective 
than others, and view them as constituting the reality of the fiction; through a particular use 
of language, in other words, a narrator may disguise her identity as a subject, by drawing 
attention to the referential nature of the fiction and the story told.4 
If perspective is studied at sentence level, it follows from this, two questions immediately 
arise. When are sentences in a narrative interpreted by the reader as subjective statements 
by the narrator, so that they describe a state of affairs from the narrator's perspective? And 
what distinguishes such sentences from those in which the narrator assumes the guise of an 
objective authority, so that it appears as if the state of affairs is not presented from her 
perspective? 
1.4 Subject-oriented features 
The most obvious answer to both questions is that a sentence is subjective if it contains 
indications that its semantic content is viewed from a particular (spatial/temporal) position, 
or coloured by the attitudes, emotions, beliefs or judgments of a subject. The linguistic 
manifestation of this is found in so-called expressive or subject-oriented features-i.e. syntactic 
4One of the author's strategies may, of course, lie in highlighting this capacity of language to pretend at 
infallibility, by exposing the fiction-creating statements of a personalised narrator as distortions or lies. One 
of the central themes of Margaret Atwood's Surfacing, for example, concerns the protagonist's attempts to 
reconstruct (parts of her) past by turning them into a narrative. Because passages which the reader interprets 
as factual turn out to be distortions, notions such as truth and referentiality are problematised and even fictional 
"reality' in, in last instance, represented as a construct of the interpretative activities of a subject. 
5 
and semantic elements which only make sense if their expressive content can be attributed 
to a subject. If such features occur in a sentence in a narrative they signal to the reader 
that the state of affairs described must be interpreted with the caution due to any subjective 
statement. 
Subject-oriented features include 
interrogatory and exclamatory constructions: 
(1-1) How often she had dreamt of dashing off down an unknown road with 
Christopher! (Wharton, Atrophy: 29) 
syntactically incomplete clauses: 
(1-2) He knew... Good Lord, exactly like- (Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the 
Serpent: 24) 
syntactic constructions which simulate the subjective dimension of a thinking or expe- 
riencing consciousness: 
(1-3) How did information that had been in the newspaper become a secret that 
needed to be whispered in a pig yard? A secret from whom? Sethe, that's 
whom. He'd gone behind her back, like a sneak. But sneaking was his job, 
his life; though always for a clear and holy purpose. (Morrison, Beloved: 
169) 
lexical items expressing an individual's emotions, attitudes, judgments, evaluations, 
beliefs etc. These include 
evaluative and qualifying adjectives and adverbs 
- kinship terms 
- nicknames or petnames 
attitudinal nouns (cf. Dolezel 1976) 
(1-4) What a mean piece of mischief, that epitaph Aggie sprang on her at break- 
fast. What an insult, for one thing; for another, what a wound. (Barfoot, 
Duet for three: 66) 
(1-5) Something had happened-he forgot what-in the smoking room. He 
had insulted her-kissed her? Incredible! Nobody believed a word against 
Hugh, of course. Who could? Kissing Sally in the smoking room! (Woolf, 
Mrs Dalloway: 82) 
6 
(1-6) Well, its perfectly obvious that's what she's done. The smell. Oh God (a 
prayer, not a blasphemy), what next? This is too much. This is out of 
the question, beyond everything. 
Really, is it not enough to have to haul Aggie out of bed, and help her get 
dressed, averting eyes from an appalling amount of old flesh, to get her 
settled downstairs in her creaky spring-broken chair in the living room, 
with a plate of something to nibble at and a pile of books beside her? To 
race around making breakfast for the two of them? To make sure before 
she leaves for school that Aggie is settled, has what she needs to get her 
through the day? And then to spend another, probably difficult day in 
the classroom, edging her way to retirement, which is still five years away? 
[...] But this is too much. Now what is she supposed to do? Duty is one 
thing; facing this quite another. (Barfoot, Duet for three: 5) 
intensifiers (e.g. too, quite, so): 
(1-7) What was really funny was the idea of Mr Cheatam or Alonzo Myers 
beauing them around. That killed her. (O'Connor, A Good Man is Hard 
to Find: 68) 
emphasisers (e.g. also, just): 
(1-8) Jane Aldis, of course, was much less self-assertive, less demanding, than 
George Frenway. (Wharton, Atrophy: 30) 
attitudinal adjuncts (e.g. likely, maybe, probably): 
(1-9) Unspoken is, "You may need one tomorrow." Or maybe she reads too 
much into words. (Barfoot, Duet for three: 250) 
conjuncts which comment upon the connection between items (e.g. anyway, still, after 
alt): 
(1-10) Yet here she was on her way to Westover... Oh, what did it matter now? 
That was the worst of it-it was too late for anything between her and 
Christopher to matter! (Wharton, Atrophy: 30) 
spatial and temporal deixis: 
(1-11) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! 
(Lawrence, Women in Love: 185) 
similes with expressive content: 
(1-12) Still, there was no mockery coming from her gaze. Soft. It felt soft in a 
waiting kind of way. He was not judging her-or rather he was judging her 
but not comparing her. Not since Halle had a man looked at her that way: 
not loving or passionate, but interested, as though he were examining an 
ear of corn for quality. (Morrison, Beloved: 25) 
the use of italics to mark various types of empathy, emotion, insistence, contrast etc 
conveyed in spoken discourse by intonation 




Some subject-oriented elements (such as attitudinal adjuncts) modify the truth status of 
a sentence by making it subject to an individual's speculative assessment; others (such as 
evaluative and qualifying adjectives and adverbs, or the use of emotional deixis) impart a 
state of affairs with the subjective colouring of someone's attitude; yet others (spatial and 
temporal deictics, for example) signal that a state of affairs is viewed from a particular 
spatial or temporal angle. What all of these elements have in common is that they cannot be 
interpreted except with reference to a subject which functions, in a sense, as the antecedent for 
the expressive content of the clause. I will refer to such a subject as a subject- of-conaciousness. 
1.5 Directly presented perspective 
In the light of the foregoing, one would assume that if a clause or sentence in a narrative 
contains one or more subject-oriented features the state of affairs is described from the per- 
spective of the narrator. And in the following passages this is indeed the case: 
(1-14) The canvas packsack with my clothes has been moved, it's back inside 
now, on the table with my case; beside it is Anna's detective novel, her last 
one, cold comfort but comfort, death is logical, there's always a motive. 
Perhaps that's why she read them, for the theology. (Atwood, Surfacing: 
170) 
(1-15) I encounter resistance in myself, of course. That is only natural. I am quite 
young and I am aware that this is a dull life. Sometimes it seems like a 
physical effort simply to sit down at my desk and pull out the notebook. 
Sometimes I find myself heaving a sigh when I read through what I have al- 
ready written. Sometimes the effort of putting pen to paper is so great that 
I literally feel a pain in my head, as if all the furniture of my mind were 
being rearranged, as if it were being lined up, being got ready for 
delivery from the storehouse. And yet when I start to write, all this heav- 
iness vanishes, and I feel charged with a kind of electricity, not unpleasant 
in itself, but leading, inevitably, to greater restlessness. Fortunately, I am 
not a hysterical person. [...] I am famous for my control, which has seen 
me through many crises. By a supreme irony, my control is so great that 
these crises remain unknown to the rest of the world, and so I am thought 
to be unfeeling. And of course I never speak of them. (Brookner, Look At 
Me: 18-19) 
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(1-16) The fence, as I say, is not what it once was, when this land was truly a 
farm. It wobbles on its posts, the wire sags, and the only part of it that 
has kept its tension and purpose is the barbed wire across the top, which 
may be what hold up the fence post. The barbs make the fence difficult to 
climb because it is an easy thing to be caught on one as the fence bends 
under my weight. Each time I say I will come out one day and clip the 
barbed wire away from the top, but I never do. It belongs. (Barfoot, 
Gaining Ground: 16-17) 
If the expressive content of a clause can be attributed to the text's narrator, we will say 
perspective is presented directly. Note that not all of the sentences in the above passages 
contain subject-oriented features. 
1.6 Represented perspective 
Now consider the following examples: 
(1-17) But this, this morning, is less to do with memory than with identification: 
what exactly is different, and wrong? (Barfoot, Duet for Three: 2). 
(1-18) Perhaps there was something in this of the old Eden idea; the tender 
human adjusting himself to himself in the soothing impersonal presence 
of trees and grass and earth, before going out into the stare of the world. 
(Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 21) 
(1-19) But no, in European hotels, they left your coffee in a pot on your table, 
along with a pitcher of hot milk, and you refilled your own cup. And 
there were waiters, with towels on their arms, at the Kaiserin Elisabeth. 
(Godwin, A Southern Family: 107) 
(1-20) But that wasn't it either. I wanted an answer, a completion, not a prepa- 
ration. (Barfoot, Gaining Ground: 66) 
None of the sentences (or tensed clauses) in these examples directly quote the words of a 
character in the text, so that the voice which is speaking is that of the narrator. And since, 
unlike in the case of indirect speech or thought, all of the above sentences are syntactically 
non-embedded, one would expect that those which contain subject-oriented features are also 
governed by the narrator's perspective. This, however, is not the case: in all of the examples 
the subject-oriented elements are most plausibly attributed to a character in the text different 
from the narrator. In other words, the sentences are interpreted with respect to a subject-of- 
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consciousness which functions as the perspectival analogue of a narrator (in her role as subject) 
within the framework of the story. Note, moreover, that this observation does not only apply 
to those sentences which contain subject- oriented features; the content of the sentences which 
do not contain any subject-oriented features, too, is most plausibly attributed to a character 
in the text. The passages in examples (1-17)-(1-20) thus seem to constitute some kind of unit 
in the sense that they are governed by the same perspective. 
Because they reflect the viewpoint of a subject, the sentences in examples (1-17)-(1-20), 
like those in section 1.5, are subjective. Unlike in the case of examples in section 1.5, however, 
the perspective which governs these sentences is most plausibly identified as that of a character 
different from the narrator. Because of this we will say they re-present perspective-this in 
contrast with the sentences in section 1.5 which, as we have seen, present perspective. 
A sentence represents perspective if the perspective it introduces does not coincide with that 
of the narrator: although the words in the text (or the voice) remain the narrator's, the reader 
is invited to identify with the subjective stance of a character. 
Thus a narrative 
can choose to regulate the information it delivers [...] according to the capacities 
of knowledge of one or another participant in the story (a character or a group of 
characters) with the narrative adopting or seeming to adopt what we ordinarily 
call the participant's "vision" or "point of view"; the narrative seems in that can 
to take on, with regard to the story, one or another perspective. (Genette 1982: 
161-62). 
It follows from this that a distinction has to be made between perspective and voice, or 
[...] la question quel est le personage dont le point de vue oriente la perspective 
narrative? et cette question toute autre: qui est le narrateur?-ou, pour parler 
plus vite, entre la question qui voltf et la question qui parle? (Genette 1972: 
52) [the question which is the character from whose point of view the narrative 
is organised? and this entirely different question: who is the story teller?-or, 
manner of speaking, who's watching? and who's telling?] 
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Represented perspective obviously constitutes an important stylistic device in narrative: since 
it allows for the implicit unfolding of aspects of the interior world of a character in the 
narrative, it makes it possible for a writer to overcome the limitations of equating perspective 
with voice. Without the narrator's voice being abandoned (as in the case of direct quotation), 
a perspective can be introduced which in terms of mimetic quality exhibits the characteristics 
normally associated with (direct) quotation. 
From the late nineteenth century onwards the phenomenon of represented perspective has 
received extensive attention. It is generally agreed that the technique , which is said to 
constitute "a principal strategy for organising a text according to limited points of view" 
(McHale 1978: 278) becomes an important element of composition in the modern novel where 
representing fictional characters as experiencing subjects is a central concern. It is inaccurate, 
however, to characterise represented perspective as an entirely modern phenomenon. Lips 
(1926), for example, who provides a survey of the style in French, traces her oldest example 
back to the ninth century. 
The phenomenon of represented perspective is referred by a variety of names, such as style 
indirect libre (Lips 1926) or free indirect style, substitionary narration (Fehr 1938), nar- 
rated monologue (Cohn 1966), quasi-direct discourse (Volosinov 1973), represented discourse 
(Dolezel 1973), represented speech and thought (Banfield 1982), and represented consciousness 
(Brinton 1980). 
Perspective can be represented in a variety of ways. Some sentences represent speech, as in 
(1-21): 
(1-21) ("Can you come tomorrow?") Yes, he had no engagement at all for to- 
morrow. 
Others represent thought, as in (1-22): 
(1-22) Silly, really, to travel with such a big bottle. Her case was so heavy. But 
it gave one something to do, packing, unpacking. (Drabble, The Realm of 
Gold: 9) 
others represent perception: 
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(1-23) The boy was about fourteen and tall and big for his age, he had a white 
skin, a dull ugly white covered with freckles, his mouth was a negro's 
mouth and he had small eyes, like bits of green glass. Worst, most horrible 
of all, his hair was crinkled, a negro's hair, but bright red, and his eyebrows 
and eyelashes were red. (Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 41) 
Represented thought and represented perception are, in the more recent literature (cf. Ban- 
field 1982; Brinton 1980) collectively referred to as represented consciousness. Sometimes, 
however, it is hard to determine whether a sentence or sequence of sentences constitutes 
thought or perception. The following example illustrates this: 
(1-24) There, absolutely stilled with fear beneath his glance, crouched a very big 
locust. What an amusing face the thing had! A lugubrious long face, that 
somehow suggested a bald head, and such a glum mouth. It looked like 
some little person out of a Disney cartoon. (Gordimer, The Soft Voice of 
the Serpent: 23) 
Although the sentences in this example describe what the protagonist perceives, they are 
also suggestive of his interpretative activity in the act of perceiving. It is therefore not clear 
whether they should be categorised as represented perception or as represented thought. 
Because of this, Banfield (1981) offers to replace the distinction between represented thought 
and represented perception by that between reflective and non-reflective consciousness, or 
[...] experiences that we notice and others that merely happen to us. (Russell, 
quoted by Banfield 1982: 197) 
Sentences which represent consciousness, Banfield claims, may render a character's experi- 
ences as unarticulated, unexpressed or not explicitly formulated in the mind, or they may 
describe them as brought to the level of conscious reflection. She finds philosophical prece- 
dent and epistemological justification for this distinction in the work of Descartes, Russell and 
Sartre (Banfield 1982: 197-199), but also supports it by linguistic arguments. The distinction, 
she claims, is not merely one in terms of what is represented-it also ties in with formal differ- 
ences. For example, the thinking subject in sentences which portray reflective consciousness is 
normally referred to by a third person pronoun, while sentences of non-reflective consciousness 
may refer to the thinking subject by a proper name. Moreover, only reflective consciousness 
allows exclamations, direct questions and parentheticals. 
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Brinton (1980) also examines the functional and semantic differences between represented 
speech, thought and perception. "Reflective represented perception", she claims, is more 
accurately called "reflective thought", because it is thought about a perception. Likewise, 
"represented speech" resembles "represented thought" in that it is basically speech filtered 
through the thoughts of a character. The term "represented perception", Brinton feels, should 
be reserved for observations dealing with the world outside. Brinton also acknowledges, 
however, that the distinctions between the three categories are by no means always clearcut. 
Thus in (1-25), the second clause 
(1-25) I walked out beyond the town to look at the weather [:] The bad weather 
was coming over the mountains from the sea. (Hemingway, The Sun Also 
Rises, quoted by Fehr 1938: 102) 
could either be represented thought (in which case "bad weather" expresses a judgment the 
character has made about the climatic conditions), or represented perception (in which case 
"bad weather" means the visible aspect of the sky). 
While the reflective/non-reflective distinction has obvious philosophical and linguistic interest, 
I will not explore it any further because nothing immediately relevant for our purposes follows 
from it. I will use the general term represented perspective to refer to clauses the expressive 
content of which can be attributed to a character other than the narrator. We will also 
distinguish between represented consciousness (which includes both represented thought and 
represented perception, with no more fine-grained distinctions being made) and represented 
speech. 
Cohn (1978) points out that while sentences which represent consciousness5 describe states 
of affairs with the colour imparted upon them by a character's subjective assessment or 
awareness, they do not imply that the character "recites" their content to herself. Since there 
are no direct indications as to who is thinking or perceiving, the relationship between the 
words on the page and the thoughts or perceptions they represent is left latent: "the words 
on the page are not identified as words running through [the character's] mind" (Cohn 1978: 
103). Represented consciousness can therefore not automatically be transposed into the first 
person, and may be incongruous as a transcript of conscious thought. Because of this the 
style has a unique mimetic capacity: consciousness can be "suspended on the threshold of 
5Cohn refers to represented consciousness as narrated monologue. 
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verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation" (ibidem). 
1.7 Subjective and objective sentences 
Let us recapitulate. We suggested in the previous two sections that the perspectival structure 
of a novel or short story (if it is viewed as a narrative process rather than as a product) is 
characterised by variability and transition, and that the narrator's strategy may shift even 
from one sentence or main clause to another. 
In some clauses, it was pointed out, the narrator may assume the role of an objective au- 
thority which establishes what constitutes the "reality" and the "history" of the fiction. To 
understand such sentences, perspectival inferences do not seem relevant-the question as to 
the perspective from which the state of affairs is described simply does not arise. The main 
clauses in the following example are "objective": 
(1-26) Robert went over and seated himself on the broad sill of one of the dormer 
windows. He took a book from his pocket and began energetically to read 
it. (Chopin, The Awakening: 38) 
Other sentences in narrative, in contrast, were said be said to be subjective in the sense that 
the reader can only interpret their content with reference to the perspective of a subject-of- 
consciouness. This subject-of-consciousness may be the narrator, as in (1-27) 
(1-27) Under certain circumstances there are few hours in life more agreeable 
than the hour dedicated to the ceremony known as afternoon tea. There 
are circumstances in which, whether you partake of the tea or not-some 
people never do-the situation is in itself delightful. Those that I have in 
mind in beginning to unfold this simple story offered an admirable setting 
to an innocent pastime. (James, The Portrait of a Lady: 5) 
or a character in the narrative, as in (1-28) 
(1-28) Her life had been so carefully guarded, so inwardly conventional in a world 
where all the outer conventions were tottering, that no one had ever known 
she had a lover. No one-of that she was absolutely sure. All the circum- 
stances of the case had made it necessary that she should conceal her real 
life-her only real life-from everyone about her; from her half-invalid 
irascible husband, his prying envious sisters, and the terrible monumental 
old chieftainess, her mother-in-law, before whom all the family quailed 
and humbugged and fibbed and fawned. (Wharton, Atrophy: 28) 
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Which types of linguistic information does the reader rely on to determine the perspectival 
status of sentences in narrative? We already identified some of this information in section 1.4: 
sentences which contain subject-oriented elements will be interpreted as subjective. But upon 
closer inspection this stipulation is not sufficient: as was already pointed out, many of the 
sentences in sections 1.5 and 1.6 do not contain any subject-oriented elements, but they are 
nevertheless interpreted as subjective. It appears, in other words, that they have something in 
common which leads the reader to interpret them as governed by the same perspective. The 
central goal of this dissertation lies in making explicit what it is that "glues" sentences such 
as those in examples (1-4)-(1-20) together, so that the reader interprets them as governed by 
the same perspective. 
1.8 Perspective and temporal ordering 
We take as the starting point for our discussion the observation that the majority of subjective 
sentences exhibit a particular discourse-level property: they do not introduce a temporal 
update on the imaginary time line which the reader constructs when processing the narrative. 
A sentence in a narrative introduces a temporal update if it creates the impression of temporal 
progression within the time sphere of the narrative. 
Consider the following examples: 
(1-29) Will parks his silver BMW in the parking space, takes the key out of the 
ignition, puts it carefully into his pocket. (Atwood, Spring Song of the 
Frogs: 172) 
(1-30) He went over to the washstand and dipped his fingers in water. (Mansfield, 
The Man Without a Temperament: 19) 
(1-31) Julian rose, crossed the aisle, and sat down in the place of the woman with 
the canvas sandals. (O'Connor, Everything That Ri8e8 Must Converge: 13) 
When processing sequences such as these, the reader infers that the order of the clauses on 
the page mimics the order in which the described states of affairs occur in the imaginary 
reality of the narrative. Identifying a specific angle from which the described situations are 
viewed or assessed, on the other hand, appears to be less relevant. Indeed, all of the clauses 
in the above passages seem to portray situations "objectively" in the sense that the "reality" 
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of the fiction is not made subject to the potentially unreliable perception or judgment of a 
particular individual. Identifying who is seeing or experiencing the states of affairs does not 
constitute a central concern. 
Note, incidentally, that this observation also applies to direct and indirect speech or thought. 
Such sentences, too, convey narrative movement, while identifying who assesses the situation 
described (i.e. the fact that something is said, thought or perceived, not the content of what 
is being said, thought or perceived) does not seem to constitute an essential part of their 
interpretation. As in the examples quoted above, the speech acts or the acts of perception 
described in the following clauses just "happen": 
(1-32) "Edna!" called Mr. Pontellier from within, after a few moments had gone 
by. 
"Don't wait for me," she answered. (Chopin, The Awakening: 52) 
(1-33) She heard a hesitating step in the hall [...] and saw Miss Aldis pause near 
the half-open door. (Wharton,Atrophy: 33) 
Compare this to the following sentences, all of which can be called subjective: 
(1-34) The thing is, most of the time when you're coming pretty close to doing it 
with a girl-a girl that isn't a prostitute or anything, I mean-she keeps 
telling you to stop. The trouble with me is, I stop. Most guys don't. I 
can't help it. [...] Anyway, I keep stopping. The trouble is, I get to feeling 
sorry for them. I mean most girls are so dumb and all. [...] You take a 
girl when she really gets passionate, she just hasn't any brains. I don't 
know. They tell me to stop, so I stop. I always wish I hadn't, after I take 
her home, but I keep doing it anyway.(Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye: 
92) 
(1-35) It was going to rain. It didn't matter, he was prepared for it. You didn't 
expect anything else in November. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Tem- 
perament: 14) 
(1-36) She was not ignoring him, she was looking through him at the trees across 
the road. She was not looking at all, she was listening. (McEwan, The 
child in time: 59) 
(1-37) Everything was vast and open, the sky, the wind blowing along through 
the swaying, trembling greens, the flowers shaking in vehement denial. 
Movement... (Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 21) 
While all of the clauses or sentences in these passages lend subjectivity to the states of 
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affairs they describe, none of them create the impression of forward movement in time at 
the level of the main line narrative the way the sentences in examples (1-29)-(1-33) do. The 
flow of situations which follow each other in time is (temporarily) suspended in favour of a 
description of the contemplating reflection or awareness of a subject. If there is a hint of 
temporal movement, this is due to the fact that such contemplation is inevitably expressed 
in language, and therefore subject to its linear dimensions: 
Language [...] analyses representation according to a necessarily successive order: 
the sounds, in fact, can be articulated only one by one; language cannot represent 
thought, instantly, in its totality; it is bound to arrae it, part by part, in a linear 
order. Now, such an order is foreign to representation [...] all the elements of 
a representation are given in an instant [...] they succeed one another with a 
rapidity so great that it is not practically possible to observe or to retain their 
order [...] though thought is a simple operation, and its expression is a successive 
operation. (Foucault, The Order of Things: 256) 
It seems, therefore, that if states of affairs are not interpreted as occurring in the order in 
which the sentnces are presented on the page, the reader gets the impression that someone 
is looking, thinking, or judging, and will therefore construct a perspective on the states of 
affairs described. In the light of this observation, two major issues need to be addressed. 
The first relates to the temporal structure of narratives: is it possible to make explicit why 
certain sequences of tensed clauses or sentences create the impression of forward movement 
in time, while others don't? And second, if we can specify this difference, does the resulting 
account also enable us to explain the apparent perspectival difference between the two types 
of sequences? These are the issues which constitute the prime object of investigation of this 
dissertation. In addressing them, we will implicitly rely on a number of ideas put forward 
by the French linguist Benveniste and other scholars working in the same tradition. In the 
following section, we will briefly discuss these ideas. 
6In this sense utterances in spoken discourse, too, remain vaguely suggestive of the fact that time inevitably 
moves forward as someone speaks, perceives or thinks. However, this clearly does not constitute `narrative 
movement'. 
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1.9 Discourse vs narration 
1.9.1 The discourse-narration distinction at the level of genre 
In his influential article Lea Relations des Temps dans le Verbe Frangais, Benveniste advances 
a thesis concerning the functioning of the French verbal system which is of particular interest 
to us because it unites both temporal and perspectival issues. Benveniste argues that the 
tenses of the French verb are not employed as members of a single system, but are distributed 
into two systems which are distinct and complementary. The distribution of the tenses, he 
claims, relates directly to the the type of language use, or the genre (in the broadest sense of 
the term) in which a verb form occurs. 
Histoire, the narration of events, corresponds to written narrative (both historical and fic- 
tional), and is characterised by the exclusion of the present tense and the use of the passi 
simple (or, in Benveniste's terminology, the "aorist"): 
On peut mettre en fait que quiconque sait ecrire et entreprend le refit d'evenements 
passes emploie spontanement l'aorist comme temps fondamental, qu'il evoque ces 
evenements en historien ou qu'il les cree en romancier. (Benveniste 1966: 241) [It 
can be stated as fact that anyone who knows how to write and who undertakes the 
narration of past events spontaneously employs the aorist as fundamental tense, 
whether he evokes the events as an historian or creates them as a novelist.] 
In other words, Benveniste points to a correlation between narrative as a genre on the one 
hand, and a certain concept of time or a way of representing time on the other: the fact that a 
narrative presents the reader with a story, or a possible history, which can be set out on a time 
line as a series of temporally related situations, is identified as emblematic or quintessential to 
its genre. This-fairly uncontroversial-correlation is further linked to a linguistic property: 
any writer who wants to narrate, i.e. present events in a time sequence, Benveniste argues, 
will intuitively select the passe simple. 
In addition to this, Benveniste associates histoire (standardly translated in English as nar- 
ration or story) with a particular point of view. Histoire, or the narration of past events, he 
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says, is objective: it is characterised by the absence of any reference to the text's narrator: 
A vrai dire, it n'y a mime plus alors de narrateur. Les eve nements sont poses 
comme ils se sont produits a mesure qu'ils apparaissent a l'horizon de l'histoire. 
Personne ne parle ici; les evenements semblent se raconter eux-mimes. (Benveniste 
1966: 241) [In fact, there is no longer even a narrator. The events are set out 
chronologically, as they occurred. No one speaks here, the events seem to narrate 
themselves.] 
Everything takes place as if, in the historical narrative, the writing subject were 
saying-[...] "What I am saying, I am not the one saying it, it is writing itself." 
(Mann 1982: 103-104) 
The objective emphasis of narration or story is, according to Benveniste, further highlighted 
by the fact that in addition to the present tense it also excludes the first and the second person 
pronoun, and shifters such as "now", "there" and "yesterday". Instead it selects the third 
person pronoun which is "impersonal" in that it is not opposed to a first or second person 
pronoun within the direct context of address, and therefore contributes to the exclusion of 
the speaker from the statement, which is typical of histoire: 
[...] le narrateur n'intervenant pas, la 3e personne ne s'oppose a aucune autre, 
elle est au vrai une absence de personne. (Benveniste 1966: 242) [the story teller 
doesn't intervene, the 3 i person is not opposed to any other person, there's really 
an absence of person] 
Benveniste thus defines a particular type of language use, namely narrative (either fictional 
or historical) as the presentation of situations as facts arising at a certain moment in time 
without any intervention of the speaker: the events seem to tell themselves without recourse 
to the producing act behind the narrative. He associates the narrative genre with a particular 
concept of time (a linear one), a particular narrative stance (an objective one : the narra- 
tor "disappears"), the exclusion of the present tense, first and second person pronouns and 
shifters, and the selection of the pass simple as main tense. 
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Hi8toire is contrasted with another type of language use which Benveniste refers to as discours, 
or 
toute enonciation supposant un locuteur et un auditeur, et chez le premier l'intention 
d'influencer l'autre en quelque maniere (Benveniste 1966: 242) [all enunciation pre- 
supposing a speaker and a listener, and with the former the intention of influencing 
the latter somehow] 
or 
tour les genres ou quelqu'un s'addresse a quelqu'un, s'enonce comme locuteur [...] 
(Benveniste 1966: 242) [all genres where someone is addressing someone else, puts 
himself forward as speaker] 
In di8cour8, or spoken discourse, both speaker and addressee and the "here and now" of 
the context of address constitute the central parameters of each utterance. Unlike story or 
narration, diacoura is not defined by exclusion: the only form which it does not allow is the 
pa88e simple. However, diacoura typically exhibits those linguistic markers which are excluded 
by narration, namely the first and the second person, the present tense, and shifters. The 
third person and the imparfait are said to be common to both narration and spoken discourse. 
As in the case of histoire, diacoura is associated with a particular narrative stance, namely a 
subjective one. The speaker is not excluded from the statement, as in narration; instead, her 
position within the communicative context of the act of speaking form the focus of the most 
important significations of the discourse. 
Benveniste's views deserve our attention because they define the function of certain linguistic 
elements in terms of both the perspectival characteristics and the temporal characteristics 
of the genre they are associated with. This clearly ties in with the central concerns of this 
dissertation as we have formulated them above. 
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1.9.2 The discourse-narration distinction in narrative fiction 
If we try to apply Benveniste's ideas to narrative fiction, however, a problem arises, because 
Benveniste contrasts two genres, or types of language use, and seems to imply that they are 
mutually exclusive. As a result of this, the concept of di8cour8 at first blush seems to be 
irrelevant for short stories and novels. This, however, is not the case. 
Like any other type of language use, a narrative text constitutes a speech act by an agent. 
In most other genres, and particularly in spoken conversation, this agent can be identified as 
the speaker, whose subjective intentions generally coincide with the meaning of the discourse. 
Narrative texts, however, are governed by a different pragmatic phenomenon: the dissociation 
between, on the one hand, their author (or "real life" agent), and, on the other, a textual 
agent or narrator. As a result of this, the notion of discour8 can be applied to narratives at 
three different levels. 
i. Discourse of the narrative. 
First of all, a narrative can be viewed as diacoura7 in the sense that it constitutes a commu- 
nicative transaction between the text's (historical) author and her (historical) audience, the 
communicative context of which is provided by real world co-ordinates. Studies of literary 
discourse in this sense take into account the total effect of a narrative text as a superstruc- 
tural synthesis of different types of information (aesthetic, moral, philosophical, ideological...) 
encoded by the text. At this level, the pragmatics of the discourse of a narrative cannot be 
isolated from biographical, socio-cultural, political and other facets of the historical context 
in which it is embedded. Issues concerning the relationship between the (historical) author 
and her audience, the intention with which the text is produced, and the characteristics of 
the cultural context in which the text is embedded, all play a pivotal role in the formation of 
meaning at this level. 
1i. Discourse in the narrative: directly presented perspective 
7The English equivalent of the term diecoura is typically also used in a more general sense, namely to refer 
to any (spoken or written) use of (natural) language. Narrative discourse, if interpreted in the more general 
sense of the word, thus refers to narrative as a particular type of language use, with no more specific meaning 
of the word discourse being implied. In the present context, however, we are clearly giving a more narrow 
definition to the term. 
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Throughout the actual reading process, however, a narrative text presents itself as divorced 
from its actual agent: because of its medium (the text) and the characteristics of its genre 
(narrative and imaginary), the author is totally extraneous to the text.8 As a result, a fictional 
narrative constitutes a discourse by an individual who has no existence except within the text, 
so that 
[...] the only enunciation to which the signs of discourse in a novel refer us is 
that which we were led to call pseudo-enunciation, while the signs of the real 
enunciation are totally absent [...] Thus we have a pseudo-discourse with real 
signs and real discourse with no signs. (Ginsburg 1982: 144) 
The reader, receiving a message divorced from its originator, makes an extremely 
complex set of inferences about the narrator on the basis of the message itself. 
(Lanser 1981: 81) 
Because of the distinction between the author level and the narrator level in narrative fiction, 
it is possible for a novel to have different narrators. Clearly a change of narrator will dramat- 
ically affect the perspectival structure of a narrative. In the rest of this dissertation we will 
use the term text to refer to a narrative (which may be a novel or short story, but also part 
of novel or, more rarely, part of a short story) which can be inferred to be told by the same 
narrator. 
Due to the pragmatic dissociation between the actual context in which the real life author 
participates on the one hand, and the context set up by the text on the other, a fictional 
utterance has to be decontextualised with respect to the actual, historical world, but is at 
the same time recontextualised in an (imaginary) alternative world. As was already pointed 
out, one aspect of this recontextualisation concerns the fact that a narrative will, to varying 
extents, contain features which cannot be interpreted except with respect to a fictional enun- 
ciator, or narrator. In narrative fiction, in other words, signs of discourse do refer us back to 
an enunciating subject, but because their communicative context only exists within the text, 
"To be more precise, the author as an extratextual entity is obviously to some extent textually encoded-her 
presence accounts, for example, for organising and titling the text; it is therefore probably more accurate to 
define the author as an historically authoritative voice akin to but not identical with the historical person 
who wrote the text" (Lancer 1981: 152). 
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they becomes intransitive and self-referential. Another aspect of a narrative's recontextuali- 
sation in an alternative world concerns the fact that the narrative sets up its own referential 
context, within which certain states of affairs are presented as "true" independently of the 
evaluating and potentially distorting refraction of a subjective point of view. In such cases the 
narrator "disappears" in the sense that her function is reduced to a purely logico-locutionary 
one, that can be equated with the mechanics of relating the story. 
As a result, the distinction between histoire and discoura can be applied to narrative fiction if it 
is formulated in terms of different ways of describing the (fictional) world. A narrative presents 
itself as histoire in those places where it establishes the "history" of the fiction, describing 
situations as temporally ordered events conveying the passage of time as unobserved. Along 
the same lines, a narrative offers itself as discoura if it takes the form of an enunciative act, 
describing situations which are not associated with the linear structure of progression and 
development in time, but which reflect the temporal awareness of the narrator as subject. 
Discourse of the narrator in the narrative can, in the light of our discussion in this section, be 
equated with sentences which directly present perspective. The histoire/discoura distinction 
can thus be reformulated in terms of different modes of description rather than as mutually 
exclusive genres. Similar distinctions are made by Bull (1963), Weinrich (1964), Hamburger 
(1973) and Lyons (1978). 
. Represented perspective. 
Our discussion in the previous section shows that Benveniste's distinction between histoire 
and di8cour8 can be applied to narrative fiction if both categories are viewed as ways in which 
the fictional world is described by the narrator, or as (the linguistic manifestation of) two 
different roles or guises which can be adopted by the narrator. 
One way in which the narrator manifests herself as subject is through the use of linguistic 
elements which Benveniste calls "shifters"-i.e. spatial or temporal deixis. As we saw ear- 
lier, however, such elements may also be interpreted with respect to the (temporal/spatial) 
position of a subject in the text different from the narrator. We also pointed out that the 
same observation applies to other subject-oriented elements, such as attitudinal semantic 
markers, intensifiers, emphasisers, etc., in that the subject-of-consciousness they require for 
their interpretation may also be identified by the reader as a subject in the text different 
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from the narrator. On the basis of this we distinguished between directly presented perspec- 
tive and represented perspective, both of which are interpreted with respect to a subject- 
of-consciousnes. In the case or directly presented perspective, or narrator's discourse, this 
subject-of-consciousness is the narrator, so that perpective coincides with voice. In the case of 
represented perspective voice and point of view are separated. Because of this the narrator's 
function becomes purely logico-locutionary; yet at the same time a subjective perspective is 
introduced. Because the subject-of- consciousness can no longer be identified as the narrator, 
however, the perspective is introduced indirectly (hence re-presented) and is therefore more 
opaque. 
This can be represented schematically as follows: 
Narration Represented perspective Discourse 
Narrator's 
function 
logico-locutionary logico-locutionary subjective 
Perspective objective subjective subjective 
Subject-of- 
consciousness 
none character narrator 
1.9.3 Problems 
Person and tense. 
Histoire is, according to Benveniste, "objective" for two reasons: it does not contain any 
speaker-oriented or subject-oriented elements, and it presents situations as events in a time 
sequence, through the selection of the passi simple. 
In histoire, in other words, two essentially similar types of perspectival information (both 
of which signal to the reader the absence or veiling of a subjective perspective, and which 
therefore complement or mutually reinforce each other) are conveyed by different linguistic 
elements. 
Clauses which trigger the impression of forward movement, however, obviously do not exclude 
the use of the first person pronoun: 
24 
(1-38) He put his head round the door just after six, and nodded, and I picked 
up my bag and went out to join him. (Brookner, Look At Me: 125) 
Moreover, first person narration also occurs in the present tense: 
(1-39) I cook the hamburgers and we eat and I wash the dishes in the chipped 
dishpan, Anna drying; then it's almost dark. I lift the bedding out from 
the wall and make up our bed. (Atwood, Surfacing: 38) 
To account for this, different combinations of tense and person in narrative, and their effect, 
need to be looked at in more detail. 
Tense and aspect. 
Implicit to the histoire/discours distinction, and, indeed, to the general argument presented 
in this dissertation so far, is the idea that sentences which do not present situations as events 
in a time sequence-sentences in other words, which do not trigger the impression of forward 
movement in time-introduce a perspective into a narrative, while sentences which do move 
narrative time forward do not. If this observation is explored in the context of a process-based 
approach to narrative understanding, it has to be determined how the reader make;decisions 
concerning the temporal relationship between successive sentences. 
Benveniste's claim is that, to convey the impression of forward movement in time, a writer 
will spontaneously select the passd simple. 
Although there are some essential differences between the tense system in French on 4- English, 
written narratives in English, too, will most standardly encode the English equivalent of the 
passd simple, namely the simple past. But although the simple past may be felt to constitute 
the tense par excellence of narrative fiction, it is, as earlier examples have shown, also possible 
to convey temporal movement through sequences of sentences in the present tense. 
When Benveniste refers to the passd simple as a "tense", he is, strictly speaking, conflating 
two categories, viz. tense and aspect. Given that sentences in the present tense may propel 
time, it is obviously not tense in the stricter sense of the term (i.e. as "grammaticalised 
expression of location in time" (Comrie 1985: 9)) which determines the temporal relationship 
between consecutive main clauses in narrative. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact 
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that present tense narration is felt to be more "unusual" than past tense narration. 
To account for these observations, we need to study not only the effect of aspect on the 
temporal ordering of consecutive main clauses in narrative, but also the way aspect interact 
with tense. 
1.10 Aims of the dissertation 
The central goal of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between temporal ordering 
and perspective in narrative fiction. 
First of all, we will turn our attention to what we call "narrative movement"-i.e. the fact 
that readers tend to perceive a moving time stream in certain passages of narratives but not 
in others. I will try to specify when (temporally unmodified) main clauses in narrative move 
time forward, and when they do not. 
Although the phenomenon of narrative movement is central to a number of prominent literary 
critical accounts, these accounts tend to assume the existence of such a timestream and explore 
the author's options for manipulating it (cf. Iser 1974; Sternberg 1978; Genette 1980), without 
identifying what structures-linguistic or extralinguistic-create the impression of temporal 
progression in the first place. Most related work in the field of linguistics, on the other hand, 
focuses on the temporal properties of syntactic constructions (Verkuyl 1972; Heinamalci 1974; 
Dowty 1972, 1979; Taylor 1977), without considering the effect of such constructions within 
a text. 
Issues relating to the temporal structure of narratives, however, have recently attracted the 
attention of some formal semanticists. In their accounts, which will receive extensive dis- 
cussion in Chapter 2, the difference between clauses that create the impression of temporal 
progression and those that do not is related to their aspectual type: the former are typically 
events, the latter processes and states. I will examine the explanatory power of these accounts 
and their relevance for the questions we are concerned with. 
In Chapter 3, I will explore how the reader decides which aspectual type a sentence in a 
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narrative belongs to. In the referential accounts discussed in Chapter 2, it is suggested that 
aspectual conclusions can be derived as a function between various types of intrasentential 
information-which includes the inherent aspect or Aktionsart of the clause's main verb, 
aspectual auxiliaries, temporal and aspectual adverbials, and complements. It will be shown 
how, in addition to this, contextual factors and pragmatic inferences also play a role. I will 
propose an aspectual analysis which integrates all these elements into a unified approach. 
On the basis of this, the relationship between temporal ordering and perspective will be 
explored. Two issues will be central to this discussion. First, is a sentence which creates the 
impression of forward movement in time always subjective? And second, is a sentence which 
does not move narrative time forward always objective? I will demonstrate that in both cases 
the issue is more complex than our analysis in this chapter suggests. 
I will advance the idea that some sentences introduce a perspectival focus into a narrative, and 
are, as a result, perspectivally situated. A perspectival focus is an imaginary position from 
which a state of affairs is viewed or assessed. It may be occupied by an anonymous observer 
(in which case the sentence is petpectivally situated, but not subjective), or by a subject in 
the narrative (in which case the sentence is both perspectivally situated and subjective). The 
subject which occupies a perspectival focus may be either the narrator, or a character in the 
narrative. 
Sentences which do not move narrative time forward, however, are not by definition per- 
spectivally situated: I will show that sentences which are classified as processes do not move 
narrative time forward but nevertheless do not introduce a perspectival focus. Moreover, 
sentences which do move narrative time forward may still be perspectivally situated: sen- 
tences which belong to an aspectual category referred to as contingent states will be shown to 
introduce a perspectival focus, despite the fact that they do not move narrative time forward. 
To introduce a perspectival focus, I will argue, a sentence has to exhibit the aspectual char- 
acteristics of a state: states always introduce an imaginary viewpoint into a narrative, which 
may be occupied by different individuals. This is the central claim put forward in this dis- 
sertation. In order to specify why states always introduce a perspectival focus, I will propose 
an aspectual analysis which crucially relies on two notions: that of a referential centre, and 
that of an associated meaning structure. All this will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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In Chapter 4 I will explore how the reader identifies a sentence or tensed clause in a narrative 
as a state. A distinction will be made between basic state propositions, which derive their 
aspectual profile from the lexical-semantic properties of their main verb, and expanded state 
propositions, which derive their aspectual profile from the fact that the aspectual class of their 
main verb has been changed under the influence of an intrasentential operator or context. A 
further distinction will be made between three types of expanded state propositions, namely 
progressive states, perfect states and structural states. We will provide an aspectual analysis 
of each of these types, and show how, despite their individual differences, different types of 
states all introduce a perspectival focus. 
In Chapter 5 I will provide further evidence for the claim that states are perspectivally 
situated, by analysing the aspectual type of present tense sentences in spoken discourse in 
contexts where tense has actual time reference. I will show that in the majority of cases such 
sentences exhibit the aspectual type of a state, and their perspectival focus is occupied by 
the locutionary agent. 
In Chapter 6, finally, I will discuss other factors which affect the perspectival status of a 
sentences in narrative. These include the narrator's stance with respect to the fictional 
world; tense; and subject-oriented features. I will also provide a brief description of linguistic 
and pragmatic elements which typically play a role in a reader's attempts to identify the 
individual who occupies a perspectival focus introduced by a state. 
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Chapter 2 
Aspect and the Temporal 
Structure of Narrative 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we drew attention to the fact that there appears to be a connection 
between the temporal structure of sentences in narrative fiction and their perspectival struc- 
ture: sentences which introduce a subjective perspective into the narrative typically convey 
the impression of narrative progression, while sentences which do not portray states of af- 
fairs from a particular perspective seem to update the narrative. To investigate why this is 
the case, we need to be able to specify what determines the relationship between successive 
sentences in narrative. We will first turn to an examination of the main tenets of two formal 
semantics theories which address exactly this issue. 
2.2 Partee's parallel between nominal and temporal anaphora 
2.2.1 Discourse Representation Theory 
In Nominal and Temporal Anaphora (1984), Barbara Partee explores and refines the thesis 
which was first systematically outlined in Partee (1973), that tense and related temporal 
categories should be looked upon as expressions the interpretation of which both influences 
and is influenced by the context in which they occur-a a view that can also be found in the 
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early computational semantics work of Isard (1975), and which has come to the fore more 
recently in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981a). It is Discourse Representation 
Theory which constitutes the formal framework on which Partee's account relies. 
The idea which lies at the basis of Discourse Representation Theory is that certain phenom- 
ena in discourse) can only be properly analysed within a model-theoretic semantics by using 
a model of the discourse instead of merely giving semantic analyses of sentences. Discourse 
Representation Theory makes use of an intermediate level of representation, "discourse rep- 
resentation structures", which mediates between syntax and model-theoretic semantics. This 
means that an analysis of a sequence of clauses comprising a discourse proceeds in two steps: 
after a syntactic analysis of language input, discourse representation rules are applied which 
map the sequence onto a discourse representation structure, which is subsequently given a 
truth-conditional interpretation. 
One task of the discourse representation construction is the specification of the temporal 
relationship between adjacent clauses. It is assumed, in other words, that all factors which 
affect the ordering of successive clauses can to be encoded into their syntax. 
2.2.2 Tense as anaphor 
Central to Partee's discussion is the notion that tense is an anaphoric device. The proposal 
of Partee (1973) to treat tense morphemes as analogous to pronouns is slightly modified 
in Partee (1984), which concedes that temporal anaphora is more complex than nominal 
anaphora. Nevertheless, Partee argues, the behaviour of past tense clauses can be likened 
to that of pronominal anaphora in that their interpretation is dependent on an antecedent 
which can be recovered from context. This antecedent may have been explicitly introduced 
in the previous discourse, for example, by a temporal adverb or an adverbial clause. If an 
antecedent has been established in this manner, past tense will invariably be interpreted with 
respect to it. In the following examples, I have used underlining to indicate the anaphoric 
linkage between tense and adverbial: 
'Discourse is used here in the general sense of the term. I will use it in this sense unless I explicitly indicate 
otherwise. 
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(2-1) a At 11 o'clock, Cindy decided to take a break. 
b When Cindy got tired, she decided to take a break. 
This behaviour of tense resembles that of the paradigm case of pronominal coreference, in 
which an anaphoric noun phrase refers to the same individual as a definite antecedent: 
(2-2) Marc plays the piano. He's pretty good at it. 
Partee also points to a number of other parallels between the behaviour of tense and that of 
pronouns. Just as pronouns can be used without linguistic antecedents when their referent is 
understood to be salient to the hearer, a past tense may be used to refer to an understood 
particular time that was not explicitly introduced by previous linguistic context: 
(2-3) a I didn't turn off the stove. (e.g. uttered while driving down the mo- 
torway) 
b She left me! (e.g. said by a man crying in the street) 
It can be observed that the temporal anaphors considered so far are taken to have definite 
reference; however, tensed clauses may, like pronouns, rely for their interpretation on an 
indefinite antecedent. Compare, for example: 
(2-4) a Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it. 
b Mary woke up sometime during the night. She turned on the light. 
Partee also compares the use of pronouns as bound variables to that of temporal bound 
variables, as in 
(2-5) a Every woman believes that she is happy. 
b Whenever Mary telephoned, Sam was asleep. 
And finally, she cites some temporal analogues of "donkey-sentences" (Geach 1962): 
(2-6) a Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
b Whenever Mary telephoned on Friday, Sam was asleep. 
Partee (1984) proposes that the meaning of tenses should be represented in the same way as 
that of pronouns into a DRT-based account. Central to this account is a version of Reichen- 
bach's (1947) referential theory of tense, in which the notion of reference time plays a crucial 
role. Indeed, as has been pointed out by Bauerle (1979) and Hinrichs (1986), it is not tense 
per se that is interpreted anaphorically, but the reference time of tense. 
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Reichenbach (1947) proposed to analyse semantic distinctions in the area of temporal reference 
in terms of three temporal entities. Of these, the speech time S and the event time E are 
self-explanatory. A third time, the reference time R, corresponds to the notion of "the time 
that is being talked about", or 
the temporal standpoint from which the speaker invites his audience to consider 
the occurrence of the event (Taylor 1977: 203) 
As we have seen, on Partee's approach the antecedent for past tense clauses may be provided 
by either linguistic or non-linguistic context. As a result, the past time operator is no longer 
defined as amounting to "at some time in the past" as in standard Priorean tense logic; rather 
it refers anaphorically to a particular (contextually or cotextually determined) reference time. 
Similarly, the reference time for a present tense clause is analysed as being provided by a non- 
linguistic antecedent (the speech time), illustrated in 
(2-7) That is outrageous! 
or by linguistic context, as in the historical present: 
(2-8) At that moment, the bomb explodes. 
In a DRT-based approach a tensed clause is always to be interpreted with respect to a reference 
time, which is provided by non-linguistic context or, as is usually the case where written nar- 
ratives are concerned, by linguistic context. Temporal adverbs are automatically interpreted 
as providing a descriptive characterization of the reference time which respect to which a 
tensed clause is to be interpreted. They may either identify this reference time completely 
(as in at 2 o'clock on June 12), or simply put bounds on it, as in the case of "frame adverbials" 
like yesterday or in June. 
Partee also follows Kamp (1981b, Kamp & Rohrer 1983), in claiming that the significance of 
tense in texts, and specifically in narrative discourse, lies primarily in the temporal relation 
it establishes between the sentence in which it occurs and its preceding discourse. If the 
reference time of a tensed clause in narrative is not specified by means of an adverbial, tense 
will still be interpreted as context-dependent: its main function consists in signalling to the 
reader how the information in the new sentence is to be incorporated into the representation 
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already constructed from the preceding text. In the next section we will see how this idea 
can be integrated into a DRT framework. 
2.2.3 Events, processes and states 
More "traditional" tense semantics has concerned itself primarily with the truth conditions 
of isolated sentences, rather than with the interpretation of a discourse consisting of several 
clauses or sentences. Consider (2-9): 
(2-9) Nigel packed his bags, said goodbye and left. 
A standard Priorean analysis would state that (2-9) is true if there are times in the past- 
say t1, t2, and t3-such that Nigel packed his bags at t1, said goodbye at t2, and left at ts. 
However, the temporal relation between these three times could be quite arbitrary; perhaps 
each a year apart, or indeed with is preceding t2 preceding t1. But this obviously does not 
suffice as an account of the temporal relations in this particular stretch of discourse, which 
clearly conveys a definite temporal order between the events described in the consecutive 
sentences. These intersentential relations should be incorporated into whatever it is that 
determines the truth-conditions of a piece of discourse as a whole. 
Partee aims to solve this problem by making explicit how the sentences in a discourse are 
integrated into a time-related representation of the state of affairs talked about in the dis- 
course, viewed as a continually updated context. To do so, she relies on a number of discourse 
representation rules which, as was mentioned above, take certain types of syntactic informa- 
tion as their input. The discourse rules for the temporal ordering of discourse are formulated 
as dependent on the a8pectual type of each new sentence in the discourse. Following Hin- 
richs (1986; also Bach 1981; 1986) Partee classifies the aspectual types of sentences as events, 
processes or states; these are taken as primitives. These types are defined as emerging from 
the interaction between atomics-i.e. whole tenseless clauses which, following Vendler, are 
classified according to their aspectual class -and a number of sentence operators, such as 
progressive, past and perfect (cf. Hinrichs 1981). The resulting aspectual type of the sentence 
serves as input for the discourse representation construction, and will consequently contribute 
to determining the relationship between a new sentence and its surrounding discourse. 
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Partee's central thesis is that only sentences which exhibit an event type can convey the 
impression of temporal progression; state and process types, on the other hand, do not move 
narrative time forward. In terms of the framework of this thesis, this would mean that events 
are perspectivally situated, while states and processes are perspectivally non-situated. We 
will return to this claim in Chapter 3. 
Events differ from states in terms of the DRS construction rules they trigger. The first differ- 
ence concerns the relationship between the state of affairs described and its reference time: 
while events (for which we use the variable e) are defined as included in the current refer- 
ence time (r)-that is, they lead to the introduction of a DRT condition of the form e C r, 
states (s) are characterised by the fact that they include the reference time at which they are 
evaluated-represented by the condition r C s. 
Second, a distinction is made in terms of whether or not a new reference time is introduced 
after processing the sentence: sentences exhibiting an event type are said to set up a new 
reference time which may act as antecedent for the anaphoric interpretation of a subsequent 
event description, while process and state descriptions do not. As a result of this, events in 
simple past narratives move the action forward in time, while processes and states locate a new 
state of affairs at the reference time of the last-mentioned event. The impression of temporal 
movement triggered by some sequences of sentences in narrative discourse is thus explained 
in terms of a principle of automatic updating of reference times after events, together with 
the stipulation that events are temporally included within a current reference time. 
The following example illustrates this temporal movement: 
(2-10) Edward got up and brushed his teeth. 
In (2-10), the event Edward got up is interpreted as included in the current reference time ro 
(probably provided by previous discourse) and sets up a new updated reference time ri. The 
next event-description Edward brushed his teeth is interpreted as included in rl. Anchoring 
these findings to a time axis as illustrated in (2-10') accounts for the forward movement of 





Edward got up and brushed his teeth 
States (and processes), on the other hand, include the current reference time, and do not 
introduce a new reference time for subsequent reference. This explains why the third clause 
in (2-11) 
(2-11) Edward got up and brushed his teeth. He was feeling depressed. He wasn't 
ready to face the day. 
can be interpreted as overlapping with the previous event (since it includes the current ref- 
erence time), and why the fourth clause can be specified as simultaneous with the third (no 
new reference time has been introduced, and the state includes the current reference time). 
Following Hinrichs (1981), Partee also notes that while states and processes are required to 
include the current reference time, they need not overlap with the event that led to the in- 
troduction of that reference time. This stipulation makes it possible to account for examples 
such as (2-12), in which the fourth clause, which exhibits a state type, does not overlap with 
the event description which precedes it: 
(2-12) Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully, and switched off the 
light. It was pitch dark around him, because the Venetian blinds were 
closed. (Hinrichs 1981: 66) 
2.2.4 The notion of "just after" 
Partee further refines her formal treatment of the temporal relationship between consecutive 
event descriptions by introducing the notion of "just after": in the absence of temporal 
adverbials, the reference time made available by an event sentence for subsequent reference is 
to be located "just after" or "immediately after" it. This notion is vague, but deliberately so. 
As Kamp (1981b) puts it, two events can be said to "immediately follow" one another when 
no event relevant to the overall pragmatic purpose of the discourse occurs between them. 
Thus, the proximity of the reference time of a new event description to that of a preceding 
one is determined by the general nature of the events described-their duration, the degree 
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of detail they convey, etc. 
Let us slightly simplify (2-12) to highlight the relevant parts: 
(2-13) Jameson switched off the light. It was pitch dark around him. 
The relationship between the two clauses is captured by the following diagram, where e is the 
event of switching off the light, a is the state of being pitch dark, C represents the relation of 
temporal inclusion, and represents the "just after" relation: 
rl 
IU 
(2-13') e 4 r2 
rn 
a 
Thus, e occurs within the current reference time ri, and triggers the introduction of a new 
reference time r2 that follows "just after"; r2 in turn includes the state a. 
Finally, it may be noted that temporal adverbs are processed before the main clause and 
serve to update the current reference time. If a sentence contains such an adverb, therefore, 
it overrides prior context, and more specifically the stipulation that the reference time of the 
new main clause is to be interpreted as coming "just after" the last-mentioned event. 
2.2.5 Reference times 
Partee (1984) presents a number of reasons for replacing the idea of a direct anaphoric con- 
nection to event times (proposed in Partee (1973)) by a theory in which reference times are 
crucial. 
As already pointed out earlier, the principle of updating reference times after a simple past 
event description, and the stipulation that simple past events are temporally located within 
the current reference time, make it possible to account for the impression of forward movement 
in time triggered by sequences of clauses exhibiting an event type. 
But reference times also have an important function when it comes to specifying the rela- 
tionship between expressions which are supposed to indicate a temporal overlap with the last 
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mentioned event. Consider the following example, cited by Hinrichs (1981): 
(2-14) Jaime was building another boat. He sang happily as he worked, and the 
muscles of his brown arms rippled in the sun. 
As Hinrichs points out, none of the sentences in (2-14) constitute events, and consequently 
none of them move time forward. This should obviously be reflected in the discourse rep- 
resentation structure for this text. But if the DRT construction rules merely required that 
states introduce a state of affairs which temporally overlaps with the last mentioned event, 
without recourse to reference times, the resulting representation would look like this: 
(2-14') i build J 
sing 
ripple 
Yet the sequence in (2-14) clearly describes all the states of affairs as going on simultaneously, 
rather than as overlapping in pairs. This part of the meaning of (2-14) can only be captured 
by introducing some notion of reference time: it can be accounted for by a discourse repre- 
sentation rule which stipulates that states surround the current reference time and do not 
update the reference time after they are processed. In the case of (2-14), this would result in 
the following representation: 





The same rule also allows for a correct interpretation of the relation of non-overlap between 
the third (event) and the fourth (state) clause in example (2-13), repeated here: 
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(2-15) Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully, and switched off the 
light. It was pitch dark around him, because the Venetian blinds were 
closed. (Hinrichs 1981: 66) 
The stipulation that a state which follows an event surrounds the new reference time intro- 
duced by the event, but need not overlap with the event itself, allows for the inceptive reading 
that the fourth clause requires-something which would not be possible without invoking the 
notion of reference time. 
Finally, the difference between the two discourses in (2-16) cannot adequately be explained 
without recourse to the notion of a reference time: 
(2-16) a At that point, Harry arrived. Mary phoned the police. 
b At that point, Harry arrived. Mary was phoning the police. 
When looked at in isolation, it is hard to specify what exactly the differences in truth- 
conditions are between Mary phoned the police and Mary was phoning the police. Yet in the 
context of other sentences, the difference emerges very clearly, as (2-16) illustrates. Kamp's 
DR rules, which specify the relationship between the clauses contained in (2-16a) as one 
of precedence, and those in (2-16b) as one of overlap, appear to successfully capture what 
distinguishes the two stretches of discourse. 
2.2.6 Partee's treatment of sequenced main clauses 
Let us recapitulate. Applying the discourse interpretation rules outlined in this section to 
a discourse segment such as (2-17) would result in a discourse representation structure as 
in (2-17'), where C indicates temporal inclusion, and -< stands for the "just after" relation 
discussed before: 




el z4 r1 
(2-17') lu 
C2 
e1=Anna walked downstairs 
81 e2=Anna went outside 
'U 
r2 a1=It was snowing 
lU 
C3 -< r3 e3=Anna began to shiver 
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The structure in (2-17') is to be read in conjunction with further conditions which would 
appear in the complete discourse representation structure. It can be paraphrased as follows: 
el is the event described as Anna walked downstairs. Since this sentence contains a simple 
past, it is interpreted as having occurred at a contextually or co-textually specified time in 
the past, called ro. The simple past event el introduces a new reference time ri "just after" 
or "slightly later than" el. This reference time will be used for the interpretation of the next 
event, labelled e2. Since this event is also described in the simple past, it is identified as having 
occurred within the current reference time, and sets up a new reference time ry. The next 
eventuality, It was snowing, is a stative, since it is is described by means of a progressive, and 
does not move the narrative forward. It is represented as surrounding the current reference 
time r2, and does not introduce a reference time of its own. The event She shivered, which 
is also described in the simple past, is then interpreted with respect to ry, which is still the 
current reference time, and introduces a new reference time r3 for possible continuations of 
the narrative. 
2.2.7 Problems 
1. Aspect and syntax 
While the formal framework proposed by Partee provides an illuminating account of particu- 
lar temporal phenomena in discourse, it is not without problems. The first concerns one of its 
main tenets-viz. that a syntactic subcategorization of clauses according to their aspectual 
type serves as input for the discourse representation rules. A large variety of constituents 
play a role in determining which aspectual class a clause belongs to. These include lexical 
material (the aspectual class or Aktion8art of the main verb), progressive and perfect auxil- 
iaries, temporal and aspectual adverbials, and indefinite plural noun phrases and mass nouns 
in various sentence positions. 
If all these components and their interaction can be encoded into a syntactic description, 
this observation does not pose any problems for Partee's and Kamp's theory. This assump- 
tion, however, is questioned by Dowty (1986), who claims that it is the semantic properties 
of the relevant categories and constituents which are responsible for the ultimate aspectual 
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properties of the sentences in which they occur, so that it is only in the model-theoretic in- 
terpretation of a sentence that its aspectual class is fully apparent. Since this compositional 
model-theoretic interpretation is determined only after a discourse representation has been 
constructed, Dowty's observation does pose a dilemma for the theory, since it implies there 
would be a conflict between the use of DRSs as intermediate constructs between syntax and 
model-theoretic interpretation on the one hand, and the role of the model-theoretic interpre- 
tation in determining properties of the sentence on which DRS construction rules depend on 
the other. We will come back to this issue in the next section, where Dowty's approach will 
be discussed in more detail. 
ii. "Being associated with" 
As we saw earlier, Partee draws a parallel between the behaviour of tensed clauses and 
that of pronouns: both, she claims, rely for their interpretation on a contextually established 
entity. 
But Webber (1987) has recently pointed to some differences between the two linguistic cate- 
gories. As was observed earlier, the antecedent for past tense event clause 0 (unless modified 
by a temporal adverbial) is provided by a preceding event clause which sets up a new ref- 
erence time. In such cases, the tensed clause 0 refers to a temporal entity that is implied 
by, rather than explicitly mentioned in, a previous event description. In contrast with pro- 
nouns, which co-refer with their antecedents, events do not just co-refer the same time as the 
previous clause. Moreover, whereas personal pronouns refer back to a previously introduced 
entity without adding a new referential entity to the model of the discourse, events refer to a 
previously introduced temporal entity and create a new temporal entity that can be used for 
subsequent reference. 
Because of this, Webber argues that it is more accurate to draw a parallel between the 
anaphoric nature of tense and that of definite nominal descriptions. These, she claims, exhibit 
a capacity to create a new entity which can be used for subsequent reference. Thus in (2-18), 
for example, 
(2-18) We unloaded the picnic. The beer was warm. 
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the nominal expression the beer relies for its interpretation on a previously established entity 
which has been implicitly set up by the expression the picnic. In the case of a definite NP, this 
new discourse entity is characterised as `strongly associated" with the antecedent. In the case 
of tensed event clauses it is a new position (or "node") on the time line under construction, 
which provides a reference time for a later event description and which can be described as 
"strongly associated" with the first event, by which it is implied. 
Webber gives backbone to her analogy between tense and definite descriptions by showing 
that the various similarities in antecedent-anaphor linkages displayed by both tense and pro- 
nouns also apply to definite NPs. Like tense, she points out, definite NPs may either co-specify 
with their antecedent (as in the (a) examples below), or specify a new entity that is "strongly 
associated" with the antecedent (as in the (b) examples): 
Non-linguistic antecedents 
(2-19) The car won't start! (said by a man in the street) 
Indefinite antecedents 
(2-20) a I picked up a banana. Up close, I noticed the banana was too green 
to eat. 
b I picked up a banana. The skin was all brown. 
Bound variables 
(2-21) a Next to each car, the owner of the car was sleeping soundly. 
b In each car, the engine was idling quietly. 
Donkey sentences 
(2-22) a Everyone who wants .a car must fix the car himself. 
b Everyone who owns a -Ford tunes the engine himself. 
Webber concludes that the different kinds of antecedent-anaphor behaviour that Partee calls 
attention to in order to support her analogy between tense and pronouns can also be used 
as arguments for an analogy between tense and definite NPs. Moreover, the latter parallel 
also encapsulates a capacity that both tensed event clauses and definite NPs share (viz. the 
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capacity to introduce a new entity into the discourse that is strongly associated with the 
antecedent and is unique by virtue of this association); pronouns lack this capacity. 
This observation seems valid, but gives rise to further questions. First of all, it has to be 
specified what it means for an event to be "strongly associated" with another event: does this 
"strong association" merely denote a (pragmatically determined) "just after" relationship, or 
does the link that a reader typically perceives between successive events also embrace another 
connection between them which is not purely temporal? This question is especially relevant 
for us, because we want to determine why event clauses as a rule describe states of affairs as 
perspectivally non-situated. To establish why this is the case, we need to get a clear picture 
of the types of relationship which typically govern successive event clauses in narrative. 
Secondly, Webber's observation about states of affairs being "strongly associated" with each 
other applies only to event descriptions. It might be possible to extend it to other aspectual 
types, however, if the notion of "being associated with" could be specified in other than purely 
temporal terms. States and processes do not (normally) introduce a temporal update into 
the discourse; in Partee's terminology, they do not introduce a new entity associated with 
them-that is to say, they do not set up a reference time "just after" them for subsequent 
reference. But this does not exclude the possibility that states and processes introduce a 
new discourse entity for subsequent reference which is associated with them in some other 
way. To establish whether this is the case, we need to explore further what "being associated 
with" may mean in terms of the types of relationships that may hold between successive main 
clauses in narrative. Again, this issue is of particular relevance for us because it may throw 
a light on the relationship between temporal ordering and perspective. 
iii. Sentence aspect vs. discourse aspect 
The issue raised in the previous section-what are the most salient ways in which states of 
affairs in sequenced main clauses may be associated with each other?-is also relevant in 
another respect: it may make it possible to determine how pragmatic inferences affect the 
temporal ordering of successive main clauses in narrative discourse. 
As we have seen, Partee's account tries to capture the different relations that hold between 
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consecutive clauses in narrative in terms of just two main discourse interpretation rules, 
formulated in terms of the aspectual type of each new sentence concerned. First, events 
introduce a new reference time "just after" them for subsequent reference, while states and 
processes do not. And second. events are included in the current reference time, while states 
and processes surround it. While these two rules make it possible to account for a great 
number of cases, in other instances they make either incorrect or imprecise predictions. 
First of all, some sequences of event do not convey the impression of forward movement in 
time. Consider, for example, (2-23): 
(2-23) Beyond the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. (Lively, 
Moon Tiger: 207) 
According to Partee's discourse interpretation rules, the reference time is moved forward 
after processing the first clause (which is an event description) and the next event has to be 
interpreted with respect to this new reference time. But in this instance this prediction is 
incorrect: no particular ordering is conveyed between the two states of affairs described. 
Moreover, when Partee's discourse interpretation rules are applied to the passage in the 
following example, 
(2-24) In the morning, father and mother took us part way up a mountain. [...] 
We left very early, while it was dark still. (Boyle 1987: Natives Don't Cry: 
46) 
this would result in a representation in which the second clause We left very early is interpreted 
as coming after the first one; this, too, is clearly wrong. It seems, rather, that "leaving early" 
is part of the event described by "being taken up a mountain". 
And in (2-25), 
(2-25) John fell. He slipped on a banana skin. 
time seems to be moving backwards, despite the fact that both sentences constitute event 
descriptions which, in sequence, are predicted to propel time forwards. 
It appears that in such and similar instances, inferences about the temporal order between 
consecutive events are affected by the reader's assumptions about the relations that hold 
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between them-in other words, by a search for coherence structured on other than purely 
temporal principles. 
Another issue not adequately accounted for by Partee concerns the fact that state descriptions 
can sometimes be interpreted as introducing a temporal update into the discourse. Thus in 
sequences such as (2-26), 
(2-26) (1) We mounted, (2) turned a corner, (3) and the village was out of sight. 
(Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 58) 
the third clause does move time forward, despite the fact that it exhibits a state type. 
Along the same lines, some stative verbs (such as stand, sit, realise) seem to be ambiguous 
in the sense that they propel time in some contexts, but not in others. This is illustrated by 
the following two sequences; in the (a) example, the second clause triggers a temporal update 
(sit is interpreted as an event), whereas in the (b) example, the sit clause in interpreted as a 
state (or a process) and does not introduce a temporal update. 
(2-27) a He takes a chair and sits on the balcony (Mansfield, The Man Without 
Temperament: 17) (temporal movement) 
b Calixta, at home, felt no uneasiness for their safety. She sat at a side 
window sewing furiously on a sewing machine. (Chopin, The Storm: 
1) (no temporal movement) 
A similar observation applies to the way processes are contextualised into a narrative. Thus 
for (2-28), 
(2-28) Her pulses beat fast, and the coursing blood warmed and relaxed every 
inch of her body. (Chopin, The Story Of An Hour: 83) 
Partee's account correctly predicts that the clauses, all of which are processes, will be inter- 
preted as simultaneous and overlapping. But in (2-29), 
(2-29) (1) The plate missed, (2) and hit the refrigerator, (3) but the pie flew and 
(4) caught him on the side of the face as in the old movies or an I Love 
Lucy show. (Munro, Chaddeleys and Flemings: 18) 
the third clause, which is also a process, does update the narrative. 
As we have seen, Partee attributes the fact that states sometimes do not overlap with a 
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preceding description to "pragmatic inferences". But given the fact that such inferences may 
overrule all of her predictions about the relationship between aspectual types and the way 
they are temporally ordered with respect to the surrounding states of affairs, this stipulation 
is unsatisfactorily vague. 
Clearly, we need to make a distinction between the types of temporal ordering standardly 
imposed by sentence aspect, and other organising principles at the discourse level which may 
overrule the latter. The question is whether it is possible to specify such principles and to 
integrate them into a theoretical framework. This will be explored in chapter 3, where it will 
be argued that referential accounts take too simplistic a view of the nature of a temporal 
referent. It is usually assumed that the entities referred to by tensed clauses are simple points 
or intervals on a time line. We will suggest that a more complex ontology is involved, and 
that states of affairs may be organised under two different types of relationships, termed 
contingency and topicality. We will discuss each of these in turn. 
Following Moens (1987) and Moens & Steedman (1988), contingency is a relation between 
states of affairs which embraces more than purely temporal sequentiality. To represent it, we 
will employ a meaning structure which links the states of affairs subsumed under it in terms 
of contingency relations like causality and enablement. We will refer to such a structure as a 
contingency structure. 
Relations of temporal progression, precedence or inclusion between consecutive states of affairs 
will be captured in terms of this contingency structure; in such cases, we will argue, each new 
state of affairs is placed in a part of the contingency structure associated with the previous 
state of affairs. 
Standard types of discourse ordering among events will be explained in terms of the require- 
ment that events evoke a contingency structure, and therefore are associated with states of 
affairs standing in some appropriate contingency relation. This approach has three advan- 
tages over the one proposed by Partee. First of all, it allows us to explain why events normally 
introduce a temporal update without having to make recourse to a rule which stipulates that 
they always do so. As a result of this, other types of temporal ordering among events (namely 
precedence and inclusion) are no longer in conflict with the theory, since the rule which stip- 
ulates that events always introduce an update has been abandoned. Second, in the approach 
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we propose such temporal relations can be accounted for without having to invoke additional 
rules or principles. And finally, by incorporating the notion of contingently related states 
of affairs into our theory we will be able to make more explicit one of the principal ways in 
which states of affairs in narrative discourse may be associated with each other. 
As mentioned earlier, the second type of relationship which governs the interpretation of 
successive main clauses in narrative discourse will be referred to as a topical one. This 
relationship will be represented in terms of a non-episodic meaning structure consisting of a 
number of topically related states of affairs assessed at the same interval. We will refer to 
this as a topical structure. 
The typical discourse function of sentences exhibiting a state or a process type will be ex- 
plained in the light of the fact that they evoke a topical structure, and thus are associated 
with topically related states of affairs. This makes it possible to account for the observa- 
tion that states and processes in sequence do not normally propel time (which again makes 
Partee's discourse rules superfluous). And in addition to this, it allows us to capture other- 
non-temporal-relationships which are highlighted by consecutive state or process types. 
In our approach, the aspectual profile of clauses in context can largely be explained in terms 
of the type of meaning structure associated with the (decontextualised) clauses. But the same 
notions will also allow us to specify how context may overrule standard correlations between 
aspectual types and temporal ordering. 
The concept of contingently related states of affairs will be invoked to explain why states 
and processes may sometimes be interpreted as introducing a temporal update rather than as 
overlapping with the reference time of the preceding description: if the reader discerns a clear 
consequential relationship between two states of affairs, we will argue, she will make salient a 
contingency structure to interpret them, even if such a structure is not normally associated 
with the type of aspectual type concerned. 
Similarly we will show that a new event will not be interpreted as updating the narrative if, as 
in the case of example (2-22), the reader cannot detect any relation of contingency-however 
weak-between the state of affairs concerned and the event which precedes it. All this will 
be explored further in Chapter 3. 
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iv. Tense 
Another major issue which is not addressed by Partee (or in the related work of Kamp and 
Hinrichs) concerns the effect of tense in its strict sense on the relationship between consecutive 
main clauses in narrative. Partee restricts herself to an analysis of past tense examples, 
without discussing whether her conclusions about the context-dependence of the past tense 
apply equally to present tense narratives. Within a R.eichenbachian framework, the difference 
between a past and a present tense utterance is captured in terms of the relationship that 
holds between the speech time and the reference time: in the present tense, these coincide, 
while in the past tense, the reference time is to be situated before the speech time. This will 
have repercussions for the anaphoric properties of the tenses. As we saw earlier (cf. Bauerle 
1979), it is not tense per se that is interpreted anaphorically, but the reference time of tense. 
What needs to be determined, therefore, is the effect of these different types of ordering: what 
does it mean for speech time and reference time to be separated? And in what way does their 
coinciding affect the reader's understanding of an utterance? 
These questions are especially relevant in the case of narrative fiction. Specifying the effect of 
the separation between speech time and reference time in the past tense is unproblematical 
if one takes for granted, as Partee does, its deictic/temporal meaning component-the gram- 
maticalization of "pastness", i.e. a time sphere before the speech time. But this observation 
only applies unambiguously to types of discourse which are temporally situated, such as oral 
communication. In narratives, however, the past tense will function as referring to a past 
time only when a speech time is established within the fictional statement, i.e. when the text 
at some point mimics the time sphere of an actual situation of speech. If this is the case, the 
past tense will be detemporalised with respect to "real" time, but recontextualised within 
the internal system of the text, for example as constituting memory, or recall, on the part 
of the narrator. When a main line narrative is in the past tense, however, it will remain 
decontextualised with respect to any "real time" (witness the fact that most science fiction 
is written in the past tense), but will not be situated with respect to a fictional speech time 
either. And this poses a problem for the theory: how do we specify the difference between 
the choice of the past and that of the present tense if no deictic/temporal contrast can be 
invoked? In th approach we propose this problem is taken into account. 
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2.3 Dowty's approach to the temporal structure of narrative 
2.3.1 Compositional semantics 
Dowty's analysis of the relationship between consecutive clauses in narrative discourse takes 
as its starting point some of the observations concerning the movement of narrative time 
made in Dry (1981, 1983). In the earlier paper, Dry argues that the perception of temporal 
movement in narrative texts is triggered by references to changes of state. In Dry (1983) she 
broadens this claim: references to changes of state are said to constitute references to points- 
the beginning or end points of situations. The notion of "natural endpoints of a situation", 
which is crucial to Dry's argument, is a fairly intuitive one in the account she proposes, and 
Dowty's aim is to make it precise in model-theoretic terms. 
Like the referential approaches discussed in the previous section, Dowty's account is based on 
the notion that the temporal relationship between consecutive clauses in narrative discourse 
is determined by the aspectual type they exhibit. 
Dowty challenges one central point of DRT and Hinrichs' application of it. He claims that 
the classification of clauses into aspectual types (which, as was shown in the previous section, 
plays a crucial role in DRT construction rules) is determined by the compositional semantics of 
the clause. This conflicts with Kamp's theory, which assumes that the model-theoretic inter- 
pretation of a sentence depends on, and is defined in terms of, the intermediate representation 
produced by the DRT construction rules; consequently, the model-theoretic interpretation can- 
not also serve as an input to those construction rules as its input. Attempts to treat aspectual 
class as a purely syntactic property of clauses (for example, by classifying various syntactic 
categories according to their aspectual class, and specifying elaborate cooccurrence restric- 
tions among them, as proposed by Verkuyl 1972) miss the point, Dowty claims, since it is 
the semantic properties of the various constituents which ultimately determine the aspectual 
type of the clause in which they appear, and those will only be fully apparent in the semantic 
interpretation of the clause. 
Dowty also points out, as we have earlier, that in some instances the ordering of states of 
affairs in narrative discourse will be affected at least in part by context and world knowledge: 
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states, for example, may in some contexts function inceptively. Hinrichs and Partee try to 
accommodate this problem by stipulating that while states may overlap with a preceding 
event, they need not do so. They feel it is sufficient to assume that while the content of some, 
indeed most, states will make an interpretation of overlap likely, this is not required by the 
theory. They also feel that the conditions under which a state will or will not be interpreted 
as overlapping need no further specification, since, they argue, the conditions represented 
formally at this level include only those constraints deemed to follow from structure indepen- 
dently of particular content. Dowty, as already pointed out, contests this by arguing that the 
two cannot be separated. 
The basic idea underlying Dowty's approach is that the aspectual type of a clause can be 
predicted by applying a number of semantic rules. The aspectual ontology he proposes aims to 
classify not only verbs, but also verb phrases and sentences. While the aspectual type of a verb 
is a property of its lexical meaning, the aspectual type of a phrase or clause can be determined 
as a function of its compositionally derived meaning, that is, on the basis of the interaction 
of the inherent aspect of the main verb with tense morphemes, aspectual auxiliaries, certain 
temporal and aspectual adverbials, and other complements. It is, of course, the aspectual 
type of a clause as a whole which will affect the relationship of the state of affairs described 
to other clauses in the discourse. But this aspectual type, Dowty claims, can be determined 
in a mechanical and completely explicit way by applying a number of compositional semantic 
rules through combining the noun phrases, adverbials, tenses, and other constituents of the 
clauses with the lexical aspectual class of its main verb. 
On the basis of this, clause are classified as belonging to one of three aspectual types-namely 
accomplishments/achievements, activities, and statives. 
2.3.2 Interval semantics 
In addition to this, Dowty's theory of the temporal ordering of clauses in narrative makes 
use of the interval semantics proposed by Taylor (1977) and extended in Dowty (1979). The 
main tenet of this theory concerns the notion of the truth of a sentence with respect to a 
interval of time. This means that the truth of a sentence with respect to a given interval 
I is formulated as independent of the truth of the same sentence with respect to moments 
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within I, subintervals of I, or superintervals of I. This notion is relied on to explain why, for 
example, the truth of a sentence like (2-30) 
(2-30) John ran a mile in five minutes. 
with respect to a time interval, e.g. between 1.00pm and 1.05pm, does not imply the truth 
of the same sentence with respect to a subinterval of this time; indeed, we want to allow it 
to be false that John ran a mile at a subinterval of I, e.g. between 1.00pm and 1.03pm. 
2.3.3 Accomplishments/achievements, activities, statives 
Using the notion of the truth of a sentence with respect to a time interval as a primitive, 
Dowty introduces three defining criteria for the three aspectual types, namely 
(a) A sentence a is 8tative if it follows from the truth of a at an interval I that a is true at 
all subintervals of I; e.g. Between S and 4, I was really tired. 
(b) A sentence a is an activity if it follows from the truth of a at an interval I that a is true 
of all subintervals of I down to a certain limit in size; e.g. Between S and 4, I worked 
in the garden. 
(c) A sentence a is an accomplishment or achievement if it follows from the truth of a at an 
interval I that a is false at all subintervals of I; e.g. Between S and 4, I wrote a letter. 
Notice that the three types distinguished by Dowty are essentially the same as those re- 
lied on by Partee to characterise the effects of aspectual class on the temporal structure of 
discourse-Partee refers to them as 8tate8, procesaea and events respectively. Dowty, however, 
draws attention to aspects of the classification which are not elaborated upon by Partee. For 
example, he captures the idea that statives and activities have the same subinterval proper- 
ties (this explains why they are treated alike by Partee's DRT construction rules); but at the 
same time he specifies the respect in which they differ (otherwise it would be irrelevant to 
distinguish between them). Dowty relates this difference to the fact that it is harder to think 
of activities as obtaining in an uninterrupted fashion the way statives do. This characteristic, 
however, does not immediately affect their truth-conditional status and the way they are to 
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be incorporated temporally into the context of the discourse in which they occur. In both 
these respects, activities resemble statives. 
2.3.4 The structure of accomplishments/achievements 
Another point that remains implicit in Partee but is explicitly addressed in Dowty's paper 
relates to the fact that accomplishments and achievements are subsumed under one category 
(in Partee's account, that of events). His argument for collapsing them into one category 
roughly runs as follows. 
Accomplishments (e.g. John built a sandcastle) are usually distinguished from achievements 
(e.g. John died) on the grounds that the former involve some duration, while the latter do not. 
But, as Dowty points out, in terms of a "real world" ontology this is arguable; for example, 
a physician may object that dying, no matter how it is defined, does have some duration. 
The other criterion often invoked to distinguish these two types, namely the syntactic stip- 
ulation that achievements, in contrast with accomplishments, cannot combine with the pro- 
gressive, is also not accurate-it is often possible to use an achievement in the progressive, as 
in (2-31): 
(2-31) John was dying when the doctor arrived. 
The difference between accomplishments and achievements, Dowty argues, has to, do with 
the "structuredness" of the situation concerned: accomplishments are "structured" in the 
sense that our understanding of them involves recognising distinct sub-events which may be 
necessary (but not individually sufficient) for the accomplishment itself. Achievements, on 
the other hand, are "unstructured" in that they are not understood as consisting of such a 
sequence of subevents, but take place when one state (e.g. being alive) is recognised as being 
replaced by another (e.g. being dead). 
Accomplishments and achievements do, however, resemble each other on one crucial point, 
which concerns the way in which they are contextualised in a narrative: in this respect, 
they are both "punctual" in the sense that no reference is made to their internal structure 
(although they may have different subparts; cf. Comrie's (11976:18) notion of a "blob" with 51 
clearly circumscribed limits and possible internal complexity). In addition, when they are 
sequenced, no event of crucial importance to the narrative overlaps with the two successive 
events or intervenes between them. It is precisely for this reason that Kamp (1979) proposes 
to represent them at the DRS level as points, (even though they may be mapped into intervals 
rather than instants in the model). 
The aspectual categories Partee and Dowty distinguish can schematically be represented as 
follows: 
Clauses 
Partee Events Processes States 
Dowty Accomplishments/Achievements Activities Statives 
(false at subintervals) (true at subintervals (true at subintervals 
down to a certain irrespective of 
limit in size) size) 
Within the framework introduced by Dowty, it remains to be specified how these different 
aspectual types affect the temporal structure of discourse. To do so Dowty introduces two 
more principles, which we will now discuss. 
The Temporal Discourse Interpretation Principle The Temporal Discourse Interpre- 
tation Principle (TRIP) states that, for a sequence of sentences to be interpreted as 
narrative discourse, each new clause will always be interpreted at a new reference time 
"immediately after" that of the previous clause, except when it contains a definite time 
adverbial, in which case it will be interpreted at a time consistent with this adverbial. 
This stipulation differs from that relied upon by Hinrichs and Partee in just one respect: 
it means that not only events (accomplishments/achievements), but also processes and 
states (or activities and statives) set up a new reference time "just after" them for 
subsequent reference. 
Assumed Reference Times The inferences which we draw in a narrative about how states 
of affairs are ordered temporally are not merely a consequence of the times at which 
the states of affairs are asserted to be true, according to Dowty, but also of the times at 
which we assume they obtain. This means, in effect, that Dowty's notion of reference 
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time is a two-fold parameter. In the rest of this discussion, the asserted reference time 
of a clause will be referred to as r, and the assumed reference time as r'. 
2.3.5 Dowty's treatment of sequenced main clauses 
Combining the notion of "truth of a sentence with respect to a time interval" with the two 
principles just discussed allows Dowty to specify the different temporal ordering relationships 
imposed by the three aspectual categories. 
Accomplishments and achievements, according to the way they were defined earlier (cf. supra, 
(c)), are true with respect to an interval I if they are false at all its subintervals. It follows 
from this that they will also be false at all superintervals of I (because otherwise the orig- 
inal condition would be violated). Combining this definition with the two principles just 
outlined results in the prediction that sequenced accomplishments/achievements will be true 
at successive non-overlapping intervals. This means, among other things, that in the case 
of accomplishments and achievements, the times at which they are asserted to be true will 
coincide with the time at which they are assumed to be true. 
The definition for stative sentences, in contrast, implies that a stative which is true at an 
interval I may also be true at a larger superinterval which includes I-this possibility is not 
in conflict with the original definition. In combination with Dowty's two principles, this results 
in an interpretation of statives as being asserted at an updated reference time r, but normally 
beginning to obtain in advance of this point and continuing beyond it (until, or possibly 
beyond, the next event sentence, depending on content, context and pragmatic factors). In 
other words, the time r at which a stative is asserted is updated, but the time interval r over 
which it is assumed to obtain can overlap with the surrounding state of affairs. Thus, while 
the asserted reference times of statives may be brief and closely spaced, the times at which 
they are assumed to obtain will normally be much longer. As we have seen earlier, however, 
statives do not always overlap with a preceding event. Dowty accounts for this by adding that 
while the actual duration of statives will in most cases extend before their asserted reference 
time, this is actually a pragmatic inference which may be cancelled on the basis of contextual 
or pragmatic knowledge. This explains why statives are in some instances given an inceptive 
interpretation. 
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Activities, as already pointed out earlier, resemble statives in their behaviour, and this is 
reflected in Dowty's approach. Like statives, activities are asserted to take place at an updated 
reference time r; and in addition to this, they are permitted-but not required-to have 
started before this time and/or to continue beyond it, depending on the reader's expectations 
about the "normal" length of the situation described (which will on average be shorter than 
that of statives, since the latter normally describe an "inert" situation which will be assumed 
to hold or persist unless the text explicitly states otherwise), and the surrounding discourse. 
As in the case of statives, the context of an activity may indicate that no overlap with the 
preceding state of affairs is to be inferred, so that the asserted reference time r is to be 
interpreted as the first interval of the assumed reference time r'. Thus, in example (2-32), 
(2-32) John asked where the children were. Mary looked anxiously out the win- 
dow. 
the activity look out the window is not understood as overlapping with the previous sentence, 
but as beginning at its asserted reference time. This is again due to a pragmatic inference, 
viz. the fact that the reader perceives a causal relationship between the activity and the event 
which precedes it. 
2.3.6 Temporal ordering and point of view 
Dowty's treatment of statives, activities and progressives touches upon an issue which is not 
addressed in Partee's paper, namely the fact that statives and activities are suggestive of 
a particular point of view. Clearly, this issue is particularly relevant in the context of this 
dissertation. 
Dowty argues that, in the absence of definite temporal adverbials, reference times in a nar- 
rative are to be continuously updated, even after statives and activities. Partee, in contrast, 
claims that statives and activities do not introduce a new reference time for subsequent ref- 
erence. At first sight, Partee's claim seems to be the more accurate one. Take, for example, 
(2-33:) 
(2-33) (1) John entered the president's office. (2) A copy of the budget was on 
the president's desk. (3) The president's financial advisor stood beside the 
copy. (4) The president sat regarding both admiringly. (5) The advisor 
spoke. (Dowty 1986) 
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The fact that the statives in sentences (2)-(4) in this passage are normally assumed to extend 
before the reference time of the stative in (2) and into the time of the event that ends the 
passage, the advisor spoke, is not at odds with Dowty's theory: it is completely in line with 
the interaction between his defining criterion for statives and the second principle described 
earlier. More worrying, however, is the fact that time does not seem to move in the three 
middle sentences of the narrative; this does appear to be in conflict with Dowty's Temporal 
Discourse Interpretation Principle (TDIP), which requires a temporal update of the asserted 
reference time after each stative. 
Dowty argues, however, that this apparent inconsistency can be explained in the light of the 
distinction he has drawn between asserted and assumed reference times: the duration which 
the reader assigns to successive (asserted) reference times, and to the intervals between these 
reference times, depends on assumptions about the normal real-world duration and spacing of 
events of a given type. Because of this, it is not implausible to assign very brief and closely- 
spaced (asserted) reference times to statives in a context like (2-33). In such an analysis, 
the fact that the sequence does not propel time in an obvious way could be explained by the 
observation that temporal movement is masked by two factors: first of all, the short duration 
and closeness of the asserted reference times; and secondly, the fact that the actual times at 
which the reader assumes the states obtain are much longer and overlap. 
But this leaves the question as to what the asserted reference times of such sequences refer 
to. In the case of accomplishments or achievements, or event descriptions, this is not an issue: 
the asserted reference time denotes the duration of the event, and thus coincides with the 
assumed reference time; in other words, the sequence of asserted reference times mimic)fs the 
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sequence of events as they occur. But in the case of statives, the assumed reference time 
(the "actual" duration of the situation described) is normally longer than that of the asserted 
reference time; so in what terms are we to conceive of the latter? 
Dowty's solution to this is the following. The statives in examples such as (2-33), he argues, 
are to be interpreted as the perceptual observations that a hypothetical human observer would 
make in the situation described, which are vicariously relived by the reader. More specifically, 
this hypothetical observer may be either the text's narrator, or a character in the text from 
whose point of view the situation is represented. This means that the time spans denoted by 
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the asserted reference times of such statives are to be constructed as the time it would take a 
human observer to perceive these facts about the scene; in other words, it is suggested that 
the order in which the pragmatically overlapping statives are recorded in the discourse is the 
order in which some (fictional) observer notices them. And this would be in line with the 
temporal updating imposed by Dowty's TDIP. 
Dowty here implicitly captures an idea which is central to the argument presented in this 
study, namely that statives often reflect the subjective awareness of a (hypothetical or specific) 
observer. Dowty invokes the (implied) subjective dimension of statives to support the validity 
of his TDIP even in cases where time does not appear to move. The TDIP thus only retains its 
theoretical consistency and explanatory power if a link is established between aspect and point 
of view. In the next chapter we will propose an approach in which the TDIP is abandoned. 
Even in our new approach, however, the observation that statives are suggestive of a subjective 
angle on the state of affairs they describe will remain crucial. We will relate it more explicitly 
than Dowty does to the referential properties of statives, which are characterised by the 
fact that their assumed reference time normally extends beyond both sides of their asserted 
reference time. Although Dowty does not explicitly discuss activities, we infer that the same 
type of analysis, involving point of view, is intended to apply to them too. On this issue, 
however, we will adopt a different position. In the next chapter, we will argue that activities 
(or processes as we will call them) are not perspectivally situated in the same way as statives. 
2.3.7 Problems 
The temporal discourse interpretation principle 
Let us summarise the main points of the discussion so far. Dowty's analysis differs from 
Partee's on three central points. First of all, he claims that the classification of sentences 
or clauses into aspectual types is determined by their compositional semantics, and therefore 
cannot be an input to the DRT-construction rules. Although Partee acknowledges there is a 
problem in this respect, she remains agnostic about its solution. We accept, with Dowty, that 
attempting to encode all aspectual information into a syntactic analysis-even if feasible-is 
theoretically undesirable. 
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Second, Dowty introduces a more complex notion of reference time, using two parameters: 
an asserted and an assumed reference time. We will further develop this idea (which remains 
fairly rudimentary in Dowty's account), illustrate its relevance for issues concerning the tem- 
poral ordering of narrative (which remains unclear on Dowty's account), and specify more 
systematically how aspectual types can be represented in terms of the interval properties of 
their asserted and assumed reference times, and the relationship that holds between the two. 
Finally, Dowty's analysis does away with Partee's stipulation that in temporally unmarked 
narrative2 only event descriptions update the narrative. Dowty's position is that in narrative, 
each new sentence or clause is automatically assigned a new updated asserted reference time. 
He admits that in the case of processes and states this may seem counterintuitive, since the 
reader does not tend to perceive temporal movement in such sequences. But this, he says, 
can be explained in the light of the fact that the assumed reference times of processes and 
states are much longer and overlap with neighbouring states of affairs. In other words, it is 
his distinction between two reference time parameters which enables Dowty to introduce the 
TDIP. 
The introduction of this principle is attractive for two reasons. First of all it simplifies 
the theory, because it makes one of Partee's discourse rules superfluous. Second, certain 
phenomena, such as the fact that some processes or states require an inceptive or quasi- 
inceptive interpretation, can, in the light of the TDIP, be explained without being in conflict 
with the general lines of the theory. 
As indicated above, the account we propose in Chapter 3 does not rely on the TDIP. It differs 
from Dowty's approach in that while Dowty occasionally invokes general assumptions of 
causality, entailment etc. to account for types of ordering which his theory cannot accurately 
predict, we will view these as central organising principles. We will claim that in the case 
of clauses which create the impression of forward movement in time, the reader's inferences 
about the temporal ordering of the narrative are based on a mental representation of the 
state of affairs described in terms of a structure of consequentially related situations. We 
have already sketched the general features of such an approach. In the next chapter, we will 
discuss it in more detail. 
'I use the term temporally unmarked narrative to refer to sequences of main clauses which are not modified 
by temporal adverbials. 
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Our claim, then, is that clauses in narrative which introduce a temporal update (in the sense 
that they move the action forward) do so because the state of affairs they describe can be 
associated to a preceding state of affairs by a contingency relation. If no such contingency 
relation can be established by the reader, the action is suspended. Since in the latter case 
temporal/causal inferences no longer constitute the reader's central focus of attention, another 
type of relationship between the sentence and its context becomes salient, which we earlier 
referred to as a topical one. 
Dowty claims that sequences of statives (and activities) can be interpreted as mimicking the 
temporal sequence of the perceptions or observations of a subject or hypothetical subject. 
And, as the following passages illustrate, this claim has some initial plausibility. 
(2-34) (Then the boy saw the buck.) It was coming down the ridge, as if it were 
walking out of the very sound of the horn which related its death. It was 
not running, it was walking, tremendous, unhurried, slanting and tilting 
its head to pass the antlers through the undergrowth. (Faulkner, Go Down 
Mose8: 183) 
(2-35) The servant girl was in their room, singing loudly while she emptied soapy 
water into a pail. The windows were open wide, the shutters put back, 
and the light glared in. (Mansfield, The Man Without Temperament: 8) 
(2-36) The manager's personal assistant was speaking to him with a concern he 
felt was quite misplaced. She was pressing her hand against his forearm, 
and urging him to drink the tea she had brought. The manager was stand- 
ing just outside his office complaining to an underling that supermarkets 
were the favoured territory of child snatchers. (McEwan, The Child in 
Time: 16) 
(2-37) There, absolutely stilled with fear beneath his glance, crouched a very big 
locust. What an amusing face the thing had! A lugubrious long face, that 
somehow suggested a bald head, and such a glum mouth. It looked like 
some little person out of a Disney cartoon. It moved slightly, still looking 
fearfully at him. Strange body, encased in a sort of old-fashioned creaky 
armour. (Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 23) 
However, it is equally possible to interpret the descriptions in these examples as capturing 
the totality of an impression-visual or otherwise. If there is a hint of temporal movement 
in these sequences, this is due to the fact that this impression is captured in language and 
therefore can only be conveyed in a linear order. But it is not implied that this order simulates 
the sequence of someone's thought or perception; certainly, such an inference does not seem 
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to be essential for an adequate understanding of the text. 
This point is illustrated even more clearly in the following cases: 
(2-38) (A long legged, lovely creature came bounding up the hill.) This was Joy 
Benson, who came with them to Wales every summer. Betsy paid her 
a pound a week for being a sort of holiday governess and handy girl; it 
was not an agreeable situation, but she needed the money, for she had 
an invalid mother to support. For the rest of the year she taught at a 
Kindergarten in a provincial town. The Hewitts had known her father, 
years ago, and it was they who had paid for her education. They had been 
astonishingly generous. (Kennedy, Together and Apart: 42) 
(2-39) Isabel Archer was a young person of many theories; her imagination was 
remarkably active. (James, The Portrait of a Lady: 48) 
(2-40) The structure of the house was hierarchical, with my grandfather at the 
top, but its secret life-the life of pie crusts, clean sheets, the box of rags in 
the linen closet, the loaves in the oven-was female. The house, and all the 
objects in it, crackled with static electricity; undertows washed through it, 
the air was heavy with things that were known but not spoken. (Atwood, 
Significant Moments in the Life of My Mother: 13) 
(2-41) My name is Frances Hinton and I do not like to be called Fanny. I work in 
the reference library of a medical research institute dedicated to the study 
of problems of human behaviour. I am in charge of pictorial material, an 
archive, said to be unparalleled anywhere else in the world, of photographs 
of works of arts and popular prints depicting doctors and patients through 
the ages. (Brookner, Look at Me: 5) 
What is relevant to the interpretation of such passages is that the portrayal of narrative 
development in terms of temporally/causally related states of affairs is temporarily suspended 
in favour of another organising principle. Although the clauses may be suggestive, from a 
logical and ontological point of view, of the fact that time moves, nevertheless in terms of 
the way they are contextualised, and in terms of the general effect they trigger, they describe 
states of affairs that are "a-temporal" and appear to be arrested or suspended in some kind of 
motionless "now"-a relationship we dubbed "topicality" before. Our approach will capture 
this effect, and to that extent will be empirically more adequate than Dowty's. 
Dowty's stipulation that statives and activities in narrative are interpreted as introducing an 
updated asserted reference time is problematic in other ways. 
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If we assume that time moves in passages such as those quoted in (2-34)-(2-37) above, rep- 
resenting the successive impressions of a subject, it becomes difficult to specify what distin- 
guishes them from passages like the following one: 
(2-42) [...] and she was actually under the Abbey walls, was springing, with 
Henry's assistance, from the carriage, was beneath the shelter of the old 
porch, and had even passed onto the hall, where her friend and the General 
were waiting to welcome her [...] (Austen, Northanger Abbey: 167) 
In this case too we get a sequence of statives which seem to reflect the subjective awareness 
of a character in the text. Here, however, time moves as it does in most consecutive events, 
in the sense that the action unfolds. According to Dowty, the asserted reference time of each 
new stative always introduces an update, while their assumed reference time may extend at 
one or both sides of this asserted reference time. 
In our approach, the difference between the stretches of narrative in (2-34)-(2-41) and (2- 
42) can be explained because we provide a unified account of both semantic and contextual 
information which affects the aspectual interpretation of a (contextualised) clause. The ob- 
servation that narrative time moves forward in (2-42) despite the fact that clauses concerned 
are statives is accounted for as follows in our analysis. Although consecutive statives are 
standardly organised under a topical relationship (as in examples (2-34)-(2-41)), in (2-42) 
their semantic content makes salient a contingency link between them, so that the sequence 
propels time forward (in the sense in which we define it). The reader's activity, in other words, 
is geared towards finding contingency relations between successive moments of perception or 
consciousness. In Chapter 3 this phenomenon will be explored in more detail. 
In summary, a major issue which remains problematic in Dowty's account concerns the fact 
that his TDIP applies not only to events but also to non-event clauses. We argue that in most 
cases, sequences of statives and activities are more accurately represented as being interpreted 
at a fixed, non-updated asserted reference time. Such a representation is intuitively more 
correct, but it also has a number of other advantages. We also claim that by introducing a 
distinction between two types of coherence that may govern consecutive sentences in narrative 
discourse we can make a larger number of predictions about their temporal ordering without 
having to invoke additional rules and stipulations. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
We have tried to show in this chapter that while both Partee (1984) and Dowty (1986) provide 
an illuminating analysis of the effect of aspectual class on the temporal ordering of narrative 
discourse, in both accounts a number of questions are not satisfactorily addressed or solved. 
In the next chapter we will propose an approach to the same issue which, although it adopts 
some of the main principles of the referential theories discussed, offers a more unified account 
of the relationship between semantics, contextual information and temporal relationships in 
narrative. 
On the basis of this we will formulate a number of predictions concerning the way the aspectual 
type of sentences in narrative affects the way the described states of affairs are integrated 
temporally into the reader's structured representation of the narrative. This will allow us to 
specify which types of sentences introduce a subjective perspective into a narrative. 
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Chapter 3 
Temporal Ordering and 
Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
When a reader encounters a new sentence or main clause in a narrative text, she has to 
determine where and how the state of affairs it describes is to be incorporated into the 
evolving situation structure which constitutes a model of the discourse. This means, among 
other things, that she has to decide what the perspectival status of the sentence is: is the state 
of affairs it describes portrayed as independent of a particular perspective or is it presented 
as perceived or assessed from a particular perspective? The aim of this thesis is to determine 
when a sentence describes a state of affairs from a particular perspective, and when it does 
not. 
In Chapter 1, I drew attention to the fact that in the majority of cases sentences which 
introduce a subjective perspective do not trigger the impression of forward movement in 
time. This apparent link between the temporal structure of sentences and their perspectival 
status constitutes our central object of investigation. 
In Chapter 2, I advanced the idea that the precise nature of the connection between the 
temporal and the perspectival properties of (temporally unmodified) sentences might become 
clearer if we can identify why some sequences of main clauses propel time while others do not. 
We discussed two recent articles in the field of formal semantics which address this issue. In 
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both of these the central claim is that the way clauses are contextualised temporally into a 
narrative depends on their aspectual type. This aspectual type is said to be determined by 
the clause's compositionally derived meaning. If a clause or sentence exhibits the type of a 
state or a process, it does not create the impression of temporal progression. If it is classified 
as an event (or accomplishment/achievement), it does. 
Predictions about the temporal contextualisation of successive main clauses in narrative solely 
on the basis of their compositionally derived meaning, however, may almost without exception 
be overruled by inferences based on context and world knowledge. The informational content 
of these appears hard to specify. 
In the first section of this chapter we investigate the relationship between sentence aspect, 
context and temporal ordering. We argue that two types of non-temporal relationships may 
change the aspectual profile of successive main clauses in narrative text, and hence affect 
the way they are ordered temporally in the model of the text. The first is referred to as 
a contingency relation (which embraces general notions of enablement and causality), the 
second as a topical one. We propose a unified account of sentence aspect and context which 
relies crucially on the idea that the same situation may be thought of, or conceived of, in 
different ways, depending on the aspectual operators the clause contains and the context it 
occurs in. On the basis of this we will specify when (contextualised) main clauses create the 
impression that time moves, and when they don't. 
In the second part of this chapter we explore the relationship between the aspectual type of 
contextualised sentence and perspectival inferences. 
3.2 Classifying aspectual profiles 
3.2.1 Vendler's typology 
Over the years, various typologies have been suggested to classify aspectual types, the most 
influential probably being the one known through the work of Vendler (1967). The central 
idea behind this taxonomy can be traced back to Aristotle, who coined a distinction between 
Kineseis (performances) and Energeiai (activities or states) (Metaphysics: 1048b 18-36). 
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In the Anglo-Saxon tradition aspectual typologies similar to Vendler's have been proposed, 
amongst others, by Jespersen (1924), Ryle (1949), Gamy (1957), Kenny (1963) Allen (1966), 
Rescher & Urquhart (1971), Bennet & Partee (1972), and Dowty (1979). 
Vendler's classification presents a fourfold taxonomy of verbal predicates: it distinguishes 
between accomplishments, achievements, activities and states. Vendler refers to these collec- 
tively as processes. 
Accomplishments are defined by Vendler as verbal predicates denoting heterogeneous processes 
with successive phases, which have a natural endpoint, or outcome, associated with them. 
Accomplishments thus refer to a time segment which has both intrinsic duration and a final 
stage which is distinct from its other stages; this is why they are called non-homogeneous: 
"in case I wrote a letter in an hour, I did not write it, say, in the first quarter of that hour" 
(Vendler 1967 : 101). Examples are: run a mile, build a chair, recover from illness, paint a 
picture, write a novel, read a book. 
Achievements are characterised as verbal predicates denoting punctual processes without 
successive phases and without intrinsic duration, which capture the inception or the climax 
of an act, and as such embody a culmination point. Verbs like recognize, die, start, stop, win 
the race, find, realize,... constitute typical examples. 
Activities are verbal predicates denoting homogeneous processes with successive phases, which 
do not have a natural culmination point or endpoint associated with them. Activities present 
processes viewed in terms of their internal temporal constituency, i.e. as continuous or ongoing 
over an undemarcated time stretch. They are homogeneous in the sense that "any part of the 
process is of the same nature as the whole" (Vendler 1967: 101). Verbs such as run (around, 
all over), write, swim (along), push (a card), walk,... illustrate this. 
States, finally, are verbal predicates denoting processes without successive phases. Like ac- 
tivities, states are homogeneous and stable: they endure or persist over stretches of time. 
States also resemble activities in that they are not demarcated on a time line, that is, they 
do not include reference to an endpoint or culmination; they differ from them in that they do 
not involve any dynamics, they "cannot be qualified as actions at all" (Vendler 1967 : 106). 
Vendler defines states as "that puzzling category in which the role of the verb melts into that 
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of predicate, and actions fade into qualities and relations." (Vendler 1967 : 109). Desire, 
love, own (a house), be blond, know, believe, want, resemble are examples of states. 
Vendler's original classification can be represented schematically as follows: 
processes with successive phases processes without successive phases 
homogeneous heterogeneous punctual period 
ACTIVITIES ACCOMPLISHMENTS ACHIEVEMENTS STATES 
run, swim, paint a picture, recognize, win love, 
walk, sing write a novel, the race, know, 
work build a house realize believe 
3.2.2 Problems with Vendler's typology 
In the context of the questions concerning the relationship between the aspectual type of 
sentences and their temporal ordering, the aspectual taxonomy proposed by Vendler (and 
others in the same tradition) is not without problems. 
Most importantly, to determine the effect of aspect on the temporal structure of narrative we 
need a typology which classifies contextualised (main) clauses. Vendler's taxonomy essentially 
classifies different classes of verbal predicates on the basis of the aspectual characteristics 
inherent to their lexical structure. But aspectual distinctions may also be grammaticalised; 
for example, the same verbal predicate may require to be classified differently depending 
on whether it encodes simple or progressive aspect, or a single or a plural object. And in 
addition to this the context in which a clause or sentence occurs may also affect its aspectual 
interpretation. In other words, factors other than the lexical-semantic structure of a clause's 
verbal predicate may have an effect on the aspectual category the contextualised clause (as 
opposed to a verbal predicate) belongs to. 
To capture this, we will follow Dowty in claiming that the aspectual category a (decontex- 
tualised) clause belongs to can be determined as a function of its compositionally derived 
meaning, that is, on the basis of the interaction of the inherent aspectual properties of the 
main verb with a number of operators, which include auxiliaries, certain temporal and as- 
pectual adverbials, and other complements. The function of these operators is described in 
semantic terms. Put differently, the aspectual profile a (decontextualised) clause exhibits is 
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specified by applying a number of semantic rules, depending on the type(s) of operator the 
clause encodes. One such rule, which is of particular importance to us, is that the presence 
of a progressive or a perfect auxiliary turns a proposition into a state. Clauses exhibiting 
a state profile because of their lexical-semantic structure are referred to as lexical states, 
to distinguish them from propositions which encode a stative operator, such as perfects or 
progressives. Clauses may, of course, contain more than one operator. 
Some clauses thus derive their aspectual characteristics purely from lexical-semantic material, 
while others consist of a verb phrase the profile of which has been changed under the influence 
of an operator in the sentence. The (a) sentences in the following example belong to the former 
category, the (b) sentences to the latter: 
(3-1) a Jill wrote a letter. (accomplishment) 
b Jill was writing a letter. (state) 
(3-2) a The train arrived. (achievement) 
b The train had arrived. (state) 
(3-3) a The fire destroyed the house. (accomplishment) 
b Fires destroy houses. (state) 
Moreover, context may change the aspectual interpretation of a clause or sentence, so that it 
functions, in effect, as an additional aspectual operator. We want to specify this function of 
context within a unified account. 
We will make a distinction between basic propositions (cf. Lys & Mommer 1986), expanded 
propositions and contextualised propositions. Basic propositions are simple clauses from 
which everything is excluded which we know might change the aspectual type of the ex- 
pression. This means a basic proposition will exhibit simple aspect, because we know that 
progressive and perfect auxiliaries change the aspectual nature of a proposition. Moreover, 
the subject of a basic proposition should be syntactically and semantically singular, and its 
object should be a singular count noun, which should only be present in the case of a nec- 
essarily transitive verb. And finally, a basic proposition should encode a past tense, because 
the present tense, as we will see in Chapter 5, may also act as aspectual operator. According 
to this definition, classifying run as a process is tantamount to saying that a basic proposition 
involving this verb, e.g. she ran, is typically an expression exhibiting the aspectual properties 
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of a process. 
Expanded propositions are basic propositions which are modified by an intrasentential operator 
which affects the reader's aspectual interpretation of the sentence, such as, for example, a 
progressive or perfect auxiliary. A decontextualised sentence, therefore, may either be a basic 
proposition (if its aspectual type is determined solely by the lexical-semantic properties of 
its verbal predicate) or an expanded proposition (if the aspectual type of its verbal predicate 
changes because of the presence of an aspectual operator within the sentence). 
Contextualised propositions, finally, are sentences, the aspectual type of which may be changed 
by the context in whichttu; occur . 
If a proposition combines with an operator which changes its aspectual type (either an in- 
trasentential operator or context) we will say its type is coerced. 
The typology needed for our purposes thus has to classify basic, expanded and contextualised 
propositions. This means that rather than a static classification of verb phrases or verbal 
predicates we need a dynamic classification which reflects how the aspectual type of a propo- 
sition changes when the proposition is thought or conceived of in a particular way because of 
the aspectual operator it combines with, or because of the context it occurs in. The typology 
should enable us to represent, in other words, how the aspectual labels of contextualised sen- 
tences relate to those of smaller units such as decontextualised sentences, verb phrases and 
verbs. 
The typology we will rely on is based on a proposal by Moens (1987) to replace traditional 
static aspectual classifications with a transition network. This network differs from earlier 
aspectual categorisations in that it not only contains a number of categories, but also a number 
of transition paths, which indicate how categories may be coerced into other categories. Moens' 
typology also introduce a fifth category, viz. that of points. In addition to this, we will 
introduce a sixth one, which we will refer to as contingent states. 
Our typology also differs from the one proposed by Moens in a number of other respects. For 
example, we specify the aspectual type of the categories in terms of two (related) criteria. The 
first concerns the referential properties of the category concerned, or its referential centre. The 
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second concerns the meaning structure evoked by the proposition, which may be contingent 
or non-contingent. On the basis of this, the function of transition paths is defined in terms 
of the way the referential centre and/or the associated meaning structure of a proposition 
change when it is coerced. 
The six categories in the aspectual typology we propose are culminations, culminated pro- 
cesses, points, processes, non-contingent states and contingent states. We will now discuss 
their aspectual characteristics in the light of the two criteria referred to earlier. 
3.2.3 Referential centres 
When a reader assigns an aspectual interpretation to a proposition, she constructs a mental 
representation which incorporates the most salient aspectual characteristics of the proposition 
described. In the rest of this discussion this representation will be referred to as a referential 
centre. 
A referential centre is a twofold constellation consisting of two intervals, an asserted reference 
time r and an assumed reference time r'.1 The asserted reference time is the time at which a 
state of affairs is asserted as taking place. If a sentence contains a definite temporal adverbial, 
this adverbial will always denote the asserted reference time: 
(3-4) a At three o'clock Henry decided to get up. 
b At three o'clock Henry was working in the garden. 
Frame adverbials, such as yesterday, in 1975, last year, etc. do not specify the asserted 
reference time of a proposition, but put a frame on it. Thus in (3-5) 
(3-5) Yesterday I went to Waterstone's. 
the asserted reference time for the proposition is a time interval within the interval introduced 
by the adverbial at which the state of affairs is asserted as having taken place. 
In temporally unmodified narrative, the asserted reference time for a new clause or sentence 
is normally provided by a clause which precedes it. This will be discussed in more detail 
'The terms asserted and assumed reference time are briefly introduced in the article by Dowty (1986) 
discussed in the previous chapter. Dowty's approach does not make use of the concept of a referential centre. 
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further down. 
The assumed reference time of a proposition is the interval at which a state of affairs is assumed 
to take place. In some cases (such as example (3-3a) above), this interval will coincide with 
the asserted reference time of the proposition. In such instances the referential centre of the 
proposition will be said to be symmetrical. Alternatively, the assumed reference time of a 
proposition will be inferred to extend at one or both sides of its asserted reference time, as 
in (3-3b)). If this is the case the referential centre of the proposition is asymmetrical. 
Two of the six categories in our typology exhibit an asymmetrical referential centre-viz. 
contingent and non-contingent states. The other four (culminations, culminated processes, 
processes and points) are characterised by the fact that their referential centre is symmetrical. 
Asserted and assumed reference times are time intervals which exhibit one of two interval 
properties: they may be either atomic or extended. If a referential centre is asymmetrical 
its asserted reference time will be atomic, and its assumed reference time extended. If it is 
symmetrical both intervals may be either atomic (in which case we will refer to the referential 
centre as an atomic RC) or extended (resulting in an extended RC). 
On the basis of this we can further narrow down distinctions between the six categories as 
follows: 
symmetrical RC asymmetrical RC 







It remains to be specified how each of the upper three categories (culminations, culminated 
processes and contingent states) differs from the one below it (points, processes and non- 
contingent states respectively). To capture this distinction, which is crucial to our argument, 
we will introduce the notion of a contingency structure. 
69 
3.2.4 Contingency structures 
Culminations, culminated processes and contingent states are, in our approach, characterised 
by the fact that their asserted reference time includes reference to a point which brings about 
a change of state and which therefore creates the appropriate conditions for a new state of 
affairs (which comes after it), by enabling it or causing it. In the case of culminations and 
contingent states this point is identical to the asserted reference time of the proposition; in 
the case of culminated processes it constitutes the final boundary of the proposition's asserted 
reference time. 
Aspectual types which make reference to a change have a particular ontological structure 
associated with them which following Moens (1987) and Moens & Steedman (1988) we will 
define as consisting of a period leading up to the change of state (or preparatory period), 
the change of state (or culmination), and a period ensuing after this change of state (or its 
consequences). Moens & Steedman refer to this as a nucleus. We will call it a contingency 
structure. It can be represented schematically as follows: 
preparatory period consequences 
[C] 
culmination 
The semantic specification of the contingency structure evoked by a given state of affairs will 
obviously depend on the context in which the sentence occurs. This means it doesn't consist of 
all situations which can be contingently related to a given state of affairs in real world terms, 
but rather of those situations which can plausibly be envisaged to be contingently connected 
to the described state of affairs within the model of the discourse under construction. 
In the case of propositions exhibiting a culminated process type, the asserted reference time 
of the proposition coincides with both the preparatory period and the culmination of the 
contingency structure associated with the type. In the case of culminations and contingent 
states the asserted reference time is identical only with the change of state of the contingency 
structure evoked. 
Points, processes and non-contingent states, on the other hand, do not invite association with 
contingently related states of affairs. The asserted reference time of points and non-contingent 
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states is not conceived of as a change of state, so that no consequences are to be envisaged 
after them. Similarly the extended asserted reference time of process types does not include 
reference to a final boundary after which consequences ensue. 
A new sentence in temporally unmarked narrative creates the impression of forward movement 
in time-that is, introduces an update on the time line under construction-only if it can be 
placed in the consequences of the state of affairs which precedes it. This means that narrative 
time moves forward only after sentences exhibiting the type of a culmination, a culminated 
process or a contingent state, all of which include reference to a culmination, and therefore 
carry intimations of consequences which can be referred to by a subsequent description. 
3.2.5 The typology 
The properties of referential centres corresponding to the six aspectual types we distinguish 
between can be described in terms of the following stipulations: 
1. A referential centre consists of two intervals, viz. an asserted (r) and an assumed (r') 
reference time. 
2. These intervals may be atomic or extended. 
3. A referential centre may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. It is symmetrical if r and r' 
coincide (r = r'). It is asymmetrical if r is included in r' (r C r'). 
4. If the asserted reference time of a RC is atomic it may either be a culmination (or change 
of state) or a point. If it is a culmination, the proposition evokes a contingency structure 
and has consequences associated with it. If it is a point, it doesn't have consequences 
associated with it. 
5. If the asserted reference time of a RC is extended it may be bounded or non-bounded If 
it is bounded it includes reference to a culmination (i.e. an atomic subinterval which 
coincides with its final boundary). This means it evokes a contingency structure and 
has consequences associated with it. 
In the light of these criteria, the typology we rely on looks like this: 
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Symmetrical RC Asymmetrical RC 
RC atomic RC extended 




-Coat Points Processes (Non-contingent) 
States 
The six types we distinguish between can be represented schematically as follows:2 






Example: The train arrived. 
Type: culmination. 
ii. RC is symmetrical; r and r' are atomic, but r is not a culmination. The proposition does 




Example: He hiccoughed. 
Type: point. 
Hi. RC is symmetrical; r and r' are extended and r includes reference to a culmination. The 





2To represent the aspectual properties of each of the categories we use square brackets to indicate a bounded 
interval, angle brackets to indicate an unbounded intervaL P stands for a non-consequential atomic interval 
(or point); C stands for a culmination. 
72 
Example: He wrote a letter. 
Type: culminated process. 
iv. RC is symmetrical; r and r' are extended but r does not include reference to a culmination. 
The proposition does not evoke a contingency structure. 
< //////////////////// > 
r 
Example: He walked slowly. 
Type: process. 
V. RC is asymmetrical; r is atomic, r' is extended, r is a culmination. The proposition evokes 
a contingency structure. 
</////////// r'//////////// > 
[C] 
[r] 
Example: (We turned the corner and) the village was out of sight. 
Type: Contingent states. 
A. RC is asymmetrical; r is atomic, r' extended, and r is not a culmination. The proposition 
does not evoke a contingency structure. 
Example: He was tired. 
Type: non-contingent states, also referred to simply as states. 
One of the advantages of our approach is that it captures the difference between processes (or, 
in Vendler's terminology, activities) and states without having to resort to real world criteria. 
In Vendler's characterisation, the difference between the two categories is specified in terms of 
the fact that activities involve dynamics, while states don't. This criterion, however, becomes 
problematical if one considers, for example, that (3-6b) is a state, while (3-6a) is an activity, 
although both situations clearly involve some kind of dynamics in real world terms: 
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(3-6) a Alfred walked slowly. 
b Alfred was walking slowly 
Apart from this, our main concern-as already pointed out-is not with an ontological clas- 
sification of situation types. At the heart of our account lies the idea that the same situation 
may be thought of, or described, in different ways depending on the aspectual operators a 
proposition combines with and the context it occurs in. Our central goal is to specify the 
relationship between the aspectual properties of clauses and the way the reader incorporates 
them into a model of the discourse in which they occur. 
In our approach, states resemble processes in that their assumed reference time is an extended 
non-bounded interval, and that they do not evoke a contingency structure. They differ from 
them in that the asserted reference time of states is an atomic interval (so that their referential 
centre is asymmetrical) while that of processes is an extended non-bounded interval (so that 
their referential centre is symmetrical). The repercussions of these referential properties for 
the temporal and perspectival interpretation of processes and states will become clear later 
in this chapter. 
3.3 Comments 
In the existing literature on aspect, the opposition between situations that include reference 
to a culmination and those that do not is often referred to as that between telic (or bounded) 
and atelic (or unbounded) situations. Telic situations are characterised by the fact that they 
reach a particular and well-defined endpoint, at which a change of state takes place. We 
refer to this endpoint as a culmination. All culminations by definition carry intimations of 
consequences. Atelic situations, on the other hand, do not include reference to a change of 
state or culmination, and have no consequences associated with them. 
Quirk e.a. (1985: 201) refer to points as non-conclusive, punctual events. Earlier proposals 
in Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) and Steedman (1977) incorporate a similar notion. Our 
use of the term points to label the category of atomic situations which do not evoke a 
contingency structure follows Moens (1987). Basic point propositions are very rare, but the 
category constitutes an important node for a number of transition paths. This will become 
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more clear later. 
The category of contingent states differs from the other categories in two respects. First of 
all, contingent states occur only as contextualised propositions; in other words, only context 
can coerce a proposition into a contingent state. And second, although the referential centre 
of contingent states is asymmetrical their assumed reference time normally does not extend 
before their asserted reference time (or if it does it does so only marginally). All this will be 
discussed in detail shortly. 
Vendler characterises achievements (in our terminology: culminations) as punctual. As was 
shown in the previous chapter, however, this term has some misleading connotations: culmi- 
nations are not necessarily characterised by the fact that they have no temporal extension at 
all in "real life" terms; rather, they are conceived of as not having any internal structure. We 
feel the choice of the term atomic more accurately reflects this. Moreover, the term culmi- 
nation captures that culminations constitute a change of state on an associated contingency 
structure, and, hence, that they carry intimations of a preparatory period and consequences. 
Accomplishments (or culminated processes) are described by Vendler as resembling activities 
(or processes) in that they have successive phases, but as differing from them in that they are 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. What such a characterisation fails to capture is that 
accomplishments are "heterogeneous" in that they are really composite situations consisting 
of an activity associated with a particular output or endpoint (cf. Dowty 1979), after which 
a change of state will ensue. The choice of the term culminated process makes clear the 
relationship between the referent of this situation type (consisting of a preparatory process 
and the culmination this leads up to) and the contingency structure it evokes. Opting for the 
term processes instead of activities enables us to reflect the fact that it is easy to conceive 
of a process as part of a culminated process (viz. the period leading up to its culmination) 
which, if assigned an endpoint, adopts the behaviour of a culminated process. 
Finally, it is perhaps worth drawing attention to the fact that Vendler's use of the term 
process differs from ours. Vendler's notion of process corresponds to what we refer to as 
propositions-in other words, he uses it as an umbrella term to refer to situation types in 
general. In our terminology processes are roughly equivalent to Vendler's activities. 
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We will now turn our attention to the way in which the different aspectual types we have 
characterised here are contextualised in narrative. 
3.4 Aspect and temporal ordering 
3.4.1 Narration vs description 
Although a number of different relationships may hold between consecutive main clauses in 
temporally unmodified narrative, two of these have a high degree of plausibility. The first is 
forward movement in time. This temporal relation applies if the ordering of the sentences 
on the page is felt by the reader to mimic temporal progression within the realm of the text. 
Sequences of sentences which create the impression of temporal movement will be said to 
narrate-they constitute narration. As was already pointed out earlier, the presentation of 
situations in a particular temporal order is quintessential to the narrative genre. 
The second temporal relation is Simultaneity, which includes overlap. Obviously strict tempo- 
ral linearity can only be maintained as long as abstraction is made of other dimensions of the 
fictional world, such as its descriptive complexity. Consecutive clauses or sentences, therefore, 
may also be interpreted by the reader as reflecting that states of affairs apply simultaneously, 
so that the "horizontal" unfolding of action of development is temporarily suspended in favour 
of a descriptive "vertical" focus. Sentences which do not update the narrative will be called 
description. Narration is, in the existing literature, often referred to as the "foreground" of a 
narrative, while description is often felt to constitute its "background" (e.g. Hopper 1977). 
Seen in this light reading a narrative involves a continuous process of extending and sus- 
pending time lines. This is illustrated by the following passage, in which bracketed sentences 
suspend the unfolding of narrative time while unbracketed sentences update the narrative:3 
$Clearly, descriptive information can also be furnished by elements which modify noun phrases or verbal 
predicates (such as, in this particular example, jammed open against some bold geraniums, stooping a little, 
stanng straight ahead, walking swiftly, that wound behind the town like a great rope looping the villas together, 
dnving towards the Excelsior). Although an analysis of such constituents could be incorporated in the type 
of approach we propose (it could be argued that they all constitute embedded states), we will restrict our 
discussion tp the aspectual information conveyed by non-embedded clauses which may change the aspectual 
type, and therefore the temporal interpretation, of the proposition concerned. 
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(3-7) (The gates of the Pension Villa Excelsior were open wide, jammed open 
against some bold geraniums.) Stooping a little, staring straight ahead, 
walking swiftly, he passed through them and began climbing the hill that 
wound behind the town like a great lope looping the villas together.(The 
dust lay thick.) A carriage came bowling along driving towards the Excel- 
sior. (In it sat the General and the Countess; they had been for his daily 
airing.) Mr Salesby stepped to one side. (Mansfield, The Man Without A 
Temperament: 13) 
While the distinction between narration and description is commonly referred to in the ex- 
isting literature (cf. Barthes 1966, Lukacs 1970), it has never received a clear linguistic 
definition. As we pointed out earlier, two types of information appear to determine whether 
or not a new main clause introduces a temporal update on the time line constructed by the 
reader-namely its aspectual type, and the way the semantic content of the sentence coheres 
with the discourse which surrounds it. We therefore need to determine the impact of both, 
and the relationship between the two. 
3.4.2 Contingency 
Due to the genre conventions associated with narrative, the reader's attention in the pro- 
cessing of a narrative will be geared towards detecting consequentiality relations between 
the states of affairs described. The notion of consequentiality embraces two relationships: a 
non-temporal one (contingency), and a temporal one (temporal ordering, most standardly 
temporal progression). A state of affairs 82 is contingently related to another state of affairs 
81 if 82 can be causally related to sl, or if al is felt to enable, or create the appropriate 
conditions for, 82. Contingency relations, in other words, may be weak or strong. 
Our central hypothesis is that the temporal ordering of consecutive sentences in narrative 
depends, invlast instance, on whether or not the reader can perceive a contingency relation 
between them. If semantic content and world knowledge make it possible to infer a contin- 
gency relation between two states of affairs s1 and 82, this relationship will be made salient 
and the reader will order the two states of affairs accordingly. This means, in the majority of 
cases, that consequences will be associated with s1, (which therefore has to include reference 
to a culmination) and that 82 will be placed in these consequences. As a result of this 82 will 
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introduce a temporal update into the narrative .4 
The following constitute examples of sequences of clauses which are not only sequentially but 
also contingently related: 
(3-8) She collected the cards and began to deal them into their proper packs. 
(Waugh, A Handful of Dust: 113) 
(3-9) He [...] shook the bottle, poured her out a dose and brought it across. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 15) 
(3-10) They took her out [of the bath] and dried her. (White, The House of 
Clouds: 59) 
(3-11) The nurses caught her and dragged her along the passage. (White, The 
House of Clouds: 58) 
(3-12) Amelie took her shoes off, tied them together and hung them around her 
neck. (Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 58) 
For obvious reasons, sentences in dialogues are dominated by a relation of contingency: 
(3-13) "Ah, Lapinova," Rosalind murmured. "Is that what she's called?" said 
Ernest-"the real Rosalind?" (Woolf, Lappin And Lapinova: 22) 
(3-14) "Like a beer," he says, "or are you a vegetarian?" "As a matter of fact I 
am," she says. (Atwood, Uglypuss: 97) 
In all these instances the contingency link between the two consecutive states of affairs is 
unambiguous: the change of state brought about by the first situation creates the appropriate 
conditions for the second one, and interpreting in any kind of order other than sequentially 
would sound strange, perplexing or nonsensical. 
In other cases, world knowledge might make it felicitous the states of affairs described by two 
consecutive clauses to be interpreted as occurring in a temporal sequence different the order 
of the clauses on the page. In such instances, too, however, there will be a strong inclination 
on the part of the reader to interpret the second clause as being enabled by the first, and 
therefore to assume that the order of the sentences on the page mimics temporal progression. 
Consider, for example, the difference between the (a) and the (b) sequence in (3-15): 
4There are some exceptions to this. These will be discussed in section 3.4.5 below. 
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(3-15) a She screamed, and nurses, dozens of them, crowded round the bath to 
laugh at her. (White, The House of Clouds: 59) 
b Nurses, dozens of them, crowded round the bath to laugh at her, and 
she screamed. 
While both passages are equally acceptable, there is a distinct difference in the interpretation 
they elicit. In (3-15a), the nurses' laughter will normally be inferred to be a reaction to the 
woman's screaming, and thus to follow it in time; while in (b), the reader will instinctively 
assume that the woman's screaming constitutes a response to the laughter, and is to be 
interpreted as coming after it. 
3.4.3 Topical coherence 
If no contingency relation can be detected between two states of affairs 81 and 82, no con- 
sequences will be associated with al, which therefore cannot be conceived of as including 
reference to a culmination. Because of this 82 is interpreted at the same asserted reference 
time as al, and therefore will not update the narrative. Moreover, the reader's focus of atten- 
tion will shift towards the establishment of another (i.e. non-contingent) relationship between 
82 and al. The clauses in the following passag'all describes states of affairs that cannot be 
contingently related to each other: 
(3-16) It [i.e. the buck] was coming down the ridge, as if it were walking out of 
the very sound of the horn which related its death. It was not running, it 
was walking, tremendous, unhurried, slanting and tilting its head to pass 
the antler through the undergrowth. (Faulkner, Go Down Moses: 183) 
(3.17) In the marvellous Framleigh morning Jason and Kevin are on the terrace. 
The early mist is again curling up from the prospect and the trees and 
a shaft of sunlight has isolated the temple so that it rides the landscape 
like a vision. No one else is about; the windows of the house are curtained 
still and within people are either numbly sleeping or waking to headaches, 
shaggy tongues and mental unease. (Lively, Next to Nature, Art: 185). 
(3-18) The coat collar pressed rough against her neck and her cheeks were softly 
cold as if they had been washed in icewater. She breathed gently with the 
air; on the left a strip of veld fire curled silently, fiameless. Overhead a 
dove purred. (Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meeth: 
17) 
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(3-19) The delicious breath of rain was in the air. In the street below a peddler 
was crying his wares. The notes of a distant song which some one was 
singing reached her faintly, and countless sparrows were twittering in the 
eaves. (Chopin, The Story of an Hour: 82) 
We characterise the relationship made salient between these sequences of sentences as topical. 
This term is deliberately vague: "topics" which may serve as dominant focus of coherence 
include any type of image, impression (sensory or mental), or contemplation of the fictional 
world. 
Although we claim that the temporal relationship between the sentences in the passages above 
is determined by (essentially non-temporal) kinds of coherence the reader perceives between 
their semantic content, it is, of course, not accidental that all of the sentences in examples (3- 
8) to (3-15) exhibit culminated process or culmination types, while those in examples (3-16) 
to (3-19) are all processes or states. We will now examine the relationship between sentence 
aspect and discourse coherence in more detail. 
3.4.4 Ordering temporally unmodified main clauses in narrative 
General principles. 
Our argument crucially differentiates between the aspectual type of decontextualised propo- 
sitions, and that of contextualised propositions. The type of decontextualised propositions is, 
as we have seen earlier, determined either by the lexical- semantic properties of their basic 
proposition (if the sentence contains no aspectual operators), or by the interaction of aspec- 
tual operators with the basic proposition (in which case the basic proposition is coerced). In 
the case of contextualised propositions the type of the decontextualised proposition may be 
further coerced by context. 
With respect to decontextualised propositions, we distinguish between contingent categories 
(which include reference to a culmination, and therefore evoke a contingency structure) and 
non-contingent categories. Because contingent states only occur as contextualised proposi- 
tions, contingent decontextualised propositions are either culminations or culminated pro- 
cesses; we refer to these collectively as events, or, in shorthand, Lb. Points, we have said 
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earlier, occur so rarely as decontextualised propositions that they are negligable. We will 
therefore limit our discussion of non-contingent decontextualised propositions to processes 
and states, collectively referred to as PSs. 
Events are characterised by two features. First of all, they are to be interpreted at an 
asserted reference time which differs from that of the sentence which precedes them. This 
means that, in the absence of temporal adverbials, they are to be placed in the consequences 
of the contingency structure associated with a preceding proposition. And secondly, they 
make available a locus for a new asserted reference time for subsequent reference which does 
not coincide with their own asserted reference time but which has been shifted. This locus 
usually coincides with the consequences associated with the event. If one of these conditions 
is not met, either because of the requirements of the proposition which precedes or follows the 
event, or because of the coherence relations made salient by the text, context acts as coercive 
operator. 
PSs, on the other hand, are to be interpreted at a stable asserted reference time, i.e. an 
asserted reference time which coincides with that of the sentence which precedes them. This 
means they cannot be placed in the consequences of a preceding proposition unless they are 
coerced. Processes and states also stabilise their own asserted reference time, which means 
they do not make available consequences which may serve as locus for subsequent reference, 
unless they are, again, coerced. 
We will now discuss different types of temporal ordering more systematically. CE, in the 
heading of the following sections, denotes that a contingency relationship is made salient 
between the two aspectual types under discussion. NC, on the other hand, means that no 
contingency relationship can be detected. Thus E + CE sequences is shorthand for sequences 
of two events which are contingently related. PS + NCE sequences stands for sequences of a 
process or a state followed by an event which is not contingently related to it, etc. 
E + CE sequences. 
In the majority of cases sequences of two events trigger the impression of forward movement 
in time. This can be explained in the light of the principles just outlined. The first event 
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makes reference to a culmination and therefore makes available consequences for subsequent 
reference. The second event has to be interpreted at a shifted asserted reference time, which 
is available. If the semantic content of the clauses supports a contingency link between the 
two, no matter how weak, the second event will be placed in the consequences of the first and 
as a result updates the narrative. 
The temporal movement exhibited by the sequence of culminated processes in (3-20), for 
example, 
(3-20) Mark put the envelope in his inside jacket pocket, and took a cab to the 
Foundation. (Oakley, The Men's Room: 133) 





[ rl ] (PP) (Cons) 
[C] ////////// 
[ r'4 ] 
[ r2 ] 
The same mechanism accounts for the impression of temporal movement created by the 
sequence in (3-21) 
(3-21) At the door of the booking office we collided with a rather exquisite young 
man, and I recognized Miss Marple's nephew just arriving. (Christie, The 
Murder at the Vicarage: 113) 
Since the first clause in this example constitutes a culmination, its referential parameters are 
to be construed as two coinciding atomic intervals which are mapped onto the culmination of 
the contingency structure the state of affairs evokes. In addition to this the culmination has 
consequences associated with it, which can plausibly serve as antecedent context for the fol- 









E + NCE sequences. 
The aspectual type of events, in our analysis, is characterised by the fact that their referential 
centre is symmetrical and that they evoke a meaning structure of contingently related states of 
affairs. If an event is followed by another event, the latter will normally activate this structure 
because it can be contingently related to it and hence be placed in its consequences. The 
type of coherence which most prominently governs the relationship between two consecutive 
events, however, may override this expectation: if no contingency relation can be inferred to 
hold between two events, a topical relation between them will be made salient. In such cases 
the reader has to adjust the aspectual nature of the decontextualised propositions in the light 
of the context in which they occur. This means abstraction has to be made of the contingency 
structure normally evoked by them: the events can no longer be perceived as bringing about 
a change of state, and are coerced into their non-contingent equivalent, so that they no longer 
evoke a contingency structure. 
The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-22) Beyond the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. (Lively, 
Moon Tiger: 207) 
(3-23) Greg, in the old gun-room that serves now as telephone room, makes two 
calls to London and one to Boston. Bob walks back from the village pub 
in the dark, a trifle unsteadily. (Lively, Next to Nature, Art: 17) 
In such instances, events do not partake in an unfolding chain of action and development, but 
furnish descriptive details of what the fictional world looks like. 
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E + CPS sequences. 
Process or state types may create the impression of forward movement in time if they are 
sequences with an event and if a contingency relation is made salient between their semantic 
content and that of the event description which precedes it. The following examples illustrate 
this: 
(3-24) (We mounted,) turned a corner, and the village was out of sight. (Rhys, 
Wide Sargasso Sea: 58) 
(3-25) (He came in and) switched on the light. There he stood tall, handsome, 
rubbing his hands that were red with cold. (Woolf, Lappin and Lapinova: 
-27) 
(3-26) (His leg is in her way-it thrashes, she thrusts, and a piece of cliff, of 
the solid world which evidently is not so solid after all, shifts under her 
clutching hands...) crumbles... and she is falling thwack backwards on her 
shoulders, her head, her outfiung arm. (Lively, Moon Tiger: 4) 
(3-27) (At last the wire tore through its hold on the cloth;) wobbling, frantic, she 
climbed over the fence. And she was out. (Gordimer, Is There Nowhere 
Else Where We Can Meet?: 19) 
(3-28) The iron gate clanged open. Light dragging steps sounded across the hall, 
coming towards him. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 7) 
(3-29) "Look here, would you like my watch?" And he dangled it before her. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 13) 
When processing sequences like the ones above, the reader constructs a contingency structure, 
which means consequences are made available which may serve as antecedent context for 
a subsequent contingently related state of affairs. The next clause is, on the basis of its 
compositionally derived meaning, identified as a state (examples (3-24) to (3-27)) or a process 
(examples (3-28) and (3-29)), and therefore normally has to be interpreted at a stable asserted 
reference time, which is not provided. But pragmatic inferences make salient a contingency 
relationship between the semantic content of the two clauses. Because of this the type of the 
second clause has to be coerced, so that it can be placed in the consequences of the first clause. 
This is achieved by associating a contingency structure with its asserted reference time. In 
the case of states this means that the asserted reference time is conceived of as a culmination. 
In the case of processes, the extended asserted reference time is assigned a culmination. Once 
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this is done, the clause can be placed into the consequences of the event which precedes it. 
The reader's interpretation of verbs which are, in principle, ambiguous between a state and 
an event interpretation can be explained along the same lines: if a contingency relation can 
be detected between the aspectually ambiguous proposition and the state of affairs which 
precedes it the propositions be interpreted as an event. (3-30) illustrates this: 
(3-30) "Tessa, sit down. I'll make you some oatmeal." As if a hand were pressing 
down on her shoulder, she sat. (Oates, Wild Saturday: 102) 
E + NCPS sequences. 
In the following examples an event is followed by a process or a state which is not contingently 
related to it: 
(3-31) She glanced at him sideways. Well, when he was eating toast he looked 
like a rabbit. (Woolf, Lappin and Lapinova: 20) 
(3-32) Finally he comes inside. The moon-the room is painted white with moon- 
light. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 18) 
(3-33) (She got up, waved,) and slowly she came to meet him, dragging the heavy 
cape. In her hand she carried a spray of heliotrope. (Mansfield, The Man 
Without A Temperament: 15) 
Again, there is a conflict between the requirements of the two consecutive aspectual types: 
the event evokes a contingency structure and makes available a shifted asserted reference 
time for subsequent reference. But the following state or process type has to be interpreted 
at a stable asserted reference time. Because no contingency relationship can be inferred 
between the two states of affairs, however, it is, in this instance, the event which has to be 
coerced: the reader has, at least temporarily, to make abstraction of the contingency structure 
normally associated with it. In the case of the examples above, this means the culmination 
proposition is coerced into a point, so that it can serve as appropriate antecedent context for 
the next proposition; this involves stripping the described state of affairs of any envisaged 
consequences, so that its asserted reference time is stabilised. 
If a culminated process is followed by a state or process description which is not contingently 
related to it, the culminated process is stripped of its culmination, and coerced into a process. 
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The following example illustrates this: 
(3-34) (Miss Henley came in time to put Francis to bed and then) she took us 
down to dinner. The Lord and Lady were waiting in the hall. (Boyle, 
Natives Don't Cry: 40) 
The contingency structure evoked by the first event, however, remains present as an underlying 
layer of meaning which may be reactivated at a later stage. Thus in (3-35), the second 
event, which has to be interpreted at a shifted asserted reference time, can be placed into 
the consequences of the first one, which had been temporarily made abstraction of for the 
interpretation of the process: 
(3-35) [...] she came to meet him, dragging the heavy cape. In her hand she 
carried a spray of heliotrope. "You're late," she cried gayly. (Mansfield, 
The Man Without A Temperament: 15) 
PS + NCPS sequences. 
If a state or process is sequenced with another state or process, the second proposition will 
be interpreted as simultaneous or overlapping with the first unless a contingency relation 
between them is made salient. This is in line with the analysis we propose. Consider, first of 
all, the case of two consecutive states, as in (3-36): 
(3-36) They were a very dark young couple-black hair, olive skin, brilliant eyes 
and teeth. He was dressed "English fashion" in a flannel jacket, white 
trouser and shoes. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 11) 
When the reader encounters the first clause in this passage, she identifies it as a state and 
accordingly constructs an atomic asserted reference time-the point at which the appear- 
ance of the couple is described, observed or perceived (we will, for the sake of clarity, make 
abstraction for the moment of the fact that the clause is itself contextualised and that this 
atomic asserted reference time is provided by preceding discourse). The actual extension of 
the state, however, is not restricted to this particular point in time: clearly, the character- 
isation provided by the clause already applied before this time, and will continue to apply 
beyond it-without it being specified when it came about, or when it will cease to hold. 
The state's asserted reference time, in other words, is to be situated within an unbounded 
interval extending at both sides of it which constitutes its assumed reference time. Because 
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the asserted reference time of the state is not a culmination it is stabilised. 
The next clause also constitutes a state. Because of this, it has to be interpreted at a stable 
asserted reference time, which is provided by the first clause. Its actual extension will, as 
in the case of the first clause, extend at both sides of this asserted reference time, so that 
it also overlaps with the assumed extension of the first clause. Because no contingency link 
is established between the two clauses, the reader directs her focus of attention towards 
establishing some kind of topical coherence between them. This is in line with the semantic 
content of the clauses. 
The asserted reference time of processes, in the analysis we propose, does not include reference 
to a change of state or culmination; hence processes do not evoke a contingency structure. 
Because of this, processes, like states, are to be interpreted at a stable asserted reference 
time, and they do not make available consequences for subsequent reference, unless they are 
coerced by context. Processes differ from states, however, in that their referential centre is 
symmetrical, and their asserted reference time extended. 
What this means is that while processes describe a non-bounded situation as extending over 
a period of time, they differ from states in that their asserted reference time is not an atomic 
interval at which this situation is assessed as in progress. Processes convey, rather, that the 
state of affairs they describe is to be conceived of as asserted at an unspecified time span 
which coincides with their assumed reference time. Such a representation captures the overt 
and developing nature of processes often referred to in the literature. But because their 
asserted reference time does not include reference to a culmination, consecutive processes are 
interpreted as simultaneous (unless a contingency relation is made salient between them): the 
first process provides the stabilised asserted reference time required for the interpretation of 
the second. The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-37) She trembled with strength as they struggled. The dust puffed round her 
shoes and his scuffling toes. (Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else We Can 
Meet: 19) 
(3-38) Her pulses beat fast, and the coursing blood warmed and relaxed every 
inch of her body. (Chopin, The Story Of An Hour: 83) 
(3-39) We drank; we ate. (Munro: Chaddeleys and Flemings: 16) 
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(3-40) The sun blazed out and steam rose from the garden behind us. (Rhys, 
Wide Sargasso Sea: 58) 
(3-41) Their laughing voices charged with excitement beat against the glassed- 
in veranda like birds and a strange, saltish smell came from the basket. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 11) 
Because the asserted reference time is protracted rather than atomic, however, the relationship 
between consecutive processes is less static than in the case of states: while processes do not 
rely for their interpretation on a shifted temporal locus and thus do not update the narrative, 
they do, because of the fact that their asserted reference time extends, convey a sense of 
temporal development which states lack. 
If a process is sequenced with a state, and no contingency relationship is detected between the 
two, both are assessed at the same stable asserted reference time, along the lines just discussed, 
and will therefore be interpreted as simultaneous. The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-42) [S] Over in the corner sat The Two Topknots, drinking a concoction they 
always drank at this hour-something whitish, greyish, in glasses, with 
little husks floating on the top-and rooting ia tin full of paper shavings 
for pieces of speckled biscuit, which they broke, dropped into the glassed 
and fished for with spoons. [P] Their two coils of knitting, like two snakes, 
slumbered beside the tray. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 
7) 
(3-43) [P] Hand in hand the youthful lovers sauntered along the esplanade. [S] It 
was a night in midsummer; [S] a whispy moon had set, [S] and the stars 
glittered. [S] The dark mass of the sea, at flood, lay tranquil, slothfully 
slapping the shingle. (Richardson, Two Hanged Women: 49) 
PS + CPS Sequences. 
While consecutive states or processes are normally interpreted as simultaneous, they may 
create the impression that narrative time moves forward if a contingency relationship is made 
salient between them. The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-44) She was nearer to him now [...]. She was level with him, passing him. 
(Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet?: 19) 
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(3-45) [...] and she was actually under the Abbey walls, was springing, with 
Henry's assistance, from the carriage, was beneath the shelter of the old 
porch, and had even passed onto the hall, where her friend and the General 
were waiting to welcome her [...]. (Austen, Northanger Abbey: 167) 
(3-46) The taxi was close to her now, its door was open, she was getting in. 
(Wharton, Atrophy: 38) 
(3-47) She went and stood at the window with a greatly disturbed look on her 
face. (Chopin, The Storm: 3) 
The mechanism which allows us to account for such sequences is completely in line with our 
earlier analysis. When the reader encounters the first state or process clause she will, on the 
basis of its compositionally derived meaning, identify it as a non-contingent type (we will, 
for the sake of clarity, not take into account discourse which precedes it and which might 
obviously also affect its aspectual interpretation). She will accordingly construct a referential 
centre the asserted reference time of which is not a culmination, and which hence does not 
make available consequences for subsequent reference. 
The second clause is again identified as a process or a state. If it could be topically related to 
the first clause it would be interpreted at the same reference time, which is stable. Semantic 
content and world knowledge, however, make salient a contingency relation between the two 
clauses. This means that the reader, first of all, has to retrospectively adapt her aspectual 
interpretation of the first clause, by making it contingent. This is achieved either by thinking 
of its asserted reference time as a culmination (if the proposition is a state) or by assigning 
a culmination to it (if the proposition is a process). And second, the aspectual type of the 
second clause has to be adjusted, so that its asserted reference time can be placed in the 
consequences of the first clause. This means the second clause, too, is to be made contingent. 
PS + NCE sequences. 
If a process or state is followed by an event which cannot be contingently related to it, the 
antecedent requirements of the event (which is to be interpreted at a non-stable asserted 
reference time) are in conflict with the antecedent context provided by the state or process. 
In such cases, however, the event will often re-activate a contingency structure associated 
with an event earlier in the narrative which was temporarily made abstraction of to create 
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the appropriate antecedent context for a subsequent state or process. The following examples 
illustrate this: 
(3-48) [Cl] Helen woke up and screamed. [C2] (Another nurse was sitting by the 
green lamp.) [C3] "You must be quiet, dear," said the nurse. (White, The 
House of Clouds: 56) 
(3-49) [C1] A carriage came bowling along driving towards the Excelsior. [C2] (In 
it sat the General and the Countess; they had been for his daily airing.) 
[C3] Mr Salesby stepped to one side. (Mansfield, The Man Without A 
Temperament: 13) 
In each of these examples the third clause [C3] is placed in the consequences of the contingency 
structure evoked by the first clause [Cl], which were temporarily made abstraction of to 
process the second clause [C2]. 
PS + CE sequences. 
In some instances, finally, a state or process may be followed by an event which is contingently 
related to it. In terms of our analysis, this means that the state or process has to be coerced 
into a contingent type so that it meets the requirements of the following event. In the case of 
a state, this is achieved by conceiving of its asserted reference time as a culmination, so that 
consequences can be associated with it: 
(3-50) When they reached the lift she was coughing. He frowned. (Mansfield, 
The Man without A Temperament: 15) 
In the case of a process, a culmination is to be assigned to the extended asserted reference 
time of the process: 
(3-51) [...] the pie flew and caught him on the side of the face just as in the old 
movies or an I Love Lucy show. (Munro, Chaddeleys and Flemings: 18) 
(3-52) Light dragging steps sounded across the hall, coming towards him. A 
hand, like a leaf, fell on his shoulder. (Mansfield, The Man Without A 
Temperament: 7) 
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3.4.5 Contingently related events: precedence and inclusion 
So far, we have limited our discussion to sequences of (temporally unmarked) main clauses 
which are either interpreted as simultaneous or overlapping, or as propelling time. Other tem- 
poral relations may hold between successive events, however, namely inclusion or precedence. 
In this section we will show how these types of temporal ordering, too, can be accounted for 
in the analysis we propose. 
Inclusion 
Consider, first of all, the following examples: 
(3-53) Dr Messinger went down to the river's edge [...]; he brought with him a 
rifle, a drinking cup and a day's provisions. (Waugh, A Handful of Dust: 
196) 
(3-54) In the morning, father and mother took us part way up a mountain. [...] 
We left very early, while it was dark still. (Boyle, Natives Don't Cry: 46) 
(3-55) Father went to the post office the first thing in Salzburg. He took the 
passports in his hand. (Boyle, Natives Don't Cry: 42) 
Although in each of these passages one event (which has the aspectual type of a culminated 
process) is followed by another one, the second event does not introduce a temporal update, 
but is interpreted as constituting part of the first event. Clearly, the reader's standard 
expectations about the sequential and consequential relations which hold between consecutive 
events is overridden here by a stronger inference: world knowledge makes it more plausible 
to make salient another connection between the two events. 
The contingency structure introduced earlier allows us to represent this connection. Unless it 
is coerced, a culminated process proposition can be represented in terms of a referential centre 
consisting of two symmetrical bounded intervals, which can be mapped onto the preparatory 
process and culmination of the contingency structure they evoke. Because of this a culminated 
process makes available consequences, which are normally singled out for reference by a 
subsequent proposition which is contingently related to it. But aside from its consequences, 
a culminated process proposition also makes available for reference the preparatory process 
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which forms part of the contingency structure it evokes. And in the passages above the second 
event is most naturally interpreted as forming part of the preparatory period (which does not 
include the culmination) of the proposition which precedes it. 







[ r2 1 
Precedence 
Apart from temporal progression and precedence, a third type of ordering may hold between 
successive events, namely precedence. Such a relationship may be inferred by the reader if a 
culmination expression is followed by an event which is most plausibly interpreted as being 
situated in the preparatory process leading up to this culmination. 
As we have seen a culmination carries intimations of the preparatory period of the contingency 
structure it evokes, and it consequences. Both can be made salient as antecedent locus for 
subsequent reference. If a new event proposition is most plausibly interpreted as being placed 
in the preparatory period of a preceding culmination, the reader will infer a relationship of 
precedence between them. 
The sequence in (3-56) illustrates this. 
(3-56) John fell. He slipped on a banana skin. 










Relations of temporal precedence among consecutive events in narrative however, are ex- 
tremely rare: while it is possible to construct sequences such as the above, we haven't en- 
countered any in the actual narratives we analyzed for the purpose of this dissertation. The 
reason for this seems to lie in a combination of Gricean principles and conventions associated 
with narrative. 
As we pointed out earlier, one of the conventions which govern our concept of narrative is that 
the reader expects that the ordering of events the page will mimic temporal progression on 
the narrative line she constructs when processing the narrative. Because of this there seems 
to be a natural reluctance on the part of the reader to assign a different temporal order to 
sequences of temporally unmodified events. 
The reader's efforts to place a new event in the consequences of the one which precedes it may 
be overridden, however, if another contingency link between the two events is so strong that 
it does not allow any other plausible interpretation-for instance, if there is a very prominent 
and virtually unambiguous causality connection between the two, as in (3-56). To express 
such a connection, however, the language user has other means at her disposal which are 
not in conflict with standard conventions of narratives: if the order of the two events in (3- 
56) were reversed, the reader would automatically try to detect a consequentiality relation 
between them which, in the case of (3-56), would be felt to be quite strong. If the writer 
wanted to emphasise this relationship she could do so through the introduction of a subclause 
which specifies it. 
As a result of this an interpretation of the temporal ordering of the two clauses in (3-56) 
would require fewer inferences on the part of the reader if they were ordered as follows: 
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(3-57) a John slipped over a banana skin and fell. 
b John fell because he slipped over a banana skin. 
As our ability to assign an appropriate causal/temporal interpretation to (3-56) illustrates, 
however, the reader will apparently be prepared to make the additional inferences required 
for a felicitous interpretation of the sequence if the causal link between the two events is suffi- 
ciently strong to justify it. If no such strong contingency relation can be inferred, however, a 
sequence which can only be interpreted felicitously if time is interpreted as moving backwards 
will be felt to be unacceptable. Example (3-58) illustrates this: 
(3-58) *John brushed his teeth. He got up. 
The preparatory period of culminated processes, in contrast, serves more frequently as an- 
tecedent locus for a subsequent contingently related proposition. There are two reasons for 
this. First of all, since the preparatory period which serves as antecedent for subsequent 
reference is already referred to by the culminated process expression no backward shift is 
necessary: instead, the temporal interpretation of the new clause merely involves a further 
specification the structure of an already established referential centre. This seems to require 
fewer inferences on the part of the reader. In addition to this the temporal meaning conveyed 
through singling out the preparatory period of a previous proposition as antecedent for a new 
one cannot be expressed in another way which is more in line with narrative conventions: if 
the order of the two clauses were reversed this would clearly result in a different temporal 
interpretation. Moreover, there are no obvious other means by which the same meaning (the 
fact that one event forms part of the time span denoted by another one) can be expressed. 
Conclusion 
In rare cases, a relationship other than temporal sequencing may hold between consecutive 
do 
events-namely inclusion or precVnnce. We have shown in this section that these types of 
temporal ordering, too, can be explained in the light of the account we propose. In the 
majority of cases, however, a new event in a narrative will introduce a temporal update. In 
the rest of this dissertation we will, for the sake of clarity, assume that the locus for the 
asserted reference time of an event in temporally unmarked narrative is provided by the 
consequences associated with a preceding event. 
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3.4.6 Conclusion 
Our discussion of the temporal interpretation of different aspectual types of clauses in a 
narrative was based on a distinction between contingent types (events) and non-contingent 
types (processes and states). If contingent types are sequenced they create the impression 
of a forward movement of time; this was explained in the light of the fact that they have 
a contingency structure associated with them. Consecutive non-contingent types, on the 
other hand, are normally interpreted as simultaneous or overlapping. This was attributed 
to the fact that they do not include reference to a culmination, and therefore do not make 
available consequences for subsequent reference. In addition to this, however, non-contingent 
types may be interpreted as contingent, and contingent types may be interpreted as non- 
contingent, depending on the relationship that is made salient between the clause and its 
context. For example, if a clause exhibiting a non-contingent type is sequenced with one 
exhibiting a contingent one, the aspectual type of one of them has to be coerced to meet the 
contextualisation requirements of the other. Moreover, the coherence relation that is most 
salient between the semantic content of consecutive clauses of affairs may also affect their as- 
pectual interpretation. Thus two consecutive propositions which, if decontextualised, exhibit 
a contingent type may be contextualised as non-contingent if no contingency relationship can 
be detected between them, while two consecutive propositions which, if decontextualised, ex- 
hibit a non-contingent type may be contextualised as contingent if a contingency relationship 
is made salient between them. 
Clauses or sentences which narrate, it follows from our discussion, exhibit a contingent type, 
and fall into two types. Events are defined as propositions with a symmetrical referential 
centre which are contingently related to a preceding proposition; they include processes and 
points which are thought of as contingent because of the context in which they occur. And 
contingent states are defined as propositions with an asymmetrical referential centre the as- 
serted reference time of which is contingently related to the proposition which precedes them. 
Contingent states have always been coerced by the context in which they occur. Events and 
contingent states introduce a temporal update into a narrative. 
Along the same lines, we can distinguish between two types of propositions which describe. 
Such propositions exhibit a non-contingent type. Points and processes are propositions with 
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a symmetrical referential centre which cannot be contingently related to a preceding propo- 
sition; they include culminations and culminated processes which are thought of as non- 
contingent because of the context in which they occur. And states (by which we always mean 
non-contingent states) are propositions with an asymmetrical referential centre which are not 
contingently related to the proposition which precedes them. Points, processes and states do 
not update a narrative. 
3.5 Aspect and perspective 
3.5.1 Perspectivally non-situated vs perspectivally situated main clauses 
In Chapter 1 we briefly introduced a distinction between perspectivally situated and perspec- 
tivally non-situated sentences. If a reader encounters a perspectivally situated sentence, she 
will assume the described state of affairs is perceived or contemplated from a particular view- 
point, and she will accordingly construct a position within the fictional reality from which 
the described state of affairs is looked at, heard or assessed. We refer to such a position as a 
perspectival focus. If a reader encounters a perspectivally non-situated sentence, on the other 
hand, the question as to the viewpoint from which the state of affairs is described normally 
simply does not arise and no perspectival focus is construed. 
Perspectival information is typically conveyed by what we have referred to as subject-oriented 
elements. But, as we observed in Chapter 1, a sentence may be perspectivally situated even 
if it does not contain any such feature. This is especially clear if its semantic content is not in 
accordance with the "reality" of the fiction, and therefore has to be interpreted as distorted 
by the unreliable judgement of a subject. In the following passage, for example, the male 
protagonist thinks he sees his daughter, who has been kidnapped two years earlier: 
(3-59) (1) The first girl was closest to him. (2) The thick fringe bobbed against 
her white forehead, (3) her chin was raised, (4) she had a dreamy appear- 
ance. (5) He was looking at his daughter. (McEwan, The Child in Time: 
142) 
The fifth clause in this example does not describe the fictional world "objectively" (the 
girl turns out not to be his daughter), but portrays what is the man's imaginative-and 
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mistaken-perception of it. 
A similar observation applies to (3-60): 
(3-60) (1) He stopped (2) and rose again, (3) and seemed quite embarrassed. (4) 
He was more in love with her than Emma had supposed. (Austen, Emma: 
261) 
Readers familiar with Jane Austen's Emma will know that the content of the fourth clause 
in this passage is pure speculation on Emma's part: the referent of the third person pronoun 
(Mr Elton) is not in love with Emma, but sentimentally involved with another character. In 
other instances, the semantic content of a sentence or tensed clause can be interpreted as 
refracted from a subject's point of view, even if there is at the same time no reason to question 
the narrative veridicality of the state of affairs. Thus in example (3-61) the third clause can 
be inferred to describe the "reality" of the fiction, but is at the same time suggestive of the 
female protagonist's subjective experience of it: 
(3-61) (1) She raised her hand [...] (2) and smoothed her hair; (3) it was wet at 
the hairline. (Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet: 20) 
Finally, sentences or tensed clauses in narrative may not be be interpreted as reflecting the 
viewpoint of a specific individual, yet remain suggestive of the presence of an experiencing 
observer. This is illustrated by example (3-62), which constitutes the opening sentence of the 
short story concerned: 
(3-62) It was a cool grey morning and the air was like smoke. (Gordimer, Is 
There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet?: 17) 
All the tensed clauses we have just discussed are, in some way or other, perspectivally 
situated-yet none of them contain any subject-oriented features. What they do have in 
common, however, is that none of them creates the impression of forward movement in time. 
On the basis of this, we could advance the following hypothesis: sentences or tensed clauses 
in narrative are perspectivally situated if they do not introduce a temporal update into the 
narrative. According to this hypothesis states, processes and points (and events which are 
thought of as processes or points) are perspectivally situated. In the following section we will 
try to establish if this hypothesis is correct. 
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3.5.2 Perspective and context 
Perspectivally situated sentences, as we have seen, are characterised by the fact that they 
introduce a perspectival focus. Upon encountering a perspectivally situated sentence, the 
reader gets the impression that the described state of affairs constitutes the object of someone's 
perception or thought. 
If a perspectival focus is occupied by the text's narrator, perspective is presented directly. In 
this case the perspectival focus is situated in the referential context of the speech act, which 
may or may not coincide with the referential context of the story. If the reader infers that 
a perspectival focus is occupied by a subject in the text different from the text's narrator, 
perspective is represented, and the perspectival focus is situated in the referential context of 
the story, which does not coincide with the context of the narrator's speech act. We will for 
the time being, ignore the case of directly presented perspective, and concentrate on sentences 
which represent perspective. 
If a sentence represents perspective, its asserted reference time has to be interpreted as the 
time at which the described situation, which constitutes the object of a subject's perception 
or thought, is assessed by the subject. We will refer to such to this type of temporal interval 
as a perspectival interval. 
A perspectivalVis often introduced in the referential context of a story by a clause or sentence 
containing a verb of speech, perception or cognition, which we will refer to as a perspectival 
sentence. The perspectival function of perspectival sentences will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. The following examples, however, should suffice to illustrate the point we 
are trying to make-namely that if a perspectivally situated sentence comes after a perspec- 
tival sentence, the reader will be inclined to identify the semantic subject of the perspectival 
sentence as the subject-of-consciousness of the perspectivally situated sentence which follows 
it: 
(3-63) (He hears her stirring). Does she want something? (Mansfield, The Man 
Without A Temperament: 18) 
(3-64) (Charles stared at her). This was his daughter, speaking to him. His 
daughter. (Oates, Wild Saturday: 138) 
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(3-65) (He laughed and shook his head): He knew... Good Lord, exactly like - 
(Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 24) 
In the light of this, we propose the following test to determine the perspectival status of 
different aspectual types: a proposition is perspectivally situated if, when sequenced with a 
perspectival sentence, it can be interpreted as reflecting the thoughts or perceptions of the 
semantic subject of the latter. 
According to this test, states are perspectivally situated, as the following examples illustrate:5 
(3-66) a John looked out of the window. The children were outside. 
b John looked out of the window. The children were playing outside. 
c John looked out of the window. The children had built a sandcastle. 
d John wondered where the children were. They always played outside. 
In all of these examples the second sentence, which is a state, can be interpreted as describing 
a state of affairs as it is being perceived by the semantic subject of the perspectival sentence 
which precedes it. 
Events, in contrast, sound awkward if they occur in such a sequence, unless a contingency 
relationship can be inferred between the event and the perspectival sentence. In the following 
examples, where no contingency relation can be established between the two sentences, the 
sequence sounds odd: 
(3-67) a John looked out of the window. The children arrived. 
b John looked out of the window. The children built a sandcastle. 
If a contingency relation can be inferred between the two sentence, the sequence no longer 
sounds awkward, but both sentences will be interpreted as perspectivally non-situated. The 
second sentence introduces a temporal update so that its asserted reference time does not 
coincide with the asserted reference time of the perspectival sentence. As a result the described 
state of affairs will no longer be interpreted as being perceived by the subject of the first clause. 
The following examples illustrate this: 
6In our approach progressives, perfecto and habituale are said to constitute states. In Chapter 4 we will 
give backbone to this claim through a detailed analysis of their aspectual properties. 
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(3-68) a John looked at Jeanie. She got up (and said it was time for them to 
leave.) 
b John looked at Jeanie. She scribbled something on a piece of paper 
(and pushed it towards him.) 
All this is in line with our starting hypothesis, which stipulates that for a sentence to be 
perspectivally situated it has to be interpreted at a stable asserted reference time. However, 
processes, which are interpreted at a stable asserted reference time, also sound odd if they 
are sequenced with a perspectival sentence. Example (3-69) illustrates this: 
(3-69) John looked out of the window. The children played outside. 
This awkwardness disappears if the process combines with a progressive auxiliary, as in (3- 
70): 
(3-70) John looked out of the window. The children were playing outside. 
The fact that the asserted reference time of a sentence is stable (so that it does not update 
the narrative) therefore does not appear to be a sufficient condition for the sentence to be 
perspectivally situated. 
In the analysis we propose, processes differ from states in that the asserted reference time of 
the former is atomic, while that of the latter is extended. Thus, the only respect in which the 
second clause in example (3-69)( "the children played outside") differs from the second clause 
in example (3-70) ("the children were playing outside") is that the same state of affairs is, in 
example (3-69)Asserted at an extended interval, while in example (3-70) it is asserted at an 
atomic interval. In other words, if the extended non-bounded interval which constitutes the 
assumed reference time of a process is asserted at an atomic interval, the proposition become 
perspectivally situated. 
It follows from this that, for a proposition to be perspectivally situated, its asserted reference 
time not only has to be stable, but also atomic. In Chapter 5, we will argue that the connection 
between the atomicity of an asserted reference time and the marking of a perspective is most 
dear in present tense discourse with actual time reference, where the asserted reference time 
of an utterance coincides with its speech time, and has to be atomic. The narrative analogue 
of such a speech time-a perspectival focus- is, accordingly, introduced only by sentences 
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the asserted reference time of which is (conceived of as) atomic. 
It follows from this that the sequence in (3-71) is counterintuitive for two reasons: 
(3-71) ? John looked out of the window. The children built a sandcastle. 
Because no contingency relation can be inferred between the two sentences, the second sen- 
tence cannot be interpreted as a culminated process which is placed in the consequences of the 
first. And because the asserted reference time of the second sentence is extended, it cannot 
be interpreted at the (stabilised) asserted reference time of the perspectival sentence unless 
its asserted reference time is made atomic-which means its aspectual type is turned into 
that of a state. In Chapter 4 we will describe in more detail what happens to the aspectual 
profile of a non-stative proposition which is turned into a state (for example, by combining 
it with a progressive auxiliary). 
If a culmination is sequenced with a perspectival sentence, as in (3-72) 
(3-72) John looked out of the window. The children arrived. 
the sequence will sound awkward, but more acceptable than example (3-71.) This is due to the 
-r1 
fact that the asserted reference time of second sentence, which is a culmination is atomic, so 
that it can, in principle, be interpreted at the stable asserted reference time of the perspectival 
sentence. This would mean that both propositions are thought of as non-contingent, or as 
points. 
Nevertheless, if the language user wants to express that a culmination proposition describes a 
state of affairs as the object of someone's perception, she will spontaneously combine it with 
the progressive, as in (3-73): 
(3-73) John looked out of the window. The children were arriving. 
The reason for this is the following. If a perspectival sentence is followed by a point- 
i.e. an atomic situation which is assessed at the asserted reference time of the perspectival 
sentence- the sequence suggests that a subject's act of perception coincides exactly with an 
atomic situation which is not viewed as having consequences. While this is not impossible, 
it is improbable in pragmatic terms. To describe a ' state of affairs from the perspective 
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of a subject, theuser will characteristically describe its assumed reference time as extended. 
In combination with the requirement that its asserted reference time should be atomic, this 
means non-stative propositions become perspectivally situated if they are changed into states. 
In Chapter 4 we will discuss the various ways in which a non-stative proposition can be turned 
into a state. 
If the asserted reference time of a proposition is atomic and coincides with its assumed 
reference time, it follows from this, the proposition will normally be portrayed as contingent 
and as perspectivally non-situated. For the same reason propositions exhibiting a point profile 
are unlikely to be sequenced with a perspectival sentence unless they can be placed in its 
consequences. In the latter case the point is thought of as a culmination, and both propositions 
assume the status of perspectivally non-situated events. Example (3-74) illustrates this: 
(3-74) John looked at Jeanie. She winked. 
S 
Let us recapitulate. We have distinguied between two aspectual properties which contribute 
to perspectival immediacy -namely an asymmetrical referential centre (where r is atomic, 
and r' is extended), and a non-contingent meaning structure. The aspectual make-up of 
(non-contingent) states, which were shown to be perspectivally situated, exhibits both these 
characteristics. Non-stative propositions, in contrast, were shown to be perspectivally non- 
situated. This was explained in the light of the fact that their referential centre is symmetrical. 
Culminations and culminated processes in addition to this also evoke a contingent associated 
meaning structure, so that they exhibit two aspectual markers of perspectival distance (while 
points and processes exhibit only one, namely an asymmetrical referential centre). 
In the case of contingent states, finally, an asymmetrical referential centre (a marker of per- 
spectival immediacy) is combined with a contingent associated meaning structure (a marker 
of perspectival distance). The perspectival effect of this will be discussed in section 3.5.6 
below. 
We will now take a closer look at the two aspectual markers of perspective described in this 
section. 
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3.5.3 Symmetrical vs asymmetrical referential centres 
The fact that propositions with an asymmetrical referential centre introduce a perspectival 
focus while those with a symmetrical referential centre do not can be explained as follows. 
In propositions with a symmetrical referential centre the interval at which a state of affairs 
occurs coincides with the interval at which it is asserted. Hence no single interval of the 
assumed reference time of the proposition is privileged over others, and states of affairs are 
ordered temporally with respect to each other, either as simultaneous (description) or as 
sequenced (narration). 
Inherent to an asymmetrical referential centre, on the other hand, is the notion that interval 
time (the atomic asserted reference time) is privileged over others, so that, when encountering 
a state, the cognitive agent has to construct an interval within the assumed extension of the 
state at which it is assessed. Because this interval does not coincide with the state's actual 
extension, the cognitive agent will spontaneously infer that it denotes the interval at which 
someone is perceiving or contemplating the state of affairs. 
3.5.4 Contingent vs non-contingent propositions 
In addition to this, a subject does not as a rule experience time in terms of bounded units: 
envisaging states of affairs as discrete, and as enabling others, implies a procedure of di8- 
tancing them from the position of the locutionary agent or narrator, because it requires the 
construction of a time line. Unless abstraction is made of a subject's immersion in what she 
perceives, thinks, or experiences, situations are not experienced, nor described, as projected 
on a time line. In Chapter 5 I will provide further evidence for this claim by showing that 
the understanding of present tense utterances with actual time reference in spoken discourse 
normally does not require the construction of a time line. Fictional narratives, because of 
their medium (the text) and their genre (they tell a story) always require the construction of 
a time line. But the writer retains the option not to draw attention to its linear developing 
dimension, by highlighting a topical rather than a contingency relation between propositions. 
Propositions in spoken discourse which express the locutionary agent's view, opinions or be- 
liefs are typically governed by a relationship of topical coherence. If a state of affairs in a 
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narrative is described in the same way (i.e. if it is non-contingent), and if its asserted refer- 
ence time is, as in the case of present tense utterances with actual time reference, atomic, the 
reader will spontaneously infer that someone is seeing or thinking, or, in other words, that 
the fictional world is described from a particular perspective. 
3.5.5 Processes 
In the analysis we propose, the assumed reference time of processes is characterised as ex- 
tended and non-bounded, and the meaning structure associated with them is non-contingent. 
As we have just seen, processes share these characteristics with states, which introduce a per- 
spectival focus. The asserted reference time of processes, however, is extended and coincides 
with their assumed reference time; this, as we have seen, is not typical of the way a subject 
experiences time. Because of this processes normally lack the capacity of states to introduce 
a perspectival focus. 
We have also seen, however, that if processes are sequenced with states they are asserted at 
the same stable asserted reference time (unless a contingency relation between them is made 
salient). The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-75) (S)Out of the thick, fleshy leaves of a cactus there rose an aloe stem 
loaded with pale flowers that looked as though they had been cut out of 
butter; (P)light flashed upon the lifted spears of the palms; (P)over the 
bed of scarlet waxen flowers some big black insects 'zoom-zoomed'; (P)a 
great, gaudy creeper, orange splashed with jet, sprawled against the wall. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 12) 
(3-76) (S)It was a cool grey morning (S)and the air was like smoke. (P)In that 
reversal of the elements that sometimes takes place, the grey, soft, muffled 
sky moved like the sea on a silent day. (P)The coat collar pressed rough 
against her neck (S)and her cheeks were softly cold as if they had been 
washed in ice- water. (P)She breathed gently with the air;(P)on the left 
a strip of veld fire curled silently, flameless. (P)Overhead a dove purred. 
(Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet?: 17) 
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(3-77) (S)The sky is the colour of jade. (S) There are a great many stars; (S) 
an enormous white moon hangs over the garden. (P)Far away lightning 
flutters-flutters like a wing-flutters like a broken bird that tries to fly 
and sinks again and again struggles. (S)The lights from the salon shine 
across the garden path and (S)there is the sound of a piano. (Mansfield, 
The Man Without A Temperament: 17) 
What seems to happen in such instances is that the processes usurp the asymmetrical quality 
of the states, in the sense that their asserted reference time is compressed without becoming 
wholly atomic (as in the case of a process coerced into a state by a progressive). Through 
opting for a process type rather than a progressive, however, a particular stylistic effect is 
conveyed: the proposition retains some of the overt or developing quality which characterises 
a process, yet at the same time introduces a perspectival focus. Such sequences suggest that, 
as a subject (or anonymous observer) contemplates the scene described, time gently moves 
forward. 
A sequence of main clauses exhibiting a state type which are not contingently related con- 
stitutes a state complex. All states in a state complex share the same perspectival focus: if 
the perspectival focus of one state in a state complex is identified as occupied by a specific 
individual (on the basis of semantic information and pragmatic inferences) the perspectival 
foci of the other states will be inferred to be occupied by the same individual. 
If processes are sequenced with states and assessed at the same asserted reference time, we 
will say they form part of the same state complex. If processes occur in a state complex and 
assimilate the asymmetrical character of the states, their perspectival focus will be inferred 
to be occupied by the same individual which occupies the perspectival focus of the states. 
The following examples illustrate this: 
(3-78) (And then he became conscious of a curious old mannish little face fixed 
upon him in a kind of hypnotic dread.) (P)There, absolutely stilled with 
fear beneath his glance, crouched a very big locust. (S) What an amusing 
face the thing had! (S)A lugubrious long face, that somehow suggested a 
bald head, and such a glum mouth. (S)It looked like some little person 
out of a Disney cartoon. (P) It moved slightly, still looking up fearfully 
at him. (Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 23) 
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(3-79) (Finally he comes inside.) (S)The moon-the room is painted white with 
moonlight. (P)The light trembles in the mirrors; (S)the two beds seem to 
float. (S) She is asleep. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 
18) 
(3-80) (At last she turned on the light and looked at Ernest lying beside her.) 
(S)He was sound asleep. (P)He snored. (P)But even though he snored, 
his nose remained perfectly still. (S) It looked as if it had never twitched 
at all. (S) Was it possible that this was really Ernest; and that she was 
really married to Ernest? (Woolf, Lappin And Lapinova: 25-26) 
3.5.6 Contingent states 
In the previous section I argued that establishing contingency relations between consecutive 
states of affairs implies a distancing procedure. This means contingent states exhibit two 
contrastive perspectival markers: one which conveys perspectival immediacy (their referential 
centre is asymmetrical) and one which introduces perspectival distance (they are contingent). 
To account for this contrast an analysis in terms of two referential parameters is crucial. 
We have seen that if a proposition is contingent its asserted reference time is placed in the 
consequences of the proposition which precedes it. In the case of events, however, this asserted 
reference time coincides with the assumed reference time (i.e. the actual interval at which 
the state of affairs takes place), so that the latter, too, automatically becomes contingent. 
Contingent states, however, retain the asymmetrical profile of non-contingent states. This 
means that, although their asserted reference time is contingently related to that of a preced- 
ing proposition, and is therefore not stable, it does not follow that their assumed reference time 
also becomes contingent. Because the referential centre of contingent states remains asym- 
metrical their assumed reference time will still extend at one or both sides of the asserted 
reference time. In other words, unlike in the case of events the actual situation described by 
contingent states is not conceived of as including reference to a culmination, and is therefore 
not subject to the distancing procedure this implies. In this respect their perspectival status 
resembles that of non-contingent states, which, as was pointed out earlier, is suggestive of 
the way a subject experiences time. Because of this contingent states are, like non-contingent 
states, perspectivally situated. Contingent states differ from non-contingent states, however, 
in that their asserted reference time is placed in the consequences of the proposition which 
106 
precedes it, so that the sentence introduces temporal update. In this respect contingent states 
resemble events. In combination, these two aspectual characteristics convey that the interval 
at which a subject experiences is a culmination, and is temporally sequenced with the asserted 
reference time of the proposition which precedes it. 
Our analysis thus explains why contingent states may function both as a consequence of the 
proposition which precedes them and as overlapping with it: while their asserted reference 
time is placed in the consequences associated with (the asserted reference time of) the propo- 
sition which precedes them, their assumed reference time is not. The following examples 
illustrate this: 
(3-81) "Can you come tomorrow?" Yes, he had no engagement at all for tomor- 
row. (Austen, Emma: 88) 
(3-82) "Go away, I am not making myself ill." No, she was drinking the very 
elixir of life through that open window. (Chopin, The Awakening: 83) 
The second sentence in example (3-81) is a state, and therefore introduces a perspectival 
focus. Two subject-oriented features (the semantic indicator "yes" and the deictic adverb 
"tomorrow".) indicate that this perspectival focus is occupied by a subject-of-consciousness, 
which is most plausibly identified as the male protagonist. The actual situation described-i.e. 
that of the male protagonist having no engagement for the next day-most plausibly extends 
in time to overlap with the speech event which precedes the sentence and any subsequently 
described situations. But its asserted reference time-in this case: the time at which the 
words are uttered-is to be placed in the consequences of the preceding speech event, to 
which it constitutes a reply, and is therefore to be interpreted as occurring after it. The 
same observations apply to example (3-82), except for the fact that the asserted reference 
time here denotes the moment at which the content of the sentence is contemplated by the 
female protagonist (in response to the preceding speech event), rather than the time of a 
(represented) speech act. 
Contingent states often convey a very particular psychological effect: in many cases, they 
seem to indicate that a state of affairs begins to happen, but that it is only after it is already 
in progress that a subject in the text realises what is going on. This effect can be achieved 
by combining a state with a definite adverbial which specifies this meaning component (e.g. 
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suddenly), as in (3-83): 
(3-83) He turned away. Suddenly he was back again. (Mansfield, The Man 
Without A Temperament: 13) 
But a similar quasi-inceptive effect may be conveyed by a temporally unmarked state, provided 
context makes salient a contingency relation between the perception of the state and the 
state of affairs described in the sentence which precedes it, and allows for the inference that 
a character in the text suddenly becomes aware of the fact that the situation obtains. The 
following example illustrates this: 
(3-84) His leg is in her way-it thrashes, she thrusts, and a piece of cliff [...] shifts 
under her clutching hands.. .crumbles.. .and she is falling thwack backwards 
on her shoulders, her head, her outfiung arm [...]. (Lively, Moon Tiger: 4) 
Dowty (1986) claims that contingent progressives only allow for this particular interpretation: 
their asserted reference time cannot be the first interval of their assumed reference time. When 
the associated psychological effect cannot be inferred, he says, it will be hard to get a felicitous 
quasi-inceptive reading for a contingent progressive. Dowty explains the oddity of example 
(3-85) in this light: 
(3-85) ? John dropped the letter from the bridge and watched it hit the swiftly 
flowing water. (Suddenly) the water was carrying the letter downstream 
and out of sight. 
In this example, the progressive in the third clause can, given its context, only be interpreted 
as a contingent state. This means it elicits a quasi-inceptive interpretation. However, such 
a quasi-inceptive interpretation implies a momentary lapse of consciousness on the part of 
John, and the semantic content of the verb in the second clause ("watched") is in conflict with 
this inference. Even with the insertion of the adverbial, the sequence remains a bit puzzling, 
because the surprise effect conveyed by the progressive cannot plausibly be construed in 
accordance with its context. 
In other instances a contingent state may be purely inceptive, in the sense that its asserted 
reference time coincides with the first interval of its assumed reference time, as in the following 
examples: 
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(3-86) (she)[...]tried to drag herself between the wires, but her coat got caught 
on a barb, and she was imprisoned there. (Gordimer, 18 There Nowhere 
Else Where We Can Meet?: 19) 
(3-87) [...]; wobbling, frantic, she climbed over the fence. And she was out. 
(Gordimer, 18 There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet?: 19) 
But this is not in conflict with our analysis, because the referential centre of such contingent 
state remains asymmetrical. 
In conclusion, contingent states, like non-contingent states, introduce a perspectival focus, 
and are therefore perspectivally situated. It follows from this that a non-contingent meaning 
structure is not a necessary condition for a proposition to be interpreted as non-contingent. 
The introduction of a perspectival focus, however, is congenial to a non-contingent mean- 
ing structure, which constitutes another aspectual marker of perspectival immediacy. The 
aspectual structure of contingent states thus combines perspectival immediacy with perspec- 
tial distance. Because of this they convey a specific stylistic effect: the extrospective and 
mobile dimension of dramatic development converges with a state's capacity to introduce a 
perspectival focus, and its potential for suggesting introspection and subjective awareness. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced an aspectual classification consisting of six aspectual types. 
Each of these types was defined in terms of two parameters: the aspectual properties of their 
referential centre (which consists of an asserted and an assumed reference time) and the mean- 
ing structure associated with them (which may be contingent or topical). It was shown how 
the notion of an associated meaning structure makes it possible to capture both semantic and 
pragmatic elements which contribute to the temporal interpretation of consecutive sentences, 
and discussed how sentences in narrative provide an antecedent context for the interpretation 
of (temporally unmarked) sentences which come after them. 
On the basis of this a distinction was made between (temporally unmarked) sentences which 
convey forward movement in time on an imaginary time line, and sentences which do not. 
Narrative time moves forward if the asserted reference time of a sentence can be contingently 
related to that of the sentence which precedes it. Sentences exhibiting an event or a contingent 
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state profile elicit this interpretation, and are said to narrate. Through narration, an element 
of perspectival distance is introduced between narrator and statement. Narrative time does 
not move forward, on the other hand, if a sentence is topically rather than contingently related 
to the sentence which precedes it. Sentences exhibiting a point, process or (non-contingent) 
state profile elicit this interpretation, and are said to describe. Description is suggestive of 
perspectival immediacy. 
It is not the type of relationship which is made salient between a sentence and the one which 
precedes it, however, which determines whether a sentence is perspectivally situated or perspec- 
tivally non-situated. This, we have shown, depends on on the symmetricity or asymmetricity 
of their referential centre. Propositions the referential centre of which is asymmetrical (i.e. 
(contingent and non-contingent) states) are perspectivally situated: upon encountering them, 
the reader will spontaneously construct a perspectival focus on the described state of affairs, 
even in the absence of semantic features which are suggestive of the presence of an evaluating 
consciousness. Propositions the referential centre of which is symmetrical (i.e. all non-stative 
types), on the other hand, are perspectivally non-situated and do not normally require the 
construction of a perspectival focus for their interpretation. 
Propositions with an asymmetrical referential centre (or states) were said to be perspectivally 
situated because one subinterval of the assumed reference time of the situation is privileged 
over others. Because of this the reader will be inclined to interpret this interval as the 
time at which a (hypothetical or actual) subject contemplates the state of affairs described. 
Normally the asserted reference time of such a proposition is stable-i.e. the interval at which 
the situation is asserted is not viewed as bringing about a change of state. In some instances, 
however, the perception or assessment of a state of affairs by a subject may be described 
as the consequence of a preceding state of affairs, and as bringing about a change of state. 
Contingent states therefore combine two contrastive perspectival emphases: they create the 
impression of forward movement in time (which is associated with perspectival distance) while 
at the same time introducing a perspectival focus. This apparent contradiction was explained 
in terms of the fact that the asserted and the assumed reference time of contingent states 
do not coincide. Because of this the contingent nature of the asserted reference time does 
not extend to the assumed reference time, and this contrast can be exploited to combine 
perspectival immediacy with narrative distance. 
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States and Stative Operators 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was argued that state sentences introduce a perspectival focus into 
a narrative. This, we claimed, is due to the fact that the structure of their asymmetrical 
referential centre corresponds to the way a subject typically experiences time. In addition 
to this, we pointed out that the meaning structure associated with a perspectivally situated 
proposition is typically non-contingent-although, as we have shown, contingent states are 
also perspectivally situated. 
A reader identifies a contextualised proposition as a state either on the basis of the lexical- 
semantic properties of its verbal predicate or because the aspectual profile of its verbal predi- 
cate is coerced into a state through an intrasentential operator or context. In this chapter, we 
will take a closer look at different types of states and stative operators. As we have already 
discussed how context may coerce a state proposition into a contingent state, we will focus 
on non-contingent states. 
Throughout our discussion, we will draw attention to different ways in which the stable atomic 
interval (which does not have consequences associated with it) normally required for the in- 
terpretation of a state may be introduced into a narrative. We will also give more backbone 
to our claim that propositions exhibiting a state profile often attract subject-oriented features 
or are often sequenced with a perspectival sentence, so that their perspectival focus is inter- 
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preted as occupied by a subject in the text, rather than by a neutral anonymous observer. 
We will say that in such cases the introduced perspective is subjective. 
Before turning our attention to different types of states, however, we will first take another 
look at their position in the aspectual typology introduced in the previous chapter. 
4.2 Operators, functions and transition paths 
4.2.1 The transition network 
In the approach we propose, contextualised tensed clauses may be basic propositions (if they 
are not coerced by semantic operators or context), expanded propositions, or conglomerates 
of expanded propositions. The aspectual profile of a proposition is coerced if the interval 
properties of its referential centre, or its associated meaning structure, are changed by an 
operator in the clause, or by context. 
Operators are characterised in terms of their function. A function stipulates what the as- 
pectual profile of a proposition has to look like before it can serve as input for a particular 
operator, and specifies how this profile changes when the operator is applied, resulting in a 
coerced profile (its output). 
Because of this the typology we rely on is dynamic: it incorporates not only the different 
aspectual categories, but also shows how these categories may change when an operator 
applies. These changes are represented in terms of one or more transition paths. Because of 
its dynamic nature, the typology is referred to as a transition network. All this is in line with 
the approach proposed by Moens (1987) who first introduced the concept of an aspectual 
transition network. 
Non-stative profiles are coerced into states if they combine with a 8tative operator. Apart 
from context, which we will discuss separately at the end of this chapter, there are three 
types of stative operators: the progre88ive, the perfect, and structural operators (which include 
certain types of adverbials and complements). In addition to lexical states (which are basic 
propositions), therefore, we distinguish between three types of expanded state propositions, 
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namely progressive states, perfect states and structural states.1 
The full transition network, which encapsulates the aspectual profiles of both basic and ex- 
panded propositions, looks like this: 
Symmetrical RC I Asymmetrical RC 
+cont. 



















Unrestrictive lexical states 
Restrictive lexical states 
- Progressive States 
- Perfect States 
- Structural States 
Figure 4-1: The full transition network 
t 1 . 11r.,,",5 Ial e ) 
In the next section, we will provide a brief description of the different transition paths. 
'Structural states are more commonly called "habituals'. In 4.6 we explain why the term `structural' was 
chosen instead. 
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4.2.2 The transition paths 
A. Paths from one symmetrical RC to another symmetrical RC 
I. Vertical paths 1. Paths from contingent to non-contingent categories: 
the transition from culmination to point, which involves stripping off the con- 
tingency structure associated with the culmination. This transition applies if 
a culmination has to be coerced into the appropriate antecedent context for 
a subsequent state proposition which is not contingently related to it. The 
transition may also form part of a more complex coercive procedure if a cul- 
mination combines with 
(i) a structural (or habitual) operator which, as we will see below, requires as 
its input a point: 
(4-1) John always knocks 
(ii) a progressive operator, which requires as its input a process. As there is 
no direct transition path from culmination to process, the culmination may be 
coerced into a process via the point node: 
(4-2) The concert is beginning. 
the transition from culminated process to process, which involves stripping the 
culminated process of its culmination, and hence of the consequences associ- 
ated with it. This transition is required if a culminated process combines with 
a progressive operator, because, as we will see presently, only process profiles 
can serve as input for a progressive: 
(4-3) Jon was painting a picture. 
2. Paths from non-contingent to contingent categories: 
the transition from point to culmination, which involves conceiving of the 
point proposition as a culmination, so that it has a contingency structure 
(and hence consequences) associated with it. This transition is required if a 
point proposition is followed by a proposition which is contingently related to 
it: 
(4-4) Jeany burped and we put her to bed. 
the transition from process to culminated process which involves assigning a cul- 
mination (and hence consequences), to the process. This transition is required 
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when a process proposition combines with a telic adverbial or complement, 
which reinforces the notion of a limitation upon it. Such adverbials include 
prepositional phrases indicative of a boundary (walk vs walk to the station), 
those complements in object position which Halliday (1967) refers to as range 
objects NPs (walk vs walk a mile), and those complements traditionally termed 
effected objects (bake vs bake a cake). This transition path also applies if a 
process proposition is followed by another proposition which is contingently 
related to it: 
(4-5) John ran a mile. 
ii. Horizontal transition paths: 1. Paths from atomic to extended intervals: 
the transition from culmination to culminated process, which involves adding 
the preparatory period associated with the culmination. This transition may 
be required if a culmination combines with a progressive operator, which de- 
mands a process as its input. In the absence of a direct route from culmination 
to process, a culmination can be coerced into a process via the culminated pro- 
cess node (cf. below): 
(4-6) The train was arriving. 
the transition from point to process, which involves protracting the two atomic 
intervals which constitute the referential centre of the point proposition into ex- 
tended but unbounded (and therefore by definition non-contingent) intervals. 
This transition applies when a point proposition combines with an adverbial 
expression which introduces an extended temporal interval without specifying 
a culmination This results in the point proposition being described as iterated 
over an extended but non-contingent interval: 
(4-7) John hiccoughed all evening. 
2. Paths from extended to atomic profiles: 
the transition from process to point, which involves making the referential cen- 
tre atomic by compressing it. This transition is required if a process proposi- 
tion combines with structural operator, which, as we will see below, requires 
as its input a point: 
(4-8) John always smokes when he's waiting for the bus. 
III. Diagonal path: the transition form culminated process to point, which involves 
compressing the two intervals which constitute the referential centre of the process 
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into non-contingent atomic intervals. This transition is required if a culminated 
process proposition combines with a structural operator, which demands as its 
input a point. Although this is a single transition path, it involves two coercive 
procedures. 
(4-9) John wrote her a letter every week. 
B. Paths from a symmetrical to an asymmetrical RC 
the transition from process to progressive state, which involves coercing the proposi- 
tion's asserted reference time into an atomic interval; this transition is required when a 
proposition combines with a progressive operator: 
(4-10) John was working in the garden. 
the transition from culmination to (perfect) state, which involves shifting the assumed 
reference time of the proposition to its consequences, which are assessed at an atomic 
asserted reference time. This transition is required when a proposition combines with 
a perfect operator: 
(4-11) John has left. 
the transition from point to structural state, which involves protracting the proposition's 
assumed reference time into a time line and describing the point as iterated over this 
time line. This iteration is assessed at an atomic asserted reference time. This transition 
applies when a proposition combines with a structural operator: 
(4-12) John always knocks 
The characterisation of the last three paths implicitly provides us with a description of the 
input and output conditions of the three types of operators which coerce non-stative profiles 
into states. These can schematically be represented as follows: 
progressive operator 
input: process 
function: asserted reference time is compressed into an atomic interval 




function: the consequences of the culmination are described as holding at an 
atomic asserted reference time 
output: perfect state 
structural operator 
input: point 
function: the assumed reference time is protracted into an time line over which the 
state of affairs is described as iterated; this iteration is asserted at an atomic 
reference time 
output: structural state 
If non-stative propositions with profiles different from the input types for each of the operators 
combine with the respective operators, their referential centre and/or their associated meaning 
structure will have to be coerced to meet the requirements imposed by the category which 
serves as input for the function concerned, before the function of the operator can apply. In 
such cases, more than one transition will be required for the original profile to be changed 
into the type which constitutes the output of the operator's function. Thus culminations, 
culminated processes and points are to be coerced into a process before they can serve as 
input for a progressive. Culminations, culminated processes and processes need a transition 
via the point node before they can combine with a structural operator. And culminated 
processes, processes and points are to be turned into culminations before the function of a 
perfect operator can be applied. 
Stative operators are of particular interest to us because by combining with a stative operator 
a non-stative proposition becomes perspectivally situated. This is why in this chapter we are 
chiefly concerned with a further description of the function of stative operators. A discussion 
of other common operators, such as prepositional phrases with for, until and in, and when- 
clauses, in a framework very similar to ours can be found in Moens (1987: 66-73; 105-113). 
Although we will discuss the different types of states individually, we will throughout our 
discussion draw attention to the aspectual characteristics they share. Because of these char- 
acteristics consecutive states, even if they belong to different categories, exhibit the same 
perspectival properties. As already pointed out, a sequence of states which are all assessed at 
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the same asserted reference time is referred to as a state complex. States in a state complex 
share the same perspectival focus. 
4.3 Lexical states 
So far we have treated lexical states, or basic state propositions, as one category. A further 
distinction, however, can be made in terms of the domain of the assumed reference time of 
lexical states. As we have seen, this assumed reference time is always a non-bounded interval, 
in the sense that no explicit reference is made to the time at which the state comes about or 
comes to an end. But there are two types of non-bounded intervals. A non-bounded interval 
is restrictive if the state of affairs described can be viewed as temporary; it is unrestrictive 
if the state of affairs is intrinsic to the subject predicated upon. Thus (4-13) is a restrictive 
state 
(4-13) Barbara was bored and depressed. 
while (4-14) is an unrestrictive one:2 
(4-14) John is tall and handsome. 
When the distinction is applied to narrative, it can be rephrased as follows. Restrictive states 
present a state of affairs as extending over a segment on the time line under construction, and 
are therefore viewed as having come about at some point on this time line, and anticipated 
to stop or cease to hold at another. Because the states of affairs described by unrestrictive 
states, on the other hand, are intrinsic to an entity in the fictional reality, their assumed 
reference time coincides with the whole of the time line under construction. 
The following constitute examples of restrictive or temporary lexical states: 
(4-15) She is asleep. [...] Her white cheeks, her fair hair pressed against the 
pillow, are silvered over. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 
18) 
2 Anderson (1973: 5) (also Comrie (1976: 104)) refers to the same distinction in terms of the opposition 
between contingent or temporary states on the one hand, and absolute states on the other. However, since we 
employ the term contingent specifically to refer to enablement and causality relations between associated states 
of affairs, we will avoid using it in any other sense. 
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(4-16) She was puzzled and frightened; she wanted to explain something; but she 
was tired and muddled. (White, The House of Clouds: 56) 
(4-17) The lawn is covered with a wavy pattern of cat's-paws; there is a thick, 
thick icing on the garden table; the withered pods of the laburnum tree 
are white tassels; only here and there in the ivy is a dark leaf showing. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 10) 
The clauses in the following two passages, on the other hand, constitute unrestrictive states: 
(4-18) I like country dancing. I do it well and I look good doing it. (Godwin, A 
southern Family: 215) 
(4-19) My mother's family lived in a large white house near an apple orchard, in 
Nova Scotia. There was a barn and a carriage house; in the kitchen there 
was a pantry. (Atwood, Significant Moments in the Life of my Mother. 
13) 
The assumed reference time of restrictive states is thus conceived of in the same way as 
that of processes. In the previous chapter we pointed out that processes may form part 
of a state complex without their combining with a stative operator. In such instances the 
process assimilates the asymmetrical quality of a state (and hence becomes perspectivally 
situated) without completely losing the "developing" dimension of processes. Processes are 
only conceived of in this way, however, if they occur in an environment of (topically related) 
restrictive states. The following examples illustrate this: 
(4-20) [S] The delicious breath of rain was in the air. [S] In the street below 
a peddler was crying his wares. [P] The notes of a distant song which 
some one was singing reached her faintly, [S] and countless sparrows were 
twittering in the eaves. (Chopin, The Story of an Hour. 82) 
(4-21) [S] Three little girls, having thoughtfully taken off their drawers and hung 
them on a bush, their skirts clasped to their waists, were standing in the 
tubs and tramping up and down. [P] They screamed, [P] their hair fell over 
their faces, [P] they splashed one another. (Mansfield, The Man Without 
A Temperament: 12) 
(4-22) [P] On this remote seat, with their backs turned on lovers, lights, the town, 
the two girls sat [P] and gazed wordlessly at the dark sea, over which great 
Jupiter was flinging a thin gold line. [S] There was no sound but the lap- 
ping, sucking, sighing, of the ripples at the edge of the breakwater, and the 
occasional screech of an owl in the tall trees on the hillside. (Richardson, 
Two Hanged Women: 50) 
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In an environment of unrestrictive lexical states, on the other hand, processes behave differ- 
ently: the situation they describe is viewed as habitual or characteristic. Thus in the following 
passage, the third, fourth and sixth clause would, if decontextualised, be interpreted as pro- 
cesses. Because of the unrestrictive context in which the processes occur, however, they are 
viewed as characteristic, and therefore intrinsic to the reality described. As we will see in 
section 4.6, this means they are coerced into a structural (or habitual) state: 
(4-23) [ULS] The structure of the house was hierarchical, with my grandfather 
at the top, [ULS] but its secret life-the life of pie crusts, clean sheets, 
the box of rags in the linen closet, the loaves in the oven- was female. 
[PST] The house, and all the objects in it, crackled with static electricity. 
[PST] Undertows washed through it, [ULS] the air was heavy with things 
that were known but not spoken. (P/ULS)Like a hollow log, a drum, a 
church, it amplified [...]. (Atwood, Significant Moments in the Life of my 
Mother: 13) 
(ULS=unrestrictive lexical state; P=process; ST=structural state) 
As in the case of unrestrictive lexical states, the assumed reference time of structural states 
coincides with the whole of the time line under construction, and their asserted reference time 
is atomic. We will come back to this in section 4.6. 
In the rest of this dissertation we will use square brackets to indicate that an interval coincides 
with a segment on a time line, and angular brackets to mark that an interval coincides with 
the whole of a time line. If a segment on a timeline is non-contingent, we will indicate this 
by putting the square brackets used to mark the segment between round brackets. Hence 
the contrast between processes, restrictive states and unrestrictive states can be represented 
schematically as follows: 
([)/////r//////(]) [r] [r] 
(RC of processes) (RC of restrictive (RC of nonrestrictive 
states) states) 
On the basis of this, we can distinguish between two types of assumed reference times, namely 
segments on a time line and time lines. In addition to this, segments on a time line may be 
either contingent (as in the case of culminated processes and culminations) or non-contingent 
(as in the case of points, processes and restrictive states). The assumed reference time of 
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unrestrictive states is a time line, and therefore non-contingent. 
4.4 The progressive 
4.4.1 Functional characteristics 
As noted earlier, the functional nature of the progressive operator can be described in terms 
of two characteristics: a progressive takes as its input a process, and it describes this process 
as ongoing or in progress at a particular point in time, by compressing its asserted reference 
time into an atomic interval. Sentences encoding a progressive therefore exhibit the aspectual 
properties of a state. 
4.4.2 Process propositions combining with the progressive 
Basic propositions which exhibit a process profile, it follows from our definition, unproblem- 
atically encode progressive auxiliaries, since their profile does not need to be coerced into 
another category before it can serve as input for the progressive operator. The following 
example illustrates this: 
(4-24) (1) Alcee got up and joined her at the window, looking over her shoulder. 
(2) The rain was coming down in sheets obscuring the view of far-off cabins 
and enveloping the distant wood in a gray mist. (3) The playing of the 
lightning was incessant. (Chopin, The Storm: 2) 
In this passage, the atomic reference time for the sv_o,,no Sentence, which is a progressive 
state, is provided by the preceding event (joined her) which is to be coerced accordingly 
from a culmination into a point. The next sentence, which constitutes a lexical state, is 
asserted at the same stable atomic asserted reference time as the progressive state, and the 
two consecutive states form a state complex. 
The progressive processes in the following examples are asserted at the (stable) asserted 
reference time of the clause which precedes them. In the first example this is a perfect state 
(clauses encoding a perfect, as we will see below, are states), in the second example it is a 
lexical state: 
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(4-25) The train had escaped from the ugly fringes of the city, and the soft spring 
landscape was gliding past her. (Wharton, Atrophy: 29) 
(4-26) Here the road ran narrow and foul between high lean houses, the ground 
floors of which were scooped and hollowed into stables and carpenters' 
shops. At a fountain ahead of him two old hags were beating linen. (Mans- 
field, The Man Without A Temperament: 14) 
The following two examples illustrate that progressives, like other types of states, introduce 
a perspectival focus. In (4-27) the progressive clause reflects the third person protagonist's 
words: 
(4-27) He told her not to hurry back, but if she and the babies liked it at Biloxi, 
to stay a month longer. He was getting on nicely. (Chopin, The Storm: 
5) 
Similarly in (4-28), the semantic content of the progressive is most plausibly interpreted as 
constituting the thoughts of the male protagonist: 
(4-28) He hears her stirring. Does she want something? "Boogles?" Good Lord! 
She is talking in her sleep! (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 
18) 
4.4.3 Point propositions combining with the progressive 
For a point proposition to felicitously combine with a progressive, its profile is to be coerced 
into a process first. As the transition network shows, this involves protracting both the 
asserted and the assumed reference time of the proposition into an extended non-contingent 
interval. This is achieved by conceiving of the point expression as iterated over a non-bounded 
segment on a time line. The resulting process profile can then serve as input for a progressive 
auxiliary. Example (4-29) illustrates this: 
(4-29) When they reached the lift she was coughing. (Mansfield, The Man With- 
out A Temperament: 15) 
The atomic asserted reference time of the progressive state in (4-29) is provided by a temporal 
adverbial, viz. the when-clause. For a when-clause to provide the appropriate antecedent 
context for a progressive state (namely a stable atomic asserted reference time) it has to 
exhibit a point profile. In this particular case, this means that the culmination expression it 
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contains is coerced into a point, so that it no longer carries intimations of contingently related 
states of affairs. 
4.4.4 Culminated process propositions combining with the progressive 
The aspectual profile of a culminated process, too, has to be coerced into a process before the 
proposition can combine with a progressive operator. This involves stripping the proposition 
of its culmination: although its referential centre remains symmetrical and extended, it is no 
longer conceived of as contingent. Thus in (4-30) 
(4-30) Then [...] they entered cautiously at the back door. Calixta was preparing 
supper. (Chopin, The Storm: 5) 
the basic proposition Calixta prepared supper is to be stripped of its culmination and con- 
sequences before it can serve as input for the progressive operator. The output proposition 
describes the resulting process as ongoing at the asserted reference time of the preceding 
sentence (the original culmination profile of which is, as in example (4-29), to be coerced into 
a point). 
4.4.5 Culmination propositions combining with a progressive 
The network shows that for a culmination to be coerced into a process two transition routes 
are possible. 
The culmination may first be coerced, via a vertical path, into a point. This involves changing 
its associated meaning structure, so that it no longer evokes a contingency structure. This 
point can then, via a horizontal path, be coerced into a process, by iterating it over an 
non-bounded interval. Example (4-31) illustrates this: 
(4-31) Chimneys were just beginning to send out evening smoke, and most of the 
factory motors had been switched oq. (Sillitoe, The Fishing-Boat Picture: 
139) 
Note that the second clause, which is a perfect state, is interpreted at the stable asserted 
reference time of the progressive clause. 
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Alternatively, the culmination may be coerced into a process via the culminated process node. 
Consider example (4-32): 
(4-32) The train was arriving. 
To interpret (4-32), the preparatory period associated with the proposition through the con- 
tingency structure it evokes first has to be added to its referential centre. In the case of the 
basic proposition the train arrived, this preparatory period could plausibly be paraphrased as 
the process the train approached the station. The resulting culminated process can be further 
coerced, via a vertical path, into a process by stripping it of its culmination (and hence of the 
consequences associated with it)-which is, in (4-32), the atomic interval at which the train 
actually arrives. The resulting process can then serve as input for the progressive operator, 
which will describe it as ongoing without asserting that the original culmination actually 
takes place (which also means that no consequences are associated with it). 
Deciding which of these alternative routes is the more plausible one obviously depends on the 
semantic content of the culmination expression and pragmatic inferences. 
As Moens (1987: 90) points out, describing the meaning of progressive culminations and 
culminated processes in terms of their culmination being stripped off before they can serve 
as input for the progressive provides an elegant solution to the problem of the so-called 
imperfective paradox (Dowty 1979: 133-154). As we have seen the attainment of a culmination 
at which a change of state takes place is viewed as inherent to the lexical meaning of both 
culmination and culminated process expressions. The imperfective paradox concerns the fact 
that this seems to be at odds with the observation that when culmination and culminated 
process expressions combine with a progressive auxiliary, this culmination no longer forms 
part of their truth conditions. Indeed, there is no contradiction in continuing such expanded 
propositions with sentences which explicitly state that the culmination referred to by the 
original proposition is not reached, as in 
(4-33) The train was arriving when the accident happened. 
(4-34) John was writing a dissertation, but he gave up when he became ill. 
By stipulating that the original profile of culminations and culminated processes is to be 
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coerced before it can combine with a progressive, the imperfective paradox can be accounted 
for without having to appeal to theory-external constructs such as inertia worlds. 
4.4.6 Restrictive lexical states combining with the progressive 
Restrictive lexical states resemble processes in that their assumed reference time implies that 
the state of affairs they describe began and will finish at some undefined point-in other 
words, it is a non-bounded segment on a time line. They differ from them, however, in that 
they are assessed at an atomic interval which forms part of their assumed reference time, 
rather than at a protracted interval identical with the assumed reference time. 
This means that for a restrictive lexical state to combine with a progressive, its asserted refer- 
ence time has to be protracted into an extended non-contingent interval first. The progressive 
function will, in turn, compress this interval again. 
The transformation of a restrictive state into a progressive state is thus felicitous only if it is 
possible to conceive of the restrictive state as a process first. Because the asserted reference 
time of processes coincides with their assumed reference time, they portray a situation as 
overt and implicitly developing in time; indeed, this is the only respect in which their meaning 
representation differs from that of restrictive states. Thus, coercing a restrictive state into a 
process may be possible if the state of affairs is given an overt and developing dimension, e.g 
by bestowing upon it the implication of deliberate or purposeful behaviour, a conscious effort, 
or some kind of pretence or play-acting. If context and world knowledge make it possible to 
think of the state of affairs in this way, the resulting process can felicitously combine with the 
progressive operator, which will describe it as in progress at a particular point in time. The 
following example illustrates this: 
(4-35) Fred is being polite. 
If no plausible appropriate context can be construed, however, the combination of the restric- 
tive state with a progressive will sound odd: 
(4-36) a Magnus is drunk. 
b ?Magnus is being drunk. 
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(4-37) a Nicole was bored, and cold, and miserable. 
b ? Nicole was being bored, and cold, and miserable. 
4.4.7 Unrestrictive lexical states combining with the progressive 
In the case of unrestrictive States, the type of coercing required to transform the meaning of 
the original predicate into a process, so that it can serve as input for a progressive is more 
elaborate and, in pragmatic terms, generally more implausible. As we have seen the assumed 
reference time of an unrestrictive state covers a time line. To be made compatible with a 
progressive, however, its assumed reference time is to be conceived of as a Segment on a 
time line, so that the situation described can be envisaged as having come about (relatively) 
recently and as coming to an end at an equally undefined point. In other words, the situation 
is to be thought of as transient and temporary, rather than intrinsic and permanent. And in 
addition to this, its meaning is to be manipulated in such a way that it can be interpreted 
as describing an overt and developing situation, rather than an inert one. Only very few 
unrestrictive states allow for such a radical change in meaning, but one could construct a 
context in which the unrestrictive state in (4-38) 
(4-38) Andre is a real racist. 
can plausibly be combined with a progressive operator, as in (4-39) 
(4-39) Andre is being a real racist. 
which carries the implication of purposeful obnoxious behaviour on Andre's part. Again, 
world knowledge may make the required type of coercing infelicitous. This explains why the 
following progressive constructions are unacceptable: 
(4-40) a Violets are blue. 
b ?Violets are being blue. 
(4-41) a Renee owns a house. 
b ?Renee is owning a house. 
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4.4.8 Distinguishing processes from states 
One advantage of the proposed definition of the progressive function is that it provides us with 
a criterion to distinguish processes from lexical states. If a proposition can unproblematically 
combine with a progressive without this involving any change to the original meaning of the 
predicate, the expression should be classified as a process. If it cannot, it is to be categorised 
as a state. Such a diagnostic test is more in line with the classification of linguistic material 
that we are aiming to provide than specifications of the process/state in terms of input of 
energy, which tend to reduce the classification to an ontological one. 
It follows from this that predicates such as wear, sit, enjoy etc., which are often classified as 
states, are more accurately characterised as processes, or at least as potentially exhibiting 
either a process or a state profile. Thus in examples (4-42) and (4-43) 
(4-42) It was cold, with fog in the air, and Rosalind was sitting over the fire, 
sewing. (Woolf, Lappin And Lapinova: 25) 
(4-43) Loulou is in the coach-house, wedging clay. She's wearing a pair of running 
shoes, once white, now grey, over men's wool work socks [...]. (Atwood, 
Loulou, or the domestic life of the language: 61) 
the ease with which the verbal predicates to sit and to wear combine with a progressive 
auxiliary indicates that the aspectual structure of a process is intrinsic to the meaning of the 
basic proposition. 
Our approach also clarifies Vendler's (1967) observation that achievements (culminations) 
and states cannot occur in the progressive. Vendler's claim is too strong: both combinations 
are possible if context and world knowledge support the transitions required to make sense 
of them. But the intuition underlying Vendler's observations is basically correct, in the sense 
that contexts in which states or culminations felicitously encode a progressive are harder to 
construct than in the case of culminated processes, processes and points, because the former 
involve a greater number of transitions (in the case of a culmination) or a more radical coercing 
(in the case of a lexical state) of the original profile. 
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4.4.9 Progressive states and perspective 
Another issue that can be accounted for in the light of the approach presented here concerns 
the difference between processes in the simple form and those in the progressive. Thus, 
both the (a) and the (b) sentences in the following examples describe an overt, developing, 
non-bounded but temporary situation: 
(4-44) a Her pulses beat fast, and the coursing blood warmed and relaxed every 
inch of her body. (Chopin, The Awakening: 83) 
b Her pulses were beating fast, and the coursing blood was warming and 
relaxing every inch of her body. 
(4-45) a The sun blazed out and steam rose from the green behind us. (Rhys, 
Wide Sargasso Sea: 58) 
b The sun was blazing out and steam was rising from the green behind 
us. 
None of the sentences move narrative time forward; the general impression they convey is 
one of states of affairs holding or extending simultaneously. It is therefore not obvious what 
the progressive auxiliary adds to the meaning of process predicates, unless one considers 
the distinction in the light of the progressive's capacity (which we defined as crucial to its 
function) to single out an atomic reference time: a progressive state presents a process at a 
certain moment of its actualisation-the point at which the situation described is assessed as 
extending or in progress. 
This aspectual property is traditionally characterised in terms of temporal framing or contour- 
ing (cf. Jespersen 1924: 178; also Allen 1966; Hirtle 1967). It is most transparent in clauses 
where the asserted reference time for the progressive is explicitly provided, for example by a 
punctual temporal adverbial, as in (4-46) 
(4-46) At one o'clock, Geoff was working in the garden. 
But even if the asserted reference time of a progressive is not specified by a temporal adverbial, 
the effect is the same; thus, the (b) sentences in examples (4-44) and (4-45) quoted earlier differ 
from their simple form counterparts in that they implicitly invite the reader to contemplate the 
situation they describe at a particular moment of its unfolding-as a subject would experience 
it. 
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And this brings us back to the relationship between aspect and perspective: because of b 
aspectual make-up, a progressive state introduces a perspectival focus into a narrative, which 
may be identified as occupied by a particular subject. As a result of this, progressives have 
the capacity to describe a situation as the object of introspection on the part of a subject. 
This explains why they may be used to denote a subjective intention or anticipation, as in 
their futurate use: 
(4-47) I am leaving tomorrow. 
(4-48) Anna declined the offer c, a drink. She was driving. 
The following examples show that they share this capacity with (restrictive) lexical states: 
(4-49) I am at home tomorrow. 
(4-50) Patrick declined the invitation. He was busy tomorrow. 
The same principle lies at the basis of the use of the so-called "interpretative progressive" 
(Jespersen 1954: 128). An interpretative progressive does not merely reflect that the situ- 
ation described is filtered through the perceptual or conceptual apparatus of a subject: the 
perspectival refraction is so strong that the progressive state "translates" the situation in 
terms of what it means, or signifies, to the experiencing subject. Example (4-51) illustrates 
this: 
(4-51) ("No." She smiled. "But I'm here now and I'm sure you could teach 
me a lot about it. For a start, how was Belvedere different from you 
other school, La Posse? They were both all-male schools, both private 
schools...") She was drawing him out. (Godwin, A Southern Family: 274) 
4.4.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the function of the progressive operator can be specified in terms of two char- 
acteristics. First of all, it takes as its input a process, i.e. an overt, developing, extended but 
non-contingent situation. And second, it describes this situation as in progress at an atomic 
interval. This means that if the proposition with which the progressive combines doesn't en- 
code the aspectual profile of a process, it has to be coerced; the transition network illustrates 
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the various ways in which this can be achieved. To interpret a progressive state, the reader 
will search its context for a stable atomic interval. In narratives, this interval is typically 
provided by a preceding clause (the profile of which may have to be coerced to meet the 
antecedent requirements of the progressive). If this is not the case, the reader will single out 
an atomic interval on the time line under construction on the basis of pragmatic inferences. 
Our analysis captures a number of different and sometimes apparently conflicting notions 
traditionally used to characterise the progressive form. Thus, the meaning of the progressive 
is often specified in terms of its continuous or durative aspect (e.g. Palmer 1965; Lyons 
1968). This can be explained in the light of the aspectual characteristics of the process profile 
which progressives take as their input. The same characteristics allow us to account for other 
meaning components standardly associated with the progressive, such as limited or finite 
duration (Koenig 1980; Toolan 1983), incompletion (Allen 1966), temporariness (Joos 1964, 
Goldschmidt & Woisetschlaeger 1982) and expectation of termination (Hornby 1949). 
Our description of the functional nature of the progressive is also in line with the observation 
that progressives normally do not move narrative time forward (cf. Joos 1964: 127; Hirtle 
1967: 66; Schopf 1974: 256; Weinrich 1977: 124). Because they normally interrupt the linear 
succession of events in a narrative, progressives are said to enhance a narrative's "temporal 
density" : their capacity to "call attention more specifically to time" is invoked to distinguish 
them from event descriptions (which "speak of nothing but the action itself", Jespersen 1924: 
180) Rather than advancing the plot, progressives are said to endow states of affairs with 
internal shape (hence their "slow cadence" in contrast with the "rapid cadence" of event 
descriptions, Hirtle 1967: 32). 
Our description of the referential make-up of progressive states makes it possible to account 
for these observations. It also fits in with the fact that the principal effect of progressives is 
often characterised in terms of the temporal contour they assign to situations. And finally, 
it enables us to explain why progressives are often used to convey an intense point in a 
narrative, a moment of (temporarily heightened) awareness or concentration on the part of 
a character or a character's involved participation or immersion in what is going on; all of 
these characteristics relate to the fact that progressives are states and therefore introduce a 
perspectival focus. 
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4.5 The perfect 
4.5.1 Functional characteristics 
The functional nature of the perfect can be described in terms of the following characteristics. 
First, it takes as its input a proposition which includes reference to a culmination. Second, 
it shifts the assumed reference time of the proposition to the consequences associated with 
the culmination, which are conceived of as an extended interval. What these look like will be 
determined by the semantic content of the proposition, context and pragmatic inferences. And 
third, it introduces an atomic interval within these consequences at which they are asserted 
as being in force. As a result of this, the referential centre becomes asymmetrical. The 
perfect operator, in other words, coerces a proposition into a state. This can be represented 
schematically as follows: 











4.5.2 Culminations combining with a perfect 
It follows from this that culmination propositions will unproblematically combine with a 
perfect, because their profile does not have to be coerced to meet the operator's input re- 
quirements. Consider: 
(4-52) He stepped to one side of the window, aware that he was visible to people 
he could not see. It had stopped raining, but the sound of water was 
louder. (McEwan, The Child in Time: 58) 
The perfect makes salient whatever consequences can be associated with the culmination 
proposition it stopped raining. These consequences extend at both sides of a stable asserted 
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reference time, which is in this particular example provided by the previous proposition (which 
is coerced into a point). The lexical state which follows the perfect is assessed at its (stable) 
asserted reference time. 
The asserted reference time of the perfect in example (4-53) is the same as that of the lexical 
state which precedes it (which has been provided by an event clause earlier in the text): 
(4-53) She lay curled up on her side of the bed, like a hare in its form. She 
had turned out the light [...]. (Woolf, Lappin And Lapinova: 26) 
Example (4-54) also illustrates the stability of the asserted reference time relied on by a 
perfect-both the perfect state and the progressive state which follows it are assessed at the 
same atomic interval: 
(4-54) They had arrived at their front door; Diana was rummaging in her bag 
for the key. (Lively, According to Mark: 28) 
The following examples show that perfect culminations introduce a perspectival focus which 
may be occupied by a subject in the text. In examples (4-56) and (4-57) other state descrip- 
tions in the same state complex are described from the same perspective: 
(4-55) But oh, how much had he lost? (Linklater, The Merry Muse: 137) 
(4-56) Of course, she had deliberately chosen Westminster Bridge. His flat was 
off Birdcage Walk. (Manning, The Doves of Venus: 7) 
(4-57) The further irony of all this was that in spite of her, he had turned out 
so well. In spite of going to only a third-rate college, he had, on his 
own initiative, come out with a first-rate education; in spite of growing 
up dominated by a small mind, he had ended up with a large one; in 
spite of all her foolish views, he was free of prejudice and unafraid to face 
facts. Most miraculous of all, instead of being blinded by love for her as 
she was for him, he had cut himself emotionally free of her [...]. He was 
not dominated by his mother. (O'Connor, Everything That Rises Must 
Converge: 12) 
4.5.3 Culminated processes combining with the perfect 
Culminated processes, too, can combine with a perfect operator without their profile having 
to be coerced first. Example (4-58) illustrates this: 
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(4-58) (In the bathroom) her cosmetic bag has been emptied into the sink: tooth- 
brush, toothpaste, bottle of aspirin, the works. (Atwood, Bodily Harm: 
158) 
In (4-59), the asserted reference time at which the perfect is interpreted is the same as that 
at which the preceding states are assessed:3 
(4-59) The windows were open wide, the shutters put back, and the light glared 
in. She had thrown the carpets and the big white pillows over the balcony 
rails. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 9) 
In (4-60), the perfect and the progressive state are both assessed at the same asserted reference 
time: 
(4-60) The train had escaped from the ugly fringes of the city, and the soft spring 
landscape was gliding past her. (Wharton, Atrophy: 29) 
The following examples illustrate that culminated processes which encode a perfect become 
perspectivally situated. 
(4-61) She felt as if her body had shrunk; it had grown small, and black and 
hard. (Woolf, Lappin and Lapinova: 26) 
(4-62) True, he had memorized a brace of resounding epigrams, so that he might 
leave some good `last words' if he retained his consciousness till near the 
end; [...] (Linklater, The Merry Muse: 132) 
4.5.4 Processes combining with the perfect 
A proposition which is not a culmination or culminated process can only combine 
felicitously with the perfect if it is coerced first. In the case of a process, this means the process 
is assigned a culmination and will thus have consequences associated with it. Example (4-63) 
illustrates this: 
(4-63) In it [the carriage] sat the General and the Countess; they 
had been for his daily airing. (Mansfield, The Man Without a Temper- 
ament: 13) 
In (4-64) the semantic content of the perfect process (which, as in the previous example, is 
BThe third clause the light glared in constitutes a process, but here forms part of the state complex. This 
phenomenon was discussed in the previous chapter. Note that the relationship of topical/scenic coherence 
which can be detected among the first three states also extends to the perfect state. 
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assessed at the stable asserted reference time of the preceding state), constitutes a subjective 
interpretation of the fictional reality: 
(4-64) This was because she had used him, stolen from him. He 
had gone searching for their daughter while she sat at home. (McEwan, 
The Child in Time: 135) 
4.5.5 Points combining with a perfect 
Point propositions only encode a perfect felicitously if they can be viewed as having con- 
sequences (cf. the transition from point to culmination). If the semantic content of the 
proposition and world knowledge do not allow for the identification of any relevant conse- 
quences, this coercion will fail and the combination of the point proposition with the perfect 
auxiliary will be felt to be unacceptable. This is illustrated by the following example, used 
by Moens & Steedman (1988: 19): 
(4-65) #The star has twinkled. 
In other cases, it may be possible to imagine a context which makes the transition from point 
to culmination plausible. Thus example (4-66) 
(4-66) Fred has hiccoughed. 
could be felicitous in a context in which bed's hiccoughing forms part of a particular scenario 
(e.g. in the framework of a play) and has to take place before the next event in a prearranged 
sequence can occur. In such a context, it will be possible to associate consequences with the 
point expression, and hence to coerce it into a culmination which may serve as input for a 
perfect operator. 
4.5.6 Lexical states combining with the perfect 
For lexical states to felicitously combine with a perfect it must be possible to associate con- 
sequences with them. This means, in principle, that the state has to evoke a contingency 
structure, or, in other words, that it has to be coerced via the transition path which maps 
non-contingent states (which include all stative basic propositions) onto contingent states. 
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The latter type of profile thus constitutes a third potential input category for the perfect 
operator. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, contingent states are characterised by the fact 
that their referential centre remains asymmetrical, which their asserted reference time is 
conceived of as a culmination. This means a number of different relationships may hold 
between the asserted and the assumed reference time. If a contingent state is placed in the 
consequences of a preceding description, its asserted reference time may, for example, coincide 
with the first moment of its assumed reference time (in which case the state is truly inceptive). 
Alternatively, it may be an interval at the beginning of the assumed reference time which is 
not its first moment (in which case the state is pseudo-inceptive). Or it may be an unspecified 
interval internal to the assumed reference time. The three possibilities can be represented 










In the case of perfect states, however, a fourth possibility applies: because consequences have 
to be associated with the actual occurrence of the state, the asserted reference time of the 
contingent state which serves as input for the perfect has to coincide with the final boundary 
of its assumed reference time, which therefore is to be conceived of as a culmination. This 





This means that, for a state to combine with a perfect, it must be possible to assign a final 
boundary to the state of affairs it describes, and to think of this boundary as a culmination 
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which has consequences associated with it. 
Because the assumed reference time of a restrictive state is a segment on an imaginary time 
line, it is, in most cases, relatively easy to conceive of a restrictive state as bringing about 
a change of state. Example (4-67) and (4-68) describe that the consequences of a restrictive 
state are registered as being in force by a character in the text: 
(4-67) She sees her notebook, laid out on the bed, with the material she's been 
collecting, maps and brochures, neatly beside it. Someone's been in here. 
(Atwood, Bodily Harm: 158) 
(4-68) Most of the men had been so thoughtful as to bring tweed caps, as well as 
their top hats [...]. (Linklater: The Merry Muse: 141) 
In the case of most unrestrictive state profiles, on the other hand, it is much harder to 
construct a context which makes this meaning transformation plausible. It is impossible, 
for example, to envisage the state of affairs be tall as being restricted in time-hence the 
infelicitousness of (4-69): 
(4-69) *John has been tall. 
Contrast this with the temporary states in (4-70) and (4-71), which are perfectly accept- 
able: 
(4-70) Vina has been ill. 
(4-71) Claire has been productive. 
And this is not surprising: since unrestrictive states describe a situation as intrinsic to the 
world, it is normally impossible to conceive of them as having consequences, because this 
would imply that the situation has come to an end. In narrative, however, there are instances 
in which it is possible to conceive of an unrestrictive state as having consequences. As we 
have seen, unrestrictive states apply without limitation over a narrative line. If this narrative 
line coincides with the whole of the imaginary time span of a narrative, an unrestrictive state 
combining with a perfect will be infelicitous. But an unrestrictive state may also apply over 
a shorter line-a particular period in the life of a protagonist which is viewed as having come 
to an end, for example. In such cases, it will be possible to assign a final boundary to the 
assumed reference time of the unrestrictive state, after which a new time line ensues. As a 
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result, it will be possible to associate consequences with the proposition and to assess them 
at some point on a later timeline-a protagonist might, for example, recall a situation which 
no longer holds, and consider it in the light of the fictional present. In such cases, a perfect 
will be felicitous. 
The following example illustrates this: 
(4-72) Her life had been so carefully guarded, so inwardly conventional in a world 
where all the outer conventions were tottering, that no one had ever known 
she had a lover. (Wharton, Atrophy: 28) 
The unrestrictive state her life was so carefully guarded applies over a timeline which covers 
an earlier stage in the female protagonist's life. At the point where this line comes to an 
end, consequences start to ensue and a new time line is introduced. The perfect construction 
describes these consequences as assessed at a particular moment on the time line which is 
being construed when the reader encounters the sentence. This moment coincides with the 
temporal co-ordinate of a character in the text: the sentence describes a situation in the 
past life of the female protagonist as she reconstructs it-it is shaped and coloured by the 
interpretative activity of her memory. 
The following examples illustrate the same principle. As in the previous passage, the perfect 
states reflect the thoughts of a character in the text: 
(4-73) She saw time stretching like a shadow behind her, like the long, dark, 
empty promenade on which the two figures, very small in her memory, 
pressed against the wind. Her father had known that he was dying. (Man- 
ning, The Doves of Venus: 55) 
(4-74) And what a narrow-minded, self-centred, domestic tyrant she had been! 
(Linklater, The Merry Muse: 136) 
Restrictive and unrestrictive states may thus be coerced into contingent states to serve as 
input for a perfect operator. Through a different route, however, their profile may also be 
changed into a culminated process before it combines with a perfect. This route goes via the 
process node, and, as in the case of progressive states, lexical states may be coerced in this 
way if it is possible to conceive of them appropriately. The state-process transition requires 
thinking of the original state profile as an overt or developing situation. This means the state's 
asserted reference time is to be protracted into an extended interval which coincides with its 
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assumed reference time (cf. the overt meaning component), which has to be an extended 
non-bounded interval on a time line. If context and world knowledge allow for this type of 
coercion, the resulting process can be assigned a boundary and serve as input for the perfect 
operator. 
As in the case of the progressive, unrestrictive states often resist this meaning transformation 
because it is difficult to think of them as transient rather than permanent. If this is possible, 
however, they may felicitously combine with a perfect. Thus, it is not hard to construct a 
context in which somebody, registering another person's distress, exclaims: 
(4-75) John has been a bastard again! 
The perfect in this example once more constitutes a subject's (in this case the speaker's) 
interpretation of a given situation. 
Restrictive states will as a rule be more conducive to being coerced into a process, because 
their assumed reference time constitutes a segment on a time line rather than the whole of a 
time line-a characteristic which they share with processes. Hence, they will more frequently 
combine with a perfect operator than unrestrictive states. To interpret the perfect in (4-76), 
for example 
(4-76) Fido has been very good. 
the state has to be conceived of as a developing situation (the transition from state to process; 
for example, Fido is good means Fido behaves himself). Once this is achieved, a final boundary 
can be assigned to the situation (the transition from process to culminated process), so that 
consequences can be associated with it (e.g. Fido deserves some praise). A context which 
allows this is easy to construct. 
4.5.7 Temporally sequenced perfects 
Let us summarise the main points of our discussion so far. A perfect takes as its input a situ- 
ation type which evokes a contingency structure, and highlights the consequences associated 
with it at a stable, non-updated asserted reference time. Because of this perfects, like lexical 
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states and progressives, generally do not normally move time forward. 
When a perfect follows or is followed by another state both states will be interpreted at the 
asserted reference time, which remains stable. No contingency structure is evoked, and the 
reader's attention will instead be geared towards the establishment of some kind of topical 
relationship between the states of affairs described. In such cases, the consecutive states form 
a state complex which is governed by the same perspectival focus. The following examples 
illustrate this: 
(4-77) The old stable block had become the sales area and three huge glasshouses 
had been built where once had been the kitchen garden. The rest was filled 
with aisle upon aisle of container-grown plants and trees, each area labelled 
with markers in elegant lettering designed by an art-school friend of Bill's: 
Shrub Roses, Fuchsias, Fruit Trees, Buddleias and so forth. (Lively, Ac- 
cording to Mark 33) 
(4-78) But the fall had shaken him, and one of his knees was sore. (Linklater, 
The Merry Muse: 12) 
(4-79) The raw white fog outside had been turned by the lamps into a golden 
mesh that blurred the edges of the plates and gave the pineapples a rough 
golden skin. Only she herself in her white wedding dress peering ahead of 
her with her prominent eyes seemed insoluble as an icicle. (Woolf, Lappin 
and Lapinova: 23-24) 
(4-80) The mourners, however, even the sturdiest, presented a less dignified ap- 
pearance than they had worn ashore. Most of the men had been so 
thoughtful as to bring tweed caps, as well as their top hats [...]. (Lin- 
klater, The Merry Muse: 141) 
(4-81) At the sides of the room were shelves of the copper hunting horns and 
ewers and warming pans and horse-brasses that would be slung from the 
beams of pubs and restaurants. New brass handles, in eighteenth century 
designs, had been clapped onto old deal chests or tough functional little 
dressers; the painted carcase of a nineteenth century pram had been made 
into a plant- stand. (Lively, The Road to Lichfield: 178) 
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(4-82) (He could not recall everything he had said to her.) Hoarse of voice and 
momentarily insane, he had muttered his suggestion to "cut and run"- 
that was a memory clothed in shame and stiff with remorse- but what 
promise had he made? A proposal to "cut and run" might be called 
an invitation, but certainly not a promise. He had spoken clearly of the 
difference between a phrase used to express gallantry, and words that 
embodied a serious purpose; but either she had forgotten that skillful 
explanation or was deliberately ignoring it. (Linklater, The Merry Muse: 
182) 
(4-83) But for a quarter of a century he had lived with propriety, with a narrow 
subservience to convention-and a handsome profit for conformity. But 
oh, how much had he lost? (Linklater, The Merry Muse: 137) 
The principle of interpreting perfects at a stable asserted reference time is, however, not 
without problems. Consider the following examples: 
(4-84) She had sketched into a notebook the tomb that bore so lavish a collection 
of trophies of war, and had written beneath her sketch "Decoration for a 
bed-head", hoping that one day at the studio she would be required to 
decorate a bed-head. (Manning, The Doves of Venus: 4) 
(4-85) "Would you know him if you met him?" Diana had once asked. "If he 
appeared, walking towards you in the street." And Mark had replied, after 
consideration that yes, he was pretty sure he would. (Lively, According to 
Mark: 60) 
While the first perfect clause in each of these passages can be interpreted at a stable asserted 
reference time in the main line narrative, the second clause (had written, had replied) in 
each case creates the impression of temporal progression. This forward movement in time, 
however, is to be situated not at the first narrative level (at which the situation described in 
the first clause is situated) but at an embedded narrative level introduced by the first clause. 
In other words, while the asserted reference time of the first clause is provided by a stable 
atomic interval at the level of the main line narrative (a feature which characterises it as a 
state), it also introduces a new embedded narrative line. And on this line it is interpreted as 
an event, which provides the antecedent context for the following clause, which updates the 
embedded narrative line. 
To capture this particular phenomenon, we will say that the first clause in each case introduces 
a new temporal temporal focus. A clause introduces a new temporal focus if it creates an 
embedded narrative line, and if its aspectual profile at the embedded narrative line differs 
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from the one on the main line narrative. 
In each of the examples above the first clause is interpreted the level of the main line narrative 
as a state. The second perfect is contingently related to the first. However, it is not the 
perfect state which is made contingent but rather the proposition which served as input for 
the perfect. In the case of (4-85), this is a culmination; in (4-84), it is a culminated process. 
The contingency structure associated with this input profile is evoked, and the profile which 
served as input for the next perfect is placed in its consequences at the level of the embedded 
narrative line. In other words, within the embedded narrative line a contingency relation 
is made salient between the propositions which, on the embedded narrative line, behave as 
events in the simple past. The non-contingent meaning structure of the first perfect at the 
level of the main line narrative, meanwhile, is temporarily stacked. This can be represented 
schematically as follows: 
(culmination) (consequences) 
(PP) [C] (cons) 
[r'] 
[r] 
new temporal focus 
[r] 
stacked stable asserted reference time 
with non-contingent associated 
meaning structure 
An important principle follows from this, namely that although aspectual profiles may be 
coerced by various operators, their earlier referential centres and associated meaning struc- 
tures are not completely erased by this coercion, but remain present as underlying layers of 
meaning which may, under the appropriate circumstances, be reactivated. In the case of past 
perfect constructions the underlying layer of meaning (the input profile for the perfect) is 
usually an event; this event is coerced by the perfect into a state, and if it occurs in a stative 
context (as in examples (4-77)-(4-83)) the perfect will be contextualised as a state. However, 
if a contingency relation can be inferred between the semantic content of successive perfects, 
the reader will be invited to consider the event profile which has been preserved as underlying 
layer meaning as more salient, to reactivate it, and to interpret the sequence accordingly. 
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4.5.8 The present perfect 
Note that only past perfects exhibit this capacity to introduce a new temporal focus and 
a new embedded time line. In the present tense, in contrast, consecutive perfects cannot 
be interpreted as contingently related and occurring in a time sequence. Consider example 
(4-86): 
(4-86) # "Would you know him if you met him?" Diana has once asked. [...] 
And Mark has replied, after consideration that yes, he was pretty sure he 
would. 
And this is not surprising. As we have seen earlier, to describe consecutive states as tempo- 
rally sequenced and therefore as contingently related, they are to be thought of as including 
reference to a culmination. To evoke a time sphere before a past tense reference point (in 
other words, a pre-past), the language user has to select the past perfect. And to convey 
temporal sequencing within this time sphere, a contingency relation has to be made salient 
between states of affairs in the past perfect. To describe states of affairs as contingently 
related in a past time s1here, however, the language user does not need to use the present 
perfect, because she has the simple past at her disposal to express precisely this meaning. 
Put differently, there are two ways of viewing the "pastnesss" of a state of affairs with respect 
to an imaginary speech point. The first consists in creating an internally coherent temporal 
continuum distanced from the speech point, in which states of affairs are described as recorded 
without interacting directly with the time sphere of the speech act. To evoke such a time 
sphere, a language user will select the simple past; and to convey temporal progression within 
this continuum, she will describe states of affairs as contingently related to each other. This 
means that they are thought of as including reference to a culmination, or change of state, 
and therefore as partaking of a chain of order and development with respect to surrounding 
events. This implies a procedure of distancing the states of affairs described from their (real 
or imaginary) speech point: the consequences of each state of affairs serve as antecedent 
locus for a subsequent state of affairs, which is also situated in the past, so that there is no 
immediate link between the speech time and the (asserted and assumed) reference time of 
the proposition. 
In a Reichenbachian framework, these characteristics are captured by the requirement that 
k t-) 
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in the simple past speech time and reference time are separated (E = R < S). 
A past tense situation can, however, also be considered in the light of the consequences that 
can be associated with it insofar as they are Still in force at the utterance's (real or imaginary) 
speech time. This means that the contingency structure associated with the state of affairs 
described is not conceived of as a self-contained contingent sequence in the past, but as a 
sequence of contingently related states of affairs the consequences of which embrace (and 
possibly extend beyond) the speech point. Schematically this can be represented as follows: 
PP Cons 
//////// [C] I//I//I/I 
( past ) 
PP Cons 
//////// [C] ///////// 
past (ST) 
(r4+) 
Accounts of the present perfect capture this idea by describing its principal meaning as 
covering a past-to-present period of time (e.g. Thomson and Martinet 1974). The same 
characterisation also pinpoints what the different and at first blush distinct uses of the present 
perfect listed by McCawley (1971, 1981) and Comrie (1976) have in common. The different 
categories McCawley and Comrie distinguish between can be summarised as follows: 
1. the universal perfect or perfect of persistent situation (which indicates that a state of 
affairs prevails throughout some interval stretching from the past into the present) 
2. the existential or experiential perfect (which indicates that an event occurred at least 
once in a period that extends from the past to the present) 
3. the stative perfect or perfect of result (which indicates that the direct effect of a past 
event still holds, or that a present state is the result of some past situation) 
4. the hot news perfect or perfect of recent past 
The characteristic shared by all these uses of the present perfect is that they relate a past 
situation to its consequences as they are felt at the present moment-something which is 
captured graphically by our characterisation of the perfect in the figure above. 
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Interval-based accounts of the present perfect attempt to formalise a similar notion when they 
specify the relevant truth conditions for the present perfect as involving the identification of 
a large interval of which "now" is a final subinterval, with the stipulation that the state 
of affairs described in the present perfect is required to be true with respect to this larger 
interval (cf. Bennet & Partee 1972; Dowty 1979). A similar approach is adopted with respect 
to a homogeneous interval logic by Heny (1982) and Richards (1986), who define the present 
perfect as true with respect to some interval i if i is a final subinterval of some interval j, and 
the situation described is true with respect to some k, which is a non-final subinterval of j. 
Schematically, this can be represented as follows: 
I 1 
I I I 1 
k 
One of the problems with this kind of account is that it does not capture the fact that perfects 
are states and are assessed at an atomic rather that an extended interval. In our approach, 
this is incorporated by distinguishing between two parameters for the description of i (which 
we identify as the consequent state of k), viz. an asserted and an assumed reference time. 
Another problem is that in purely topological terms, the above definition (and also the one 
proposed by Dowty and Bennet & Partee) boils down to the stipulation that k precedes j, so 
that it is not immediately obvious what distinguishes the present perfect from the simple past. 
The above accounts try to remedy this by specifying a larger interval of which both the interval 
at which the perfect is assessed and that of the situation which it describes are to be part. But 
such a specification, it seems to us, is not sufficient to represent the relationship of contingency 
which holds between the past event and the present assessment of its consequences, and the 
corresponding notion that both belong not only to the same temporal sequence, but also to 
the same causally related episode. In the approach we propose, this is captured by invoking 
the notion of a contingency structure which embraces both the past and the present. 
In contrast with a simple past clause, then, the asserted reference time of a present perfect 
clause coincides with its speech time: it is an atomic interval surrounded by the larger interval 
at which the consequences of a past situation are assumed to hold. In a Reichenbachian frame- 
work, this would be expressed by the stipulation S = R, and E < S. The English language 
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thus provides different grammaticalisations of the different ways in which past descriptions 
can be related to a speech point. 
4.5.9 The past perfect 
However, it is also possible to situate past descriptions with respect to a reference time 
different from that of the (real or imaginary) speech point. This means that, within a time 
sphere temporally distanced from the speech point, a reference point is introduced with respect 
to which a "pre-past" is located. As in the case of propositions which make reference to a past 
time sphere, propositions in a pre-past time sphere can be conceived of in different ways- 
either as partaking of a self-contained temporal continuum distanced from the reference point 
in the past time sphere (as in the case of the simple past), or as having consequences which 
are viewed as in force, and are assessed at, this reference point (as in the case of the present 
perfect). Unlike in the case of the simple past and the present perfect, however, language 
provides only one means of expressing both these meanings, namely the past perfect. 
This is why, in contrast with the present perfect, a past perfect may be interpreted either 
in terms of the aspectual properties of its input proposition (which includes reference to a 
culmination) or in terms of those of its output profile (which consists of the consequences of the 
input category being assessed at a stable asserted reference time). Which of these possibilities 
applies depends largely on context. If a past perfect is sequenced with other states, it will be 
assessed at the same stable asserted reference time. In addition to this, any first occurrence of 
a past perfect will automatically be interpreted in first instance as a consequent state, and be 
assessed at a stable asserted reference time within the past tense narrative. The interpretation 
of a subsequent past perfect by the reader, however, will depend on her inferences concerning 
the type of coherence which governs the sequence: if a temporal/causal relationship can 
be detected between the two, the temporal focus will shift and, within the new embedded 
narrative line, both perfect constructions will effectively function as events. 
The similarity between such sequences and simple past event sequences is borne out by the 
fact that such an embedded narrative line will often be continued in the simple past. The 
following example illustrates this: 
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(4-87) At three o'clock one morning, she had rung for the night nurse and told 
her she couldn't sleep. The nurse gave her a pill; she swallowed it with 
some water, leaned back with a sigh, then had given a little yip of surprise 
and was gone. (Godwin, A Southern Family: 174) 
After an embedded narrative line the meaning structure originally associated with the past 
perfect at the main line narrative (the asserted reference time of which is stable) which was 
temporarily made abstraction of, may be reactivated. Consider, for example, (4-88) 
(4-88) (1) This was because she had used him, stolen from him. (2) He had gone 
out searching for their daughter while she sat at home. (3) When he had 
failed to find her, Julie had blamed him (4) and left, her head full of cant 
about the proper way to mourn. (5) The proper way! (6) Who was she 
to lay down rules about that? (McEwan, The Child in Time: 135) 
The clauses in this passage are all assessed at the same stable asserted reference time, so that 
they constitute a state complex, the perspectival focus of which is occupied by a character 
in the narrative. But within this complex a relationship of contingency can be detected 
between the consecutive past perfect constructions in (2) and (3); these consequently form 
an embedded narrative line within the complex, on which narrative time moves forward. As 
a result of this the temporal focus will temporarily shift. But when the reader encounters 
the state in clause (4), which has to be interpreted at a stable asserted reference time, the 
non-contingent meaning structure originally associated with clause (2) will be reactivated. 
4.5.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, perfects are normally interpreted as states, and assessed at a stable asserted 
reference time situated within the consequences associated with the event profile which they 
take as their input. If a relationship of contingency can be perceived between two consecutive 
past perfects, however, the contingency structures associated with the events which serve as 
their input may be made salient as embedded temporal foci. The original temporal focus 
is stacked, and a new embedded narrative line is introduced. The original temporal focus, 
however, may be activated at a later stage. 
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4.6 Structural states 
h 
At the beginning of this capter we introduced a distinction between restrictive or temporary 
states, which apply over a segment on the time line under construction, and therefore imply 
that the state of affairs they describe came about and will come to an end at some unspecified 
point on that time line; and unrestrictive states, which apply without envisaged limitation 
over the whole of the time line under construction. Restrictive lexical states and progressives 
belong to the former group, unrestrictive lexical states to the latter. Perfect states may be 
interpreted either way. 
In this section, we will introduce another subcategory of state profiles, which we will refer to as 
structural states. Structural states resemble unrestrictive lexical states in that their assumed 
reference time covers the whole of the time line under construction; unlike unrestrictive lexical 
states, however, they elicit this type of representation because their lexical-semantic profile 
has been coerced by a structural operator. 
4.6.1 ]Functional characteristics 
The functional nature of structural operators can be captured in terms of the following char- 
acteristics: they take as their input a point, and they map this point onto a time line by 
iterating it over this time line. The resulting output profile consists of an extended non- 
contingent interval (the time line onto which the point has been mapped) which is assessed at 
a stable atomic asserted reference time, and thus exhibits the aspectual properties of a state. 
Structural states thus describe the repeated occurrence of a situation which is thought of as 
a point, as characteristic of, or intrinsic to, the structure of a time line. 




In terms of the aspectual properties of their referential centre, structural states are identi- 
cal to unrestrictive states. The difference between the two categories concerns the internal 
constituency of the time line which constitutes their assumed reference time. In the case of 
unrestrictive states, this time line is unstructured: the assumed reference time of the proposi- 
tion coincides with the inferred (inert) extension of the state. In the case of structural states, 
it is the iterative applying of the point proposition which extends over the time line; the 
original, non-iterative proposition can only be assumed to obtain at the intervals implicitly 
or explicitly highlighted by the structural operator, which thus in effect assigns a particular 
structure to the time lines. This is why we characterise this category as structural states. 
The type of proposition we refer to as structural states includes frequentative, di8po8itional, 
normal, and customary 8tate8 (cf. Lyons 1977: 716), iterative8 and habitual8. We opt for 
the term structural because we feel it best reflects the property which we are trying to cap- 
ture. For present purposes nothing important follows from not making any more fine-grained 
distinctions. 
The transition path between points and structural states resembles the one between points 
and processes, in that its function consists in iterating a point proposition over an extended 
interval. There are, however, two crucial differences. First of all, structural operators map 
a point proposition onto a time line. Because of this, they describe the iteration as intrinsic 
to (an entity in) the world as it is viewed at the time at which the described state of affairs 
is asserted. And secondly, they describe this unrestrictive interval as assessed at an atomic 
interval internal to their assumed reference time; because of this, structural states lack the 
overt or developing quality which characterises processes. 
4.6.2 Structural operators 
Unlike the progressive and the perfect operator, which can be identified by the reader through 
the presence of one specific syntactic feature (viz. a progressive or a perfect auxiliary), the 
category of structural operators is more diverse and includes a variety of different sentence 
constituents. 
Generally speaking, these constituents fall into two main groups. The first consists of fre- 
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quency adverbs (such as twice a week, every Saturday etc.), which specify the structure they 
impose on a timeline in terms of a particular number or pattern of occurrences. If such an op- 
erator applies, the point-like situation which served as its input is described in a characteristic 
or habitual light. The following examples, which all contain non-stative basic propositions 
which are coerced into a structural state by a frequency adverbial, illustrate this: 
(4-89) He always gulped down his first cup of coffee [...]. (Godwin, A Southern 
Family: 107) 
(4-90) Every year they took a different cook with them [...]. (Godwin, A Southern 
Family: 148) 
(4-91) Twice a year the octopus orchid flowered [...]. (Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 
17) 
(4-92) On her Saturday afternoon walks she came here [...]. (Manning, The 
Doves of Venus: 4) 
The second group consists of generic constituents; they include bare plurals and mass nouns 
in various sentence positions, and generic uses of expressions such as one, you and they. The 
structural function of these is best explained in the light of their "non-countability" feature, 
which interacts with the referential properties of a proposition in such a way that the proposi- 
tion also acquires this feature. This means that, when a clause contains a generic constituent, 
the situation it describes is no longer portrayed as a singular and therefore countable occur- 
rence; instead, its repeated occurrence is presented as intrinsic to, and characteristic of, the 
whole of the time line it is mapped onto, without any further specification (in terms of an 
identifiable number of instances) of this implied iteration. 
The following examples illustrate this. They also show that structural states, like other states, 
introduce a perspectival focus-in all of the following examples, this focus is occupied by a 
character in the narrative: 
(4-93) Did you take any precautions, they say, not before but after. (Atwood, 
Surfacing: 7) 
(4-94) But no, in European hotels, they left your coffee in a pot on your table, 
along with a pitcher of hot milk, and you refilled your own cup. (Godwin, 
A Southern Family: 107) 
(4-95) (Life was wonderful,) but men died. (Manning, The Doves of Venus: 4) 
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(4-96) But it gave one something to do, packing, unpacking. (Drabble, The 
Realms of Gold: 7) 
4.6.3 Points combining with a structural operator 
Since structural operators require as their input a point they unproblematically combine with 
point propositions, as in the following example: 
(4-97) Because sometimes when Aggie was lying awake late on a Saturday night, 
listening for car doors closing, footsteps coming up the walk, low voices, 
and sometimes a long quiet before the front door downstairs opened and 
then clicked shut-sometimes despite herself Aggie felt a stab of envy, or 
worse, resentment. Not nice, that. Not generous, or loving. (Barfoot, 
Duet for Three: 200) 
This example again illustrates the capacity of structural states to introduce a subjective 
perspective into a narrative. 
In (4-98) the second sentence, which contains a point proposition coerced into a structural 
state, is assessed at the same asserted reference time as the structural state which precedes 
it: 
(4-98) Often they looked slyly at each other when people talked about rabbits 
and woods and traps and shooting. Or they winked furtively across the 
table when Aunt Mary said that she could never bear to see a hare in a 
dish [...]. (Woolf, Lappin And Lapinova: 22) 
4.6.4 Culminations combining with a structural operator 
When culminations occur in combination with a structural operator, they are to be conceived 
of as points, which involves making abstraction of the consequences normally associated with 
them. The following examples illustrate this: 
(4-99) She seldom addressed or, apparently, noticed people who wandered into 
the showroom. (Lively, According to Mark: 17) 
(4-100) Mrs Halloran's always wins [...]. (Brookner, Look At Me: 10) 
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(4-101) [...] sometimes in the hot hours of the early afternoon they fell asleep. 
(Waugh, A Handful of Dust: 169) 
(4-102) He always gulped down his first cup of coffee [...]. (Godwin, A Southern 
Family: 107) 
4.6.5 Culminated process expressions combining with a structural oper- 
ator 
We earlier discussed two possible transitions paths from culminated processes to points: one 
goes via the process node (the culminated process is stripped of its culmination, and the 
resulting process is compressed into a point), the other one via the culmination node (the 
culminated process is stripped of its preparatory period, and the resulting culmination is 
no longer envisaged as evoking a contingency structure). But a closer look at the following 
examples reveals that neither of these routes applies when a culminated process is coerced 
into a structural state: 
(4-103) Between customers in the evenings in her big chair in the front room, 
Aggie read novels and histories and textbooks. (Barfoot, Duet for Three: 
136) 
(4-104) Masses became mobs, which had their own rules. (Any revolution proved 
that). (Barfoot, Duet for Three: 136) 
(4-105) Twice a year the octopus orchid flowered [...]. (Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 
17) 
(4-106) They stick needles into you so you won't hear anything. (Atwood, Sur- 
facing: 80) 
In none of these cases, the culminated process is stripped of either its preparatory period 
or its culmination before it is compressed into a point; rather, the whole of their referential 
centre (which includes reference to both) is compressed into a point-like structure (which, 
once this has been achieved, no longer has consequences associated with it). In other words, 
to serve as input for a structural operator culminated processes are coerced into points via 
a direct transition path. This, incidentally, supports our earlier observation that the atomic 
structure of points should not be defined in ontological terms. When culminated processes 
are compressed into points they do not lose their internal complexity. It is more accurate to 
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say that when they are described in a general, characteristic or habitual light, the reader no 
longer thinks of them as composite entities which bring about a change of state. 
4.6.6 Processes combining with a structural operator 
When processes combine with a structural operator, their referential centre is coerced into 
a point by compressing their asserted and assumed reference time into an atomic interval. 
Again, this does not mean the process loses its extension, but rather that it is no longer 
described as such. The following examples illustrate this: 
(4-107) Sometimes Sally worries that she's a nothing, the way Marilyn was before 
she got a divorce and a job. (Atwood, Bluebeard's Egg: 138) 
(4-108) Some Sundays he spoke of the joys of heaven, the reward for goodness, the 
pure peace of it. Other days he spoke of hell, quite graphically. (Barfoot, 
Duet for Three: 124) 
(4-109) She read about other people's lives, how they managed and how they 
were seen to have managed. She read about ideas, and systems of ideas. 
(Barfoot: Duet for Three: 136) 
(4-110) [ ...] the foghorn sounded regularly through the rain. (Waugh, A Handful 
of Dust: 168) 
4.6.7 Lexical states combining with a structural operator 
For lexical states to meet the input requirements of a structural operator, it must be possible 
to think of the state of affairs they describe as a point. If it can be conceived of as such, 
it can felicitously combine with frequentative expressions, which will describe the repeated 
occurrence of the state as characteristic of the time line under construction. As in the case of 
processes and culminated processes, the extension of the state is in such instances preserved 
as an underlying meaning component; when the structural operator applies, however, this 
extension no longer constitutes the focus of the reader's attention, and the state will be 
thought of as a point-like entity. 
Because restrictive states apply over a segment on a time line, it is often possible to compress 
their assumed reference time into a point. The following examples illustrate this: 
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(4-111) Suzanne Handley-Cox, fiftyish and of lacquered appearance, remained for 
the most part in her office where she intimidated young artists. (Lively, 
According to Mark: 17) 
(4-112) (Most often June went downstairs to the Sunday school in the basement, 
but sometimes he let her stay with him, in the high-ceilinged, dark-pewed 
cool and quiet church part.[...]. It was hard to sit still during sermons, 
though. (Barfoot, Duet for Three: 96) 
The last clause in (4-112) again illustrates that structural states may introduce a subjective 
perspective into a narrative. 
Unrestrictive states, on the other hand, are not as a rule compatible with adverbs quantifying 
over times. This is due to the fact that the appropriate coercion would require that the whole 
of the time line which constitutes their assumed reference time is conceived of as bounded; 
in addition to this, the operator would describe this bounded time line as iterated over yet 
another time line. The oddity or unacceptability of the following examples demonstrates that 
such a procedure is normally felt to be impossible or nonsensical: 
(4-113) *Three times a week, Chris is attractive. 
(4-114) *Sometimes John is tall. 
If an unrestrictive state does felicitously combine with a frequentative expression, this means 
a context can be constructed in which the described situation can plausible be interpreted as 
temporary. This explains why the following examples are acceptable: 
(4-115) Every so often, Nikki was happy. 
(4-116) At regular intervals, Kitty is a redhead. 
Unrestrictive states are, however, compatible with bare plurals and mass nouns: 
(4-117) Elephants are clever. 
(4-118) Moss is green. 
In such cases, however, the iterative aspect which characterises structural descriptions is 
absent, and the original profile of the unrestrictive state is preserved rather than coerced. 
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The non-countability feature of the time line and that of the mass or bare plural constituent 
in such cases reinforce each other's meaning orientation, and the time line which constitutes 
their assumed reference time remains unstructured. Note that such unrestrictive states can 
combine with the adverbial always. In such' cases, however, the adverbial does not have a 
frequentative or an iterative meaning, but an inert one, which again reinforces the aspectual 
structure of the basic proposition without coercing it: 
(4-119) Violets are always blue. 
4.6.8 Narrative lines 
In the approach we propose structural states and unrestrictive lexical states are both charac- 
terised by the fact that their assumed reference time covers the whole of the time line under 
construction. In many instances the domain of this narrative line will coincide with that of 
the main line narrative as a whole, as in (4-120) 
(4-120) The commonest kind of missing person is the adolescent girl, closely fol- 
lowed by the teenage boy. The majority in this category come from 
working-class homes and almost invariably from those where there is seri- 
ous parental disturbance. There is another minor peak in the third decade 
of life, less markedly working class, and constituted by husbands and wives 
trying to run out on marriages or domestic situations they have got bored 
with. (Fowles, The Enigma: 189) 
In other cases pragmatic inferences will determine how the reader views the extension of a 
narrative line. In this respect the identification of the state's perspectival focus and that 
of the subject which potentially occupies it may play a vital role. The structural states in 
the following passage, for example, can, through various contextual clues, be interpreted as 
assessed from the perspective of the main protagonist-a young boy-at a particular point 
in the story: 
(4-121) The girls kept diaries, but you never had a chance to read them. They kept 
them locked away-Laura's in her top bureau drawer, Bess's in the secret 
compartment of her desk. Diaries, besides, had keys. Laura wore hers 
on a bracelet with other trinkets-a gold heart and a tiny ivory slipper. 
Bess kept hers pinned to the black silk lining of her everyday purse or 
sometimes under the strap of an evening gown. (Taylor, A Woman of 
Substance: 1) 
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The structural states in (4-121) thus portray characteristic elements of the fictional world as 
it is perceived by the boy. But although the domain of these states of affairs (their assumed 
reference time) covers a major part of the novel, it does not extend to parts of it which focus 
on the same male protagonist at a later stage in his life. 
In other instances, the domain over which structural states apply may be demarcated through 
the use of a clause which puts a frame on their assumed reference time, as in the following 
example: 
(4-122) All that week the black boys lounged in the camp; sometimes they washed 
their clothes and hung them out on the gunwales of the boat to dry in the 
sun; sometimes they went fishing and came back with a massive catch, 
speared on a stick (the flesh was tasteless and rubbery); usually in the 
evenings they sang songs round the fire. (Waugh, A Handful of Dust. 
176) 
Narrative lines therefore need not coincide with the whole extension of a main line narrative. 
But whatever the implied or explicitly marked extension of the main or embedded time line 
under construction, structural and unrestrictive states all share the characteristic that they 
are assumed to obtain without limitation over the whole of this time line. 
In the case of consecutive structural states, the time lines over which the states described are 
assumed to extend may be structured differently-that is, states of affairs may be described as 
iterated at different intervals. This, however, does not appear to be a problem as long as the 
asserted reference time of the clauses or sentences concerned remains stable. The following 
examples illustrate this: 
(4-123) Tony and Dr Messinger seldom spoke to one another, either when they 
were marching or at the halts, for they were constantly strained and ex- 
hausted. In the evenings after they had washed and changed into dry 
shirts and flannel trousers they talked a little, mostly about the number 
of miles they had done that day, their probable position and the state of 
their feet. They drank rum and water after their bath; for supper there 
was usually bully beef stewed with rice and flour dumplings. (Waugh, A 
Handful of Dust: 181) 
(4-124) [...] sometimes in the hot hours of the afternoon they fell asleep. (2) 
They ate in the boat, out of tins, and (3) drank rum mixed with the 
water of the river, which was mahogany brown but quite clear. (Waugh, 
A Handful of Dust: 169) 
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4.6.9 Unrestrictive state complexes 
As we have seen earlier, consecutive states which are asserted of the same stable asserted 
reference time form a state complex. All the tensed clauses in a state complex are governed 
by the same perspectival focus. In addition to the structural operators discussed above, a 
state complex consisting of structural states and unrestrictive lexical states may function as a 
structural operator, in the sense that it coerces non-stative propositions and restrictive lexical 
states into structural states. The following examples illustrate this: 
(4-125) [ULS] The structure of the house was hierarchical, with my grandfather 
at the top, [ULS] but its secret life-the life of pie crusts, clean sheets, 
the box of rags in the linen closet, the loaves in the oven- was female. 
[P DST] The house, and all the objects in it, crackled with static electricity. 
[P DST] Undertows washed through it, [ULS] the air was heavy with things 
that were known but not spoken. ( PULS')Like a hollow log, a drum, a 
church, it amplified [...]. (Atwood, Significant Moments in the Life of my 
Mother: 13) 
(4-126) [ULS] At the back of the Campo di Santa Maria Formosa was a network of 
streets and narrow gutter-canals, at high tide smelling like dead fish and at 
low tide even worse. [P PST] The befouled water lapped at the lower doors 
of the tall buildings on either side; [UPS] but these doors had been closed 
for ever. [ULS] The entrances to the buildings were round the other side, 
in some narrow alley between the waterways. (Spark, Territorial Rights: 
13) 
(4-127) [...] [ST] the foghorn sounded regularly through the rain. [P DST] Tony 
prowled disconsolately about the deserted decks [P DST] or sat alone in 
the music room, his mind straying back along the path he had forbidden 
it, to the tall elm avenue at Hetton and the budding copses. (Waugh, A 
Handful of Dust: 168) 
(4-128) [UPS] For my mother, hospitals have never been glamorous places 
[CP DST] and illness offers no respite or holiday. [C DST] "Never get 
sick," she says, [RLS DULS] and means it. [ST] She hardly ever does. 
(Atwood, Significant Moments in the Life of My Mother: 12) 
(ULS = unrestrictive lexical state; P = process; ST = structural state; UPS = unrestrictive 
perfect state; CP = culminated process; D indicates the coercion of a proposition's aspectual 
profile) 
In such cases, the unrestrictive state complex has an effect on non-stative propositions which 
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is similar to that of the present tense in a discourse context (which will be discussed in chapter 
5). 
4.6.10 Temporally sequenced structural states 
Like other state profiles, structural states are normally interpreted at a stable asserted refer- 
ence time, so that they do not introduce an update into a narrative. 
Consider, however, the following example: 
(4-129) (1) Allan always brought a large croute of foie gras, a delicacy of which 
he was particularly fond. (2) Everyone ate a great deal (3) and became 
slightly torpid towards Boxing-day evening; (4) silver ladles of burning 
brandy went round the table, (5) crackers were pulled and opened [...]. 
(Waugh, A Handful of Dust: 60) 
The passage as a whole constitutes a state complex consisting of structural states, and none 
of the tensed clauses it contains moves time forward at the level of the main line narrative. 
Clause (3), however, does introduce an update with respect to clause (2). 
The phenomenon concerned is essentially similar to the one discussed earlier with respect to 
the past perfect. Although normally a topical relation is made salient between consecutive 
structural states, sometimes a contingency relation between them may be prominent. This 
contingency relation, however, will not hold between the structural states (as we have seen, 
this would require a fairly complex procedure of conceiving of time lines as contingently related 
events) but between the events which are coerced by the structural operator (in example (4- 
129), eat a great deal and become slightly torpid). This means that, as in the case of the past 
perfect, the referential centre of the uncoerced basic proposition remains present as underlying 
layer of meaning and may be activated in an appropriate context. 
If semantic content and pragmatic inferences highlight a contingency relationship between 
two consecutive propositions which combine with a structural operator, a new temporal focus 
is introduced and an embedded narrative line is constructed. The new temporal focus consists 
of the contingency structure associated with the first (uncoerced) event. The second (unco- 
erced) event is placed in its consequences and hence introduces a temporal update within the 
embedded narrative line. 
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At the same time the referential centre of the first coerced proposition (which, at the level 
of the main line narrative, functions as a structural state and is interpreted accordingly) is 
stacked. Again, however, it may be reactivated at a later stage, when the embedded narrative 
line is not expanded any further. Example (4-129) illustrates this: as it is more plausible to 
interpret clause (4) as topically related to clause (2) (and clause (1)) than as contingently 
related to clause (3), it will reactivate the meaning structure associated with the coerced 
structural state profile of clause (2). 
Example (4-130) illustrates the same principle: 
(4-130) What nonsense to pretend that nowadays, even in big cities, in the world's 
greatest social centres, the severe old-fashioned standards had given place 
to tolerance, laxity and ease! You took up the morning paper, and you read 
of girl bandits, movie-star divorces, `hold-ups' at balls, murder and suicide 
and elopement, and a general welter of disjointed disconnected impulses 
and appetites; then you turned your eyes onto your own daily life, and 
found yourself as cribbed and cabined, as beset by vigilant family eyes, 
observant friends, all sorts of embodied standards, as any white muslin 
novel heroine of the 'sixties! (Wharton, Atrophy: 28-29) 
In the present tense, too, sequences of events may be portrayed as characteristic of the time 
line under construction in this way. Example (4-131) illustrates this: 
(4-131) They stick needles into you so you won't hear anything, [...I they bend 
over you, technicians, mechanics, butchers, students clumsy or sniggering 
practising on your body, they take the baby out with a fork like a pickle 
out of a pickle jar. (Atwood, Surfacing: 80) 
Example (4-131) and (4-130) also illustrate once more that structural states are perspectivally 
situated and may be interpreted as reflecting the thoughts or opinions of a subject. 
In conclusion, it is possible to portray not only events, but also sequences of events in a 
characteristic, habitual or general light. In such cases, time moves forward on an embedded 
narrative line but not at the level of the surface narrative. 
4.8.11 Conclusion 
When the reader encounters a proposition modified by a structural operator in a narrative 
she will, on the basis of pragmatic inferences, construct a time line over which the proposition 
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can plausibly be envisaged as iterated. This time line will be assessed at an atomic asserted 
reference time 
Like other types of states, structural states introduce a perspectival focus, which may be 
inferred to be occupied by a subject in the narrative. 
If a structural state is sequenced with other state profiles, it will normally be interpreted at the 
same stable asserted reference time. In the case of consecutive structural states, however, a 
contingency relation may be salient between states of affairs which are, through the structural 
operator, described in a general or characteristic light. In such instances, a new temporal 
focus and narrative line are introduced, on which the states of affairs described are situated 
as events. At the same time this narrative line as a whole (which includes the temporal 
order conveyed between the events described) will be portrayed in a structural light, and be 
interpreted as a state at the level of the main line narrative. 
4.7 Combining operators 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that different operators may apply within 
the same tensed clause or sentence. Given the additional stipulation that they apply in a 
particular order, however, the co-occurrence of different operators can also be explained in 
the light of the analysis suggested here. 
Operators apply in the following sequence: 
1. the structural function 
2. the progressive function 
3. the perfect function 
When a structural operator occurs in combination with a progressive operator, for exam- 
ple, the latter will coerce the output of the structural operator. Thus (4-132) presents a 
characteristic situation as temporary: 
(4-132) Rosalind was always finding new qualities in him. (Woolf, Lappin and 
Lapinova: 21) 
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Interpreting (4-132) involves coercing the basic proposition it contains into a structural state, 
by mapping it iteratively onto a time line. The output proposition of the structural operator 
is then further coerced into a progressive, which means the unrestrictive state is converted 
into a restrictive one. This operation also appears to enhance the subjective dimension of 
the state: the implication seems to be that the limited duration assigned to the assumed 
reference time of the proposition is determined by a subject's speculative assessment of the 
extension of the state of affairs described. This explains why the meaning of always changes 
when it combines with a progressive. Always with the non-progressive means invariably or 
on every relevant occasion (in other words, its meaning is purely frequentative), whereas 
alway8 with the progressive means (hyperbolically) constantly or continuou8ly and refers to a 
situation which a specific subject (which in spoken discourse is always the speaker, but which 
in narrative may be either the narrator or a character in the text) does not expect to last 
permanently. Because of this the progressive, when it combines with a structural operator, 
adds to it overtones of emotive colouring, annoyance or puzzlement (cf. Mitchell 1986). The 
contrasts between the (a) and (b) sentences in the following examples illustrate this: 
(4-133) a He always makes fun of me. 
b He is always making fun of me. 
(4-134) a Her mother always told her not to walk home alone in the dark. 
b Her mother was always telling her not to walk home alone in the dark. 








(output after the progressive function has applied) 
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If the sentence in (4-132) also contail a perfect operator, the latter would assign a 
culmination to the assumed reference time of the progressive proposition, and describe any 
consequences which can be associated with it as holding at a particular point in time. Example 
(4-135) 
(4-135) Rosalind had always been finding new qualities in him. 
could therefore schematically be represented as follows: 
r' 
[r 
(output after the perfect function has applied) 
Thus, if the last operator to apply is a perfect one, the asserted reference time of the sentence 
as a whole coincides with the point at which the consequences of the proposition which it 
takes as its input are assessed. This is especially clear if a subjective perspective is introduced, 
as in the following examples: 
(4-136) (Not that she was a woman to be awed by conventions. She knew she 
wasn't.) She had always taken their measure, smiled at them-and con- 
formed. (Wharton, Atrophy: 29) 
(4-137) Ah, how often he had said to Nora: "If I could have you to myself for a 
weekend at Westover [...]". (Wharton, Atrophy: 30) 
(4-138) She had gone over their conversation so often that she knew not only her 
own part in it but Miss Aldis's by heart. (Wharton, Atrophy: 31) 
If a progressive combines with a perfect auxiliary, it is coerced into a culminated process via 
the process node. Progressives, as we have seen, describe an overt and developing situation of 
finite duration as ongoing at a particular point in time. To felicitously encode a perfect, their 
asserted reference time first has to be protracted into an extended interval (the transition 
from state to process); if a culmination can be assigned to this interval, the coerced profile 
will meet the input requirements for the perfect operator. 
Thus (4-139) 
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(4-139) Fabia has been cleaning the flat. 
can be used felicitously to refer to the consequences associated with the progressive con- 
struction, i.e. with the ongoing process of cleaning the flat. Because of this, (4-139) need 
not imply that Fabia actually finished cleaning the flat, and the consequences described by 
(4-139) might include the observation that the flat has been turned upside down but isn't 
necessarily clean. 
Example (4-140), on the other hand, 
(4-140) Fabia has cleaned the flat. 
describes the consequences associated with the the culminated process clean the flat, which 
includes reference to the culmination finish cleaning the flat; these consequences will normally, 
among other things, consist of the flat being clean. 
To summarise, sentences containing different stative operators are best described as conglom- 
erates of expanded propositions and their corresponding referential centres. This means that 
while such sentences will exhibit the aspectual characteristics of the last function to apply, 
the output profiles of any other operators they contain are preserved as underlying layers of 
meaning. 
4.8 Conclusion 
We have distinguished between five different types of states. All of these have a number 
of aspectual properties in common which can be characterised in terms of their referential 
centre: the asserted reference time of a state is always an atomic interval which forms part 
of its assumed reference time, which is therefore by definition extended. As we have seen in 
Chapter 3, all propositions exhibiting this type of referential centre introduce a perspectival 
focus. We have illustrated this by showing how all five types of states may present the state of 
affairs they describe as filtered through the awareness or evaluating consciousness of a subject 
in the narrative. 
We have also pointed out that because of these aspectual properties states will normally be 
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evaluated at a stable, non-updated asserted reference time; as a result, the reader's search for 
coherence among successive states will be geared towards establishing a topical rather than 
a contingency relation between them. 
In the next chapter we will provide further evidence for our claim that states are perspectivally 
situated through an analysis of the way the present tense (with actual time reference) interacts 
with the different aspectual types. 
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Chapter 5 
The Present Tense in Spoken 
Discourse 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will discuss the use of the present tense with real or actual time reference 
in spoken discourses, and the way it interacts with different aspectual types. At first blush, 
this may not seem directly relevant to our principal object of investigation, which concerns the 
relationship between aspectual class and certain temporal and perspectival issues in narrative 
fiction (where tense never has actual time reference). We feel, however, that it bears directly 
upon the central argument put forward in this dissertation, since it provides further evidence 
for our claim that (main) clauses which exhibit a state profile are perspectivally situated. 
The starting point for our discussion is that there are restrictions on the way the present 
tense, if it has actual time reference, combines with aspectual class: certain combinations 
are odd or unacceptable, others are less standard. We will explain this in the light of earlier 
observations about the way a subject's experience of time is represented linguistically. 
'Tense has real or actual time refence if it deictically relates a situation to its moment of speech. This means 
tense in narrative fiction although it may simulate the deictic capacity of tense in spoken discourse when a 
pseudo speech-time is established in the text. We will come back to this in Chapter 6. In spoken language, 
the use of the narrative or historical present tense constitutes an example of a case where the present tense 
lacks actual time reference. 
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5.2 The present tense with actual time reference 
Grammatical descriptions of tense which take spoken discourse as their norm usually echo 
Comrie's view that the present tense 
in its basic meaning [...] invariably locates a situation at the present moment, 
and says nothing beyond that. [...] [It] refers only to the situation holding at the 
present moment. (Comrie 1985: 37) 
Such a deictic-temporal definition of the present tense essentially captures the fact that the 
present, if it has actual time reference, is always someone's present: its meaning can only 
be specified as relative to the temporal situatedness of the speaker-that is, to the time at 
which a sentence is uttered (the speech time). In a present tense utterance which has actual 
time reference the speech time is the time at which the state of affairs described is asserted 
to take place or obtain. In Chapter 3 we argued that when the asserted reference time of a 
proposition coincides with the temporal co-ordinate of a subject, it constitutes a per8pectival 
interval. We also claimed that a perspectival interval always has to be atomic. We will now 
further substantiate this claim by showing that present tense utterances with actual time 
reference are only felicitous if their asserted reference time is atomic. We will call this the 
necessary condition or requirement imposed by the present tense. 
In addition to this, we will argue that a state of affairs in a present tense utterance with actual 
time reference is normally also described from the perspective of the speaker. This implies 
that it is possible for a speaker to describe a situation in the time sphere of the present as 
per8pectivally distanced from the speaker. This claim is not as paradoxical as it may sound 
if it is viewed in the light of our earlier observations between perspectival distance and the 
establishment of a time line. The establishment of a time line, we suggested, always involves 
a procedure of perspectival distancing, because it means that situations are thought of as 
discrete units which derive their position on the time line from their relationship with other 
states of affairs, rather than from their relationship with the speech time. Clearly this type 
of perspectival distance is inextricably related to the concept of narrative: the establishment 
2 Tense is defined as a deictic category if it is viewed in its capacity to relate a situation to the moment of 
speech. Dahl (1985: 25) refers to this as absolute tense, Comrie (1976: 5) describes it as (the establishment 
of) situation-external time. 
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of a time line is tantamount to the establishment of a narrative context, cf. Dahl 1985: 112), 
and always requires a measure of distance between speaker and statement. A situation in 
the present tense is perspectivally distanced from the speaker, therefore, if the present is 
portrayed by the speaker as a time line on which the situation is projected. 
Such perspectival distance is at odds with a subject's immediate and involved experience 
and/or assessment of states of affairs in the time sphere of the present, where situations are 
typically viewed as obtaining or being in progress as the subject contemplates or describes 
them. In terms of the analysis we propose, this means that the assumed reference time of 
situations in the present tense with real time reference is typically extended and unbounded, 
and that their asserted reference time typically does not include reference to a culmination, so 
that it is stable. Nevertheless it is possible to convey temporal immediacy while at the same 
time introducing an element of perspectival distance through the implicit construction of a time 
line to view situations in the present, in other words, as a kind of narrative which unfolds as 
the situations are described. Because this type of description is contrastive, however, it is also 
felt to be non-standard.3 Because of this a non-contingent associated meaning structure and 
an extended assumed reference time (or, by implication, an asymmetrical referential centre) 
are not necessary conditions for a present tense utterance with actual time reference to be 
used felicitously. We refer to them as a features which are congenial to the present tense. 
On the basis of this we can distinguish between two types of utterances in the present tense 
with actual time reference: those which describe a state of affairs from the perspective of the 
speaker (i.e. extended states of affairs which are assessed at a non-contingent atomic interval, 
or states) and those which introduce a measure of perspectival distance between speaker 
3This explains why narrative is typically associated with the past tense which, aside from its deictic capacity 
to introduce a temporal distance between the moment of speech and the described state of affairs, is also 
associated with perspectival distance, in very much the same way as the temporal immediacy of the present 
tense is associated with perspectival immediacy. It is worth pointing out, however, that as in the case of the 
present tense, a state of affairs in the past tense may be viewed either as perspectivally distanced from the 
speaker, or as governed by the speaker's perspective. Thus 
Elle [language] connait deux sortes de passes: Pun qui eat immddiatement mien, que je commente, 
comme tout ce qui vient a ma rencontre dans la situation de locution concrete oh je me trouve; 
1'autre que le regit, a la maniere dun filtre, separe de moi et distancie. (Weinrich 1973: 101) 
[language has two types of past: one which is immediately mine, which I annotate, just like 
anything else that I find in my immediate environment; the other past, which narrative, like 
some sort of filter, distance$from me] 
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and statement (i.e. states of affairs which are assessed at an contingent atomic interval, or 
culminations). The rest of our discussion will follow this distinction. 
5.2.1 Present time reference with speaker's perspective 
State profiles 
It follows from our discussion above that states meet the necessary requirement of the present 
tense and also exhibit its congenial characteristics. This is in line with/supports our claim 
that states are always perspectivally situated. The following diagram captures this: 
Present tense Referential make-up 
of state profiles 
Necessary requirement r is atomic r is atomic 
Congenial feature RC is asymmetrical RC is asymmetrical 
associated meaning associated meaning 
structure is non- structure is non- 
contingent contingent 
As a result of this the present tense in the majority of cases combines with a proposition 
exhibiting a state profile-that is, a lexical, progressive, perfect or structural state. In se- 
quence, present tense state propositions are interpreted at the same stable asserted reference 
time (which coincides with their the speech time), and a relationship of topical coherence is 
made salient between them. If subject-oriented constructions occur in such propositions they 
reflect the point of view of the speaker. The perspectival focus of state propositions in the 
present tense, therefore, is always occupied by the speaker. 
The following examples illustrate all this: 
(5-1) Fabia is furious and to be honest I am furious too. 
(5-2) I like horseriding. Unfortunately I get very little practice. 
(5-3) It is raining again! And all my washing is outside! 
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(5-4) Marc gets to go to Paris quite often. He's so lucky. 
(5-5) Sophie has just arrived. Tomorrow she's going to Aberdeen. 
Process profiles 
The asserted reference time of propositions exhibiting a process profile is an extended interval. 
Because of this process propositions can only combine with the present tense if their meaning 
profile is coerced. 
Consider the following examples: 
(5-6) Henry drinks a lot. (We all worry about him). 
(5-7) Ewan works in the garden. (He enjoys it.) 
(5-8) We do push-ups in the park. (It keeps us in shape). 
Due to the conflict between the extended asserted reference time of the process profile and 
the atomic reference time required by the present tense it is impossible to interpret a pro- 
cess proposition in the present tense with actual time reference as describing an overt and 
developing process: to meet the temporal requirements of the present tense, the asserted 
reference time of the proposition has to be atomic. To achieve this, the process profile is to 
be coerced into a state. The only stative interpretation which can be assigned to a simple 
form (if it is not a lexical state) is a structural one. We have seen earlier that a simple form 
is coerced into a structural state if it combines with a frequentative adverb, a generic, or a 
mass noun or bare plural-in other words, with a structural operator. In a context in which 
tense has actual time reference, we can now add, the present tense, when it combines with a 
process profile, also functions as structural operator, in the sense that it imposes a habitual 
or characteristic interpretation on the state of affairs described. The transition from process 
to structural state, as we have seen in Chapter 4, goes via the point node. 
All this can schematically be represented as follows: 
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Present tense Process Structural state 
Necessary r is atomic r is extended r is atomic 
requirement 
Congenial RC is asymmetrical RC is symmetrical RC is asymmetrical 
feature associated meaning associated meaning associated meaning 
structure is structure is structure is 
non-contingent non-contingent non-contingent 
If a process profile is coerced into a state by the present tense, it becomes perspectivally 
situated, and its perspectival focus is occupied by the speaker. The following examples 
illustrate this: 
(5-9) Jo smokes too much. 
(5-10) Stefana works out with admirable discipline and devotion. 
Culminated Process profiles 
Now let us consider culminated processes in the present tense. Since their asserted reference 
time is extended, culminated processes cannot combine with the present tense unless their 
aspectual profile is coerced. This is illustrated by the following sentences which, as basic 
propositions, would constitute culminated processes. In the present tense with actual time 
reference, none of them can be interpreted as culminated processes: 
(5-11) Anja feeds the cat. (She loves animals). 
(5-12) Henk makes a good curry. (But it takes him ages.) 
(5-13) Robert cleans the flat. (We all appreciate it.) 
As in the case of processes, there is a conflict between the asserted reference time of culminated 
processes (which is extended) and the type of asserted reference time required by the present 
tense. Because of this culminated processes can, like processes, only be used felicitously in the 
present tense if they are interpreted as structural states. In terms of the transition network 
this means they are first coerced, via a direct route, into a point, which is then coerced into 
a structural state. 
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This can be represented schematically as follows: 
Present tense Culminated Process Structural State 
Necessary r is atomic r is extended r is atomic 
requirement 
Congenial RC is asymmetrical RC is symmetrical RC is asymmetrical 
feature associated meaning associated meaning associated meaning 
structure is structure is structure is 
non-contingent contingent non-contingent 
Culmination profiles 
The case of culminations is different yet again. Because their asserted reference time is 
atomic culminations meet the necessary requirement of the present tense, and therefore can 
combine with it without being coerced first. On the other hand the assumed reference time 
of culminations is also atomic, which makes their referential centre symmetrical (r and r' 
coincide), and their associated meaning structure is contingent (r is a culmination). For a 
culmination to be described from the speaker's perspective, therefore, it also has to be coerced 
into a structural state (via the point node in the transition network). The following examples 
illustrate this: 
(5-14) Ailsa comes in through the back door. (She has the key.) 
(5-15) Nicky says she hates cooking. (But she often asks us over for a meal.) 
(5-16) Anna kicks the cat. (It makes me angry.) 
This can be represented schematically as follows: 
Present tense Culmination Structural state 
Necessary r is atomic r is atomic r is atomic 
requirement 
Congenial RC is asymmetrical RC is symmetrical RC is asymmetrical 
feature associated meaning associated meaning associated meaning 
structure is structure is structure is 
non-contingent contingent non-contingent 
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Point profiles 
Because point propositions are interpreted at an atomic asserted reference time, they meet the 
necessary requirement of the present tense. Moreover, their associated meaning structure is 
non-contingent, so that they exhibit one of the perspectival features congenial to the present 
tense. However, their assumed reference time is atomic rather than extended, and this, as 
we have seen earlier, is not in accordance with the way a subject typically experiences time: 
although a perspectival interval-the time interval at which a subject registers or contemplates 
states of affairs-is felt to be atomic, the states of affairs registered or contemplated by a 
subject are typically experienced as extending. 
Points, we have pointed out earlier, rarely occur as propositions -their significance in terms 
of the network lies primarily in the fact that they constitute an important node for transition 
paths. Their rare occurrence can be explained in the light of their referential properties. While 
their referential centre is atomic and symmetrical, it is also non-contingent. This is slightly 
puzzling because it is difficult to think of an atomic (and therefore bounded) interval as not 
bringing about a change of state. In the case of other non-contingent profiles this difficulty 
does not arise. Processes are extended, and can therefore be thought of as unbounded. Their 
role consists in furnishing descriptive details, so that their non-contingent nature is functional. 
The asserted reference time of states, on the other hand, constitutes a perspectival interval- 
i.e. a moment of perception or cognition. It is easy to think of such a moment as not bringing 
about a change of state: the relevance of states lies in their descriptive/perspectival function. 
Point propositions, however, demarcate a discrete interval on a time line which, like events, is 
bounded and perspectivally non-situated. Unlike events, however, points are not significant 
enough in terms of the narrative development to bring about a change of state-they are, in 
a sense, trivial events. Hence their rare occurrence in narratives. 
In spoken discourse an uncoerced point proposition in the present tense would describe a 
punctual event, which does not bring about a change of state, as coinciding with the speaker's 
report of it. This is improbable for the following reason: if a speaker describes present tense 
situations as bounded units, she will in effect be constructing a narrative line in the present (cf. 
below). This means every situation which is being reported will be viewed as contributing 
to the rapidly unfolding dramatic development. Conceiving of bounded situations as non- 
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consequential-i.e. as points-would, in such a context, be inappropriate. 
To describe a point proposition from the speaker's perspective, therefore, it is, like.other 
non-stative profiles, to be coerced into a structural state. The network shows this can be 
achieved via a direct route. 
This can be represented as follows: 
Present tense Points Structural states 
Necessary r is atomic r is atomic r is atomic 
requirement 
Congenial RC is asymmetrical RC is symmetrical RC is asymmetrical 
feature ass. meaning ass. meaning ass. meaning 
structure is structure is structure is 
non-contingent non-contingent non-contingent 
Example (5-17) illustrates this: 
(5-17) (Guy has terrible table manners.) He burps. He hiccoughs. (And he tells 
terrible jokes.) 
5.2.2 Present time reference without speaker's perspective 
Culmination propositions, we have seen in the previous section, meet the necessary require- 
ments of the present tense, because they are asserted at an atomic interval. Because of this 
they can occur in the present tense without being coerced. If they do, however, they make 
available consequences for subsequent reference, so that their asserted reference time is not 
stable. Because of this they do, in sequence, convey the impression of forward movement in 
time: they describe "what happens" as with each new clause or sentence a change of state 
takes place. Thus a narrative context is constructed within the discursive context. As we 
have seen earlier, this implies a procedure of perspectival distancing. 
At the same time each new asserted reference time coincides with the temporal awareness 
of the speaker. The perspectival distance conveyed by such sequences convey is therefore 
combined with the temporal immediacy of the present tense: a state of affairs is reported as 
a fact, but its occurrence coincides with the speaker's perception of it. In other words, both 
temporal immediacy and perspectival distance are maintained at the same time: events are 
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synchronised with the speaker's report of them. One consequence of the fact that perspectival 
distance is not complemented with temporal distance (as in the case of past tense narrative) 
is that contingency relations between successive states of affairs are considerably weaker than 
in the past tense, because they are subordinated to the focalising presence of the speaker. 
Because of the contrastive procedure it implies this use of the present tense is felt to be 
marked or non-standard. Descriptive grammars label it the instantaneous or punctual use 
of the present tense. It is associated with scenarios where both the rapid unfolding of ac- 
tion and the mediating presence of a speaker are crucial, such as sport commentaries and 
demonstrations: 
(5-18) Napier passes the ball to Jeffreys, who misses it and slips! 
(5-19) I open the cage and here comes the rabbit! 
Because they combine the unrolling of events with temporal immediacy, such descriptions 
often yield a a distinct theatrical effect, or carry strong overtones of excitement and dramatic 
build-up. 
Leech (1971) points out that 
in most of these cases, the event probably does not take place exactly at the instant 
when it is mentioned: it is subjective rather than objective simultaneity that is 
conveyed. (Leech 1971: 3) 
This observation is completely in line with our analysis. 
States of affairs in the punctual or instantaneous present always exhibit a culmination profile. 
Both points and culminated processes, however, can occur in a context in which events unroll 
simultaneously with the speaker's speech acts, provided they are thought or conceived of as 
culminations. In the case of points, this means the situation is to be assigned consequences. 
Example (5-20) illustrates this 
(5-20) He opens the cage. He winks. And out come the rabbit! 
4The past tense, in contrast, will reinforce the anaphoric organisation of a narrative, because its time sphere 
is independent of the time sphere of the speaker. 
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Culminated processes, on the other hand, are to be compressed into a point first (the transition 
from culminated process to point), so that their asserted reference time can be viewed as 
coinciding with the speech time.' This culmination is subsequently assigned consequences. 
The following example illustrates this: 
(5-23) He walks to the other side of the room. He takes the cage. He opens it. 
And out comes the rabbit! 
Conclusion 
A state of affairs in the present tense, if it has actual time reference, is always asserted at the 
speech point, which is always an atomic interval. Because of this only state and culmination 
propositions can be used felicitously in the present tense (if it has actual time reference) 
without being coerced. Moreover, the use of the present tense is typically associated with a 
subjective perspective, namely that of the speaker. Because of this the referential centre of 
present tense utterances with actual time reference is normally asymmetrical (r and r' do not 
coincide) and non-contingent (r is not a culmination). The use of present tense culmination 
propositions is therefore non-standard (or marked) and limited to very specific contexts. 
All this can schematically be represented as follows: 
'This illustrates once more that we are not concerned with an ontological analysis, but with an analysis 
of the ways in which a given situation may be viewed or described. Thus, although a culminated process is 
extended, it may be thought of as atomic if it is described as occurring simultaneously with the speaker's 
report of it. Of course, this requires that it must be plausible to think of the culminated process as more 
or less coinciding with its report (which is again thought of as atomic, although it would clearly have some 
duration in real world terms). Thus it is hard to construct a context in which (5-21) 
(5-21) He paints a picture. 
could be interpreted as a culmination in the present tense, because of the elaborate nature of the type of 
activity involved. But for (5-22) 
(5-22) He draws a circle. 
an appropriate context could be much more easily constructed. 
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present tense with actual time reference 
Necessary temporal immediacy 
requirement: r has to be atomic 
Congenial perspectival immediacy 
feature RC asymmetrical 
AMS is non-contingent 
states culminations points 
RC asymmetrical RC symmetrical RC symmetrical 
AMS non-contingent AMS contingent AMS non-contingent 
perspectivally perspectivally pragmatically 
situated distanced implausible 
5.3 Conclusion 
We have shown in this chapter that the present tense with real time reference imposes restric- 
tions on the aspectual interpretation of propositions: because it makes reference to the time 
of a speaker, only state profiles are both felicitous and unmarked. To free an utterance from 
these restrictions, it has to be distanced from its speaker. There are two ways of achieving 
this. The first consists in making reference to a time sphere in the speaker's past. And the 
second consists in lifting the utterance into an imaginary time sphere, so that it becomes a 
story. Thus, while the sequence in (5-24a) is infelicitous if it has actual time reference (be- 
cause it is impossible to think of the states of affairs described as occurring simultaneously 
with their being reported), it is acceptable if it is recontextualised into an imaginary time 
sphere. And (5-24b) is acceptable even if it has actual time reference, because it encodes the 
past tense: 
(5-24) a Jack writes a short story and submits it to a contest. 
b Jack wrote a short story and submitted it to a contest. 
In both cases, an element of distance is introduced between the speech point and the state- 
ment. In the case of a past tense with actual time reference this distance is a deictic/temporal 
one. In the case of an imaginary present or an imaginary past the time sphere of the statement 
exhibits an indeterminate relationship with the speech point. In such instances the deictic 
status of the actual speech point is no longer relevant for the statement, and the speaker 
assumes the role of a narrator. 
Although both the present and the past tense, if they have real time reference, essentially 
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situate a state of affairs temporally with respect to its speech point, the temporal immediacy 
of the present tense is normally associated with perspectival immediacy and the temporal 
distance of the past tense is typically associated with perspectival distance. This is illustrated 
by the following examples: 
(5-25) a John walks home from work (and goes jogging in the weekend). 
b Han does push-ups in the park. (It keeps him in shape.) 
(5-26) a John walked home from work (and collapsed in front of the TV). 
b Han did push-ups in the park (and went home to cook dinner.) 
When the first clause in the (a) sentences above is encountered in isolation the cognitive agent 
will be inclined to interpret it as a structural state, and to contextualise it in an environment 
of topically/thematically related states of affairs. The first clause in the (b) sentences, on the 
other hand, will intuitively be interpreted as an event which makes available consequences for 
subsequent event reference. 
But these connections between temporal and perspectival distance or immediacy are not 
rigid: temporal immediacy may be combined with perspectival distance (as in the case of the 
instantaneous present) and temporal distance may be combined with perspectival immediacy 
(as in the case of topically related statepropositions in the past tense). 
Because narrative, as a genre, is associated with the ordering of situations with respect to each 
other on a time line (which implies a procedure of distancing), it is typically also associated 
with the past tense (which establishes a temporal distance between speaker and statement). 
The fact that situations in the present tense if it has actual time reference are described as 
states unless they are perspectivally distanced from the speaker provides further evidence for 
our claim that states are perspectivally situated and always introduce a perpectival focus. 
In narratives, the perspectival focus introduced by states may be occupied by the text's 
narrator, but also by a(nother) participant in the story, or an anonymous observer. In the next 
chapter I will discuss how the reader, upon encountering a state in a narrative, will attempt 
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to identify who occupies its perspectival focus on the basis of intrasentent and contextual 
information combined with pragmatic inferences. 
177 
Chapter 6 
Perspectival Markers in Narrative 
Fiction 
6.1 Introduction 
We have argued in this dissertation that perspectival refractions in narrative fiction-the 
sensations of involvement or distance a narrative creates throughout the reading process-are 
not only brought about by expressive or subject-oriented elements: the a8pectual properties 
of sentences, we have tried to show, also serve as markers of perspective. We have captured 
these aspectual properties in terms of two contrasts: that between a contingent and a topical 
meaning structure, and that between a symmetrical and an asymmetrical referential centre. 
In this chapter, we will integrate these claims into a more general account of perspective in 
narrative fiction. First of all, we will turn our attention to an important perspectival dimen- 
sion of narratives which we have virtually ignored so far, namely the relationship between the 
narrator and the story. If this relationship can be described as a deictic-temporal one (the 
narrator relates situations as they obtain or unfold in her presence, or recalls them as they 
have occurred in her presence), the narrator is personalised. If the relationship between nar- 
rator and story is temporally indeterminate, the narrator is non-personalised. In the former 
case the narrator typically refers to herself by means of a first person pronoun, in the latter 
case she typically does not. We will show how the relationship between narrator and story 
affects perspective; in the same context we will also discuss the perspectival function of tense. 
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In addition to this, we will try to specify which information contributes to the reader's in- 
terpretation of perspectival foci introduced by perspectivally situated sentences. We have 
already pointed out that a perspectival focus may be occupied by various individuals, such 
as the text's narrator, a character in the narrative, or an anonymous observer. The aspectual 
type of a sentence as such does not furnish the reader with any information as to who occupies 
a perspectival focus. We will discuss how the reader, upon encountering a state, will attempt 
to identify which individual occupies the perspectival focus which is introduced by the state, 
on the basis of intrasentential information, contextual information and pragmatic inferences. 
We will also show why the identity of a perspectival focus may remain ambiguous. 
Before addressing these issues, however, we will provide a summary of the main points of our 
argument. 
6.2 Aspectual markers of perspective 
6.2.1 Narration vs description 
In our discussion of the relationship between aspect and perspective we have, first of all, 
introduced a distinction between sentences which create the impression of forward movement 
in time (or narration) and sentences which do not (description). The concept of narration, we 
have pointed out, is crucial to narrative because it encapsulates what is felt to be quintessential 
to narrative as a genre. Indeed, what distinguishes narrative from non-narrative discourse is 
the fact that in narrative 
the speaker relates a series of real or fictive events in the order (in which) they 
are supposed to have taken place. (Dahl 1985: 112) 1 
Banfield (1982) relates narrativity in this sense to the notion of telling time: 
[...] to narrate is to recount (in French, raconter), to tell. In French, its product is 
a conte or, sometimes, a compte rendu; in English, a tale (like a tally). Etymolog- 
'A similar definition is proposed by, among others, Forster (1962: 6); R.immon-Kenan (1983: 2); Prince 
(1982: 179). 
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ically, all these terms contain the notion of counting, of enumeration, a vestigial 
meaning of which can still be invoked in phrases like "all told", "to tell time", "to 
tell one's beads". A "teller" can mean either a story-teller or a counter, one who 
reckons. (Banfield 1982: 264) 
To construct a narrative, and hence a time line, situations are to be portrayed as discrete 
countable entities which can be related to each other in terms of causality, enablement, and 
development. We have argued that states of affairs are presented in this way if the time at 
which they are asserted includes reference to a change of state, or a culmination, after which 
consequences ensue. Thus the relationship between two sentences which constitute a narrative 
sequence is not merely one of temporal ordering-it is also characterised by a dimension of 
enablement or causality. We have used to term contingency to denote this dimension. 
Sequences of sentences in narrative thus constitute narration if they can be contingently 
related to each other-that is, if the propositions concerned exhibit a contingent profile. 
Culminations, culminated processes and contingent states are contingent. Clearly not all 
sentences in a text have to exhibit a contingent profile for the text to constitute a narrative. 
However, some degree of narration is required throughout a narrative to sustain the reader's 
capacity to keep conceptualising a time line. 
Sentences which describe, in contrast, do not create the impression of forward movement 
in time. This, we have argued, is due to the fact that their asserted reference time does 
not include reference to a change of state. Sentences do not propel time if they exhibit a 
non-contingent profile. Points, processes and (non-contingent) states are non-contingent. 
The relevance of the distinction between narration and description for the perspectival issues 
we are concerned with lies in the fact that highlighting a contingency relation between states 
of affairs, so they are to be ordered with respect to each other on a time line, introduces an 
element of perspectival distance between the narrator and the statement. 
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6.2.2 Perspectivally situated vs perspectivally non-situated sentences 
In addition to this, we have made distinction between sentences which introduce a perspectival 
focus (or perspectivally situated sentences) and sentences which do not (perspectivally non- 
situated sentences). We have argued that if the aspectual properties of a sentence can be 
represented in terms of an asymmetrical referential centre, the sentence is perspectivally 
situated. This means both contingent states and non-contingent states are perspectivally 
situated. If the referential centre of the proposition is symmetrical, it is perspectivally non- 
situated. Thus culminations, culminated processes, points and processes are all perspectivally 
non-situated. 
We have also pointed out that although contingent states are perspectivally situated, that 
their perspectival status is contrastive. This is due to the fact that their asserted reference 
time exhibits a characteristic normally associated with perspectival distance (it is conceived 
of as a culmination) while their referential centre as a whole incorporates the characteristics 
of a perspectivally situated proposition. In the majority of cases, however, perspectivally 
situated sentences constitute description, This means that they exhibit a non-contingent state 
profile, and that their asserted reference time is stable. 
We will now look at some other factors which contribute to perspectival refraction in narra- 
tives fiction. 
6.3 Other markers of perspective 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation we already referred to a commonly made distinction between 
personalised and non- personalised narrators. If the reader encounters a first person pronoun 
in a narrative text outside the context of direct quotation, and the referent of this pronoun 
is a participant in the story told, the reader will construct a personalised narrator. 
This means two time spheres are automatically constructed: that of the narrator's present (i.e. 
the time sphere of the imaginary speech act), and that of her past. Hence a pseudo-speech 
time is established within the text, and tense, while it loses its deictic-temporal capacity 
with respect to any actual speech time, is recontextualised as a deictic category within the 
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internal system of the text. The present tense in narratives with a personalised narrator thus 
establishes present time reference within the referential framework of the narrative, while 
past tense utterances will be interpreted as constituting memory, or recall, on the part of the 
personalised narrator. In present tense narratives with a personalised narrator, therefore, the 
asserted reference time of each new state of affairs coincides with the (textually established) 
pseudo-speech time: the referential context of the (imaginary) speech act and that of the 
story coincide. In past tense narrative with a personalised narrator, the referential context of 
the (imaginary) speech act and that of the story are separated. 
The fact that a narrator is personalised obviously has perspectival repercussions: it elicits a 
sense of involvement, or empathy, in the reader, who will instinctively be inclined to identify 
with the narrator. But the establishment of a personalised narrator also imposes restrictions 
on who may occupy perspectival foci: a personalised narrator only has access to what she 
herself sees, feels, or experiences, or has seen, felt, or experienced at some point in the past. 
Thus in a present tense narrative with a personalised narrator, the narrator (in the referential 
context of the imaginary speech act, which coincides with that of the story), constitutes the 
only possible subject-of-consciousness for sentences which introduce a subjective perspective. 
This means perspective cannot be represented, but is always directly presented. In past tense 
narratives with a personalised narrator there are two potential subjects of consciousness: the 
narrator (in the context of the speech act, which is separated from that of the story) and 
the "past self" of the narrator, as a participant in the story. As a result of this perspectival 
foci become potentially ambiguous, and perspective may be both presented (the perspectival 
focus is occupied by the narrator) or represented (the perspectival focus is occupied by the 
narrator's past self). 
If a narrator is not personalised, i.e. if she does not participate as character in the story told, 
tense loses its deictic/temporal capacity with respect to the narrator's imaginary speech time. 
In such cases, the time sphere of the narrative is indeterminate and truly "imaginary" . 
This, too, has perspectival repercussions. Because there is no longer a direct connection 
between the narrator's referential context and that of the story, there are, in principle, no 
longer any restrictions on point of view. In narratives without a personalised narrator, there- 
fore, perspectival foci may in principle be occupied by the narrator, by a participant in the 
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narrative, or by an "anonymous observer"). 
It is worth pointing out that a narrator may refer to herself in the first person even if there 
is no clear connection between her referential context and that of the narrative reality. This 
is typically the case in nineteenth century novels with an overt narrator who comments upon 
the narrative. Despite the selection of the first person pronoun, such narrators are not 
personalised as a character in the fictional world-something which is most clearly borne 
out by the fact that they are typically omniscient. The relationship between such overt 
narrators and the referential context of the story therefore remains indeterminate? If a non- 
personalised narrator presents herself as "overt", she obviously becomes a salient potential 
subject-of- consciousness. 
In general, the function of tense in narratives with a non-personalised narrator is reduced 
to a perspectival one-the past tense introduces an element of perspectival distance in the 
narrative, while the present tense conveys perspectival immediacy. 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, th presence of subject-oriented features also constitutes a marker 
of perspective: if a sentence contains subject-oriented features it is subjective, and has to be 
interpreted with reference to a subject-of-consciousness. 
Let us recapitulate. Sentences the aspectual profile of which can be represented in terms 
of an asymmetrical referential centre introduce a perspectival focus, while sentences with a 
symmetrical referential do not. But this aspectual marker of perspective interacts with other 
perspectival markers which introduce additional perspectival refractions. These include the 
type of relationship that holds most saliently between consecutive sentences (contingent vs 
topical), the relationship between the time sphere and the referential context of the imaginary 
speech act and that of the story (established chiefly through the choice of person and tense), 
and thapresence or absence of subject-oriented features. 
Because of this the opposition between perspectivally situated and perspectivally non-situated 
sentences can be situated on a continuum which reflects how the perspectival status of a 
sentence established through the relationship between its asserted and its assumed reference 
2The relationship between a non-personalised narrator and the story thus resembles the one between an 
author and the narrative text as a whole, while that between a personalised narrator and the story is more 
akin to that between a locutionary agent and utterances with actual time reference. 
183 
time may be reinforced or modified by other perspectival markers. 
At one pole of this continuum, we find contingent perspectivally non-situated sentences (or 
events) in a past tense narrative which does not contain any subject-oriented features, and the 
narrator of which is not personalised. In sequence, such sentences create an illusionary, but 
internally coherent, temporal continuum of states of affairs recorded "in themselves", 
without interacting with the time sphere of their (imaginary) speech act, and independent of 
any subjective viewpoint.3 This mode of presentation is often felt to constitute narrative par 
excellence. 
At the other pole of the continuum, we find topically related perspectivally situated sentences 
in a present tense narrative which contains subject-oriented features and the narrator of 
which is personalised. If this mode is adopted the narrative is geared towards the expression 
of the perceptions, opinions or beliefs of a narrator who assumes the role of a subject-of- 
consciousness. 
Between the two poles we find sentences exhibiting perspectival characteristics which are in 
some way contrastive. Present tense narration, for example, presents perspectivally non- 
situated states of affairs as non-contingent, thus establishing two kinds of perspectival dis- 
tance. Yet at the same time it does not complement this with the perspectival distance 
conveyed by the past tense, suggestive as it is of "hindsight"; through the selection of the 
present tense an element of perspectival immediacy in introduced instead. As a result of this 
present tense narration 
[...] constantly pushing us along, leaves no leisure for thinking about why; it 
hustles us into a new now. The present, in this case, never becomes a past, a 
8This is precisely what Barthes captures in his description of the French preterite: 
Its function is no longer that of a tense. [...]Through the preterite the verb implicitly belongs 
with a verbal chain, it partakes of a set of related and interrelated actions, it functions as the 
algebraic sign of an intention. Allowing as it does for an ambiguity between temporality and 
causality, it calls for a sequence of events, that is, for intelligible Narrative. This is why it is the 
ideal instrument for every construction of a world: it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myths, 
History and novels. [...] Behind the preterite there always lurks a demiurge, a God or a reciter 
[...] So that finally the preterite is the expression of an order, and consequently of euphoria. 
(Barthes 1967: 36-37) 
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thing we can keep and look into. (Lee 1923: 176) 
Because of this perspectival contrast present tense narration is felt to be more "unusual" than 
past tense narration (where the perspectival effect of tense and aspect mutually reinforce each 
other), and its effect tends to be described as both vivid and alienating. 
In present tense narration with a personalised narrator, the narrative suggests that states of 
affairs unfold simultaneously with the temporal awareness of the narrator. But this is clearly 
mere pretence-if only because otherwise a narrative in the present tense with a personalised 
narrator could never cover a time span significantly longer than the amount of time it takes 
to read the text. The suggested synchronicity between states of affairs and their report, in 
other words, is not subject to the restrictions imposed by the present tense on utterances 
which have actual time reference (the "instantaneous present"). In the historical present, 
extended intervals can be projected on the time line constructed, so that culminated process 
and process propositions occur without having to be coerced into states first. 
If states of affairs are described as subjective in a past tense narrative, or in a narrative with 
a non-personalised narrator, their subject-of-consciousness, because of the distance which is 
introduced between the referential context of the narrator and that of the story, becomes 
potentially ambiguous. This means perspective may be represented. 
6.4 Perspectival refractions in perspectivally situated sen- 
tences 
Sentences which portray a state of affairs as perspectivally non-situated, it follows from our 
discussion in the previous section, may convey varying degrees of perspectival distance. This 
can be represented schematically as follows:4 
'The case of perspectivally non-situated sentences with subject-oriented features will be discussed separately 
further down. 
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Perspectivally non-situated sentences 
General feature: no perspectival focus is introduced 







topical coherence (description) 
present tense 
personalised narrator 
In this section we will illustrate this through some examples. 
1. Perspectivally non-situated narration (events). 
General feature: the absence of a perspectival focus is reinforced by contingency. 
1. Present tense (perspectival immediacy) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-1) I cook the hamburgers and we eat and I wash the dishes in the chipped 
dishpan, Anna drying; then it's almost dark. I lift the bedding out from 
the wall and make up our bed. (Atwood, Surfacing: 38) 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-2) He bends down. He kisses her. He tucks her in, he smooths the pillow. 
(Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 19) 
2. Past tense (perspectival distance) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-3) He put his head round the door just after six, and nodded, and I picked 
up my bag and went out to join him. (Brookner, Look At Me: 125) 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-4) He went over to the washstand and dipped his fingers in water. (Mansfield, 
The Man Without A Temperament: 19) 
[Maximally distanced narration] 
2. Perspectivally non-situated description (points and processes) 
General feature: the absence of a perspectival focus not reinforced by contingency. Topical 
coherence is suggestive of perspectival immediacy. 
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1. Present tense (perspectival immediacy) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-5) [...] my breath knots, my body tightens against it; the water fills my 
mouth [...]. (Atwood, Surfacing: 13) 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6.6) Beyond the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. (Lively, 
Moon Tiger: 207) 
2. Past tense (perspectival distance) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6.7) The sun blazed out and steam rose from the garden behind us. (Rhys, 
Wide Sarga88o Sea: 58) 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-8) She trembled with strength as they struggled. The dust puffed round her 
shoes and his scuffling toes. (Gordimer, 18 There Nowhere Else Where We 
Can Meet?: 19) 
6.5 Perspectival refractions in perspectivally situated sen- 
tences 
Perspectivally situated sentences may exhibit varying degrees of perspectival immediacy, de- 
pending on how they interact with other perspectival markers. In this section, we will illus- 
trate this by means of some examples. 
As we have seen earlier, perspectivally situated sentences always introduce a perspectival 
focus. A perspectival focus will be inferred to be occupied by the narrator if the narrator is 
personalised and the narrative is in the present tense: in such cases, there is not sufficient 
perspectival distance for perspective to be represented. In all other cases, perspectival foci 
are, at least in principle, ambiguous. If the perspectival focus introduced by the states or 
state complexes in the following examples is unambiguously occupied by the narrator, we 
have added this in square brackets. If the perspectival focus is potentially ambiguous, we 
have specified the individual most likely to occupy it (again in square brackets) and added a 
question mark. 
1. Perspectivally situated narration (contingent states) 
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General feature: a perspectival focus is introduced, but at the same time an element of 
perspectival distance is maintained through the highlighting of a contingency relation between 
the sentence and the sentence which precedes it. 
1. Present tense (perspectival immediacy) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-9) (I unlatch the gate), the chicken wire walls are around me. (Atwood, 
Surfacing: 172) [Perspectival focus (PF): narrator] 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-10) [...](a piece of cliff, of the solid world which evidently is not so solid after 
all, shifts under her clutching hand... crumbles...) and she is falling thwack 
backwards on her shoulders, her head, her outflung arm. (Lively, Moon 
Tiger: 98) [PF: ?female protagonist] 
2. Past tense (perspectival distance) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-11) (We mounted, turned a corner), and the village was out of sight. (Rhys, 
Wide Sarga88o Sea: 58) [PF: ?narrator's past self] 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-12) [...] (wobbling, frantic, she climbed over the fence.) And she was out. 
(Gordimer, 18 There Nowhere E18e Where We Can Meet?: 98) 
[PF: ?female protagonist)] 
2. Perspectivally situated description ((non-contingent) states) 
General feature: a perspectival focus is introduced. Topical coherence adds an additional 
element of perspectival immediacy. 
1. Present tense (perspectival immediacy) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-13) Sometimes I wish it were different. I wish I were beautiful and lazy and 
spoiled and not to be trusted. (Brookner, Look At Me: 19) 
[PF: narrator] 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-14) (Claudia hesitates. She walks quickly down to the wreckage.) The man 
is lying face down. His hair is fair, his tin hat lies beside him, part of his 
head is in black bloody shreds, the sand too is blackened, one leg has no 
foot. (Lively, Moon Tiger. 98) [PF: ?Claudia] 
188 
2. Past tense (perspectival distance) 
Personalised narrator (perspectival immediacy) 
(6-15) (I watched them, assessed with absolute detachment what I was doing.) I 
was their mother and I was deserting them. I was taking the money that 
would have been theirs. (Barfoot, Gaining Ground: 95) 
[PF: ?narrator's past self] 
Non-personalised narrator (perspectival distance) 
(6-16) Still, there was no mockery coming from his gaze. Soft. It felt soft in a 
waiting kind of way. He was not judging her-or rather he was judging her 
but not comparing her. Not since Halle had a man looked at her that way: 
not loving or passionate, but interested, as though he were examining an 
ear of com for quality (Morrison, Beloved: 25) [PF: ?female protagonist] 
6.6 Identifying perspectival foci 
Various factors play a role in the reader's interpretation of the perspectival focus introduced 
by a state. In this section, we discuss the most important ones. 
6.6.1 Narrator's identity and tense 
As we have seen earlier, in present tense narratives with a personalised narrator the perspecti- 
val focus introduced by a state will always be inferred to be occupied by the narrator, so that 
states are always interpreted as subjective: perspective is presented directly, and states are 
interpreted as narrator's discourse. Subject-oriented features reinforce this impression, but 
need not be present for a state in this type of narrative to be interpreted as subjective. 
In first person narratives in the past tense, two potential individuals may occupy a perspectival 
focus: the narrator (by which we mean the narrator in her own time sphere, which is always the 
present) or the narrator's past self. The fact that in first person narratives only the narrator 
or her past self serve as potential subjects-of-consciousness is, as we have pointed out, due 
to the pragmatic restrictions inherent to a first person point of view, which is by definition 
limited. Only consciousness (i.e. perception, thought, emotion, judgement etc.), however, 
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is subject to this restriction; speech, clearly, is not. If sentences in past tense narratives 
with a personalised narrator are interpreted as represented speech they are interpreted with 
respect to a third person subject- of-consciousness. The procedure for its identification is 
similar to that followed in the identification of subjects- of-consciousness in narratives with a 
non-personalised narrator outlined further down. 
Represented speech aside, the perspectival focus of states in past tense narratives with a 
personalised narrator always has to be occupied either by the narrator or by the narrator's 
past self. 
In narratives with a non-personalised narrator, a perspectival focus is more ambiguous: it 
may be occupied by the narrator (as we have seen, this is most likely of the narrator is overt), 
a character in the story, or an anonymous observer. In the former caseSthe perspectival focus 
is occupied by a subject-of-consciousness. In the latter case the sentence is perspectivally 
situated but not subjective the individual which occupies its perspectival focus is not a 
subject-of-consciousness. 
To determine who occupies the perspectival focus introduced into a narrative with a non- 
personalised narrator, the reader will rely on various types of information. The most im- 
portant ones are the presence (or absence) of subject-oriented features, and the presence (or 
absence) of perspectival clauses in the surrounding discourse. 
6.6.2 Subject-oriented features 
To establish the identity of a perspectival focus in a narrative with a non-personalised nar- 
rator, the reader will look for subject-oriented features either within the sentence or within 
the state complex it forms part of. If no such features can be found, and the perspective is 
external (i.e. the sentence describes what can be perceived from the outside), the perspecti- 
val focus will be inferred to be occupied by an anonymous observer. The following examples 
illustrate this: 
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(6-17) Loulou is in the coachhouse, wearing clay. She's wearing a pair of running 
shoes, once white, now grey, over men's wool work socks, a purple Indian- 
print cotton shirt, and a rust-coloured smock, so heavy with clay dust it 
hangs on her like brocade, the sleeves rolled up past the elbow. (Atwood, 
Loulou: 61) [PF:?anonymous observer] 
(6-18) [...] there was a dull stare in her eyes, whose gaze was fixed away off yonder 
on one of those patches of blue sky. It was not a glance of reflection, but 
rather indicated a suspension of intelligent thought. (Chopin, The Story 
of an Hour: 83) [PF: ?anonymous observer] 
In both of these examples, the states contain descriptive details which cannot be perceived by 
the protagonist in the scene. If states describe what can be perceived by a character in the 
story, the perspectival focus becomes more ambiguous, and hovers between the neutral posi- 
tion of an anonymous onlooker and the subjective situatedness of the protagonist concerned. 
Example (6-19) illustrates this: 
(6-19) The servant girl was in their room, singing loudly while she emptied soapy 
water into a pail. The windows were open wide, the shutters put back, 
and the light glared in. (Mansfield, The Man Without A Temperament: 
71) [PF: ?male protagonist; ?anonymous observer] 
If a state contains no subject-oriented features but the perspective is internal, the perspectival 
focus may be occupied either by the narrator or by the character who can be inferred to 
know, think or contemplate what is being described. The following passage, which describes 
a fantasy of one of the protagonists in the short story concerned, illustrates this: 
(6-20) He was King Lappin; she was Queen Lapinova. They were the opposite of 
each other; he was bold and determined; she wary and undependable. He 
ruled over the busy world of rabbits; her world was a desolate, mysterious 
place, which she ranged mostly by moonlight. All the same their territories 
touched; they were King and Queen. (Woolf, Lappin and Lapinova: 22) 
[PF: ?narrator; ?female protagonist] 
If the state or state complex contains subject-oriented features, and can therefore be inferred 
to be occupied by a subject-of-consciousness, the reader will try to determine the identity of 
this subject-of-consciousness on the basis of contextual information and pragmatic inferences. 
We will come back to this in section (5.7) below. 
Thus subject-of-consciousness of the perspectival focus which governs the state complex in 
(6.21) is most plausibly identified as the text's narrator: 
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(6-21) Frederick is so charming and so attractive that women forgive him for his 
little treacheries. Where others would meet censoriousness Frederick tends 
to invite collusion. His reputation precedes him, for that is reputation's 
only useful function. in this, perhaps, he finds the justification for his 
behaviour. (Brookner, Family and Friends: 19) 
[PF: ? (non-personalised) narrator] 
(6-22) Six women and three men. The times being what they are, it is not 
possible to determine occupation, let alone class, by people's dress. The 
women wear jeans, or long skirts of an Indian cotton in bright colours 
that, a few years back, would have been regarded as more suitable for 
bedspreads. They have long hair, for the most part, and look as though 
they have cultural or artistic connections- work in art galleries, perhaps, 
or small publishing houses, or in interior decoration. In fact they are a 
dentist's receptionist, a librarian, two teachers and two married women 
whose occupation is precisely that. (Lively, Next to Nature, Art: 7) 
[PF: ?(non-personalised) narrator] 
(6-23) There was nothing particularly recondite about his careless endearments, 
which we had all grown used to; somehow, though, he managed to make 
one feel as if those 'Darlings' (Darling Fanny, Darling Olivia, Darling 
Delia) might one day be invested with significance. He seemed to prepare 
an atmosphere of affection for himself [...]. He was, or seemed to be, 
totally ignorant of the sad compromises and makeshifts, the substitutions 
and the fantasies, that constitute the emotional baggage of the average 
person. (Brookner, Look At Me: 38) [PF:?(personalised) narrator] 
(6-24) She was fond of all boys' plays, and greatly preferred cricket not merely to 
dolls, but to the more heroic enjoyments of infancy, nursing a dormhouse, 
feeding a canary-bird, or watering a rose-bush. Indeed she had no taste 
for a garden; and if she gathered flowers at all, it was chiefly for the plea- 
sure of mischief-at least so it was conjectured from her always preferring 
those which she was forbidden to take.- Such were her propensities-her 
abilities were quite as extraordinary. (Austen, Northanger Abbey: 37) 
[PF: ?(non-personalised) narrator] 
In the following examples, it is more plausible to infer that the perspectival focus is occupied 
by a character in the text different from the narrator: 
(6-25) The boy was about fourteen and tall and big for his age, he had a white 
skin, a dull ugly white covered with freckles, his mouth was a negro's 
mouth and he had small eyes, like bits of green glass. Worst, most horrible 
of all, his hair was crinkled, a negro's hair, but bright red, and his eyebrows 
and eyelashes were red. (Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: 41) 
[PF: ?child protagonist] 
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(6-26) But no, in European hotels, they left your coffee in a pot on your table, 
along with a pitcher of hot milk, and you refilled your own cup. And 
there were waiters, with towels on their arms, at the Kaiserin Elisabeth. 
(Godwin, A Southern Family: 107) [PF: ?female protagonist] 
(6-27) He hadn't realised his son had been so handsome. Why was that? Was 
it the more formal way they'd combed his hair, parted at the side and 
revealing his high forehead? He looked older this way, more his real age. 
(Godwin, A Southern Family: 155) 
(6-28) Claudia snuffs Lisa out-drains the colour from her cheeks, deprives her of 
speech or at least all speech to which anyone might pay attention, makes 
her shrink an inch or two, puts her in her place. The other Lisa is not 
like that. The other Lisa, the Lisa unknown to Claudia, is positive while 
not assertive, is prettier, sharper, a good cook, a competent mother, an 
adequate if not exemplary wife. She knows now that she married too 
young too quickly the wrong man, but has found ways of making the best 
of the situation. (Lively, Moon Tiger: 60) [PF: ?Lisa] 
(6-29) Well, it's perfectly obvious that's what she's done. The smell. Oh God (a 
prayer, not a blasphemy), what next. This is too much. This is out of the 
question, beyond everything. (Barfoot, Duet for three, 5) 
[PF: ? (third person) protagonist] 
6.6.3 Perspectival sentences 
The reader's speculations concerning the identity of the subject-of-consciousness which oc- 
cupies a perspectival focus also be affected by the presence of a perapectival sentence in the 
immediate context of the state. In Chapter 3, we already defined a perspectival sentence as 
sentence which contains a perapectival verb. Perspectival verbs include: 
verbs of speech and thought (say, exclaim, think, wonder, ...) 
perception verbs (ace, hear, ...) 
predicate-adjective constructions with psychological adjectives (be delighted, happy, jeal- 
ous, scared, ...) 
psychological action verbs (smile to oneself, gasp, wince, ...) 
action verbs, especially those which introduce a deictic angle into the discourse (come 
inside, arrive, ...) 
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If a state or state complex is preceded (or, in rare cases, followed) by a perspectival sentence, 
the semantic subject of the latter will often be identified as subject-of-consciousness of the 
state or state complex. The following examples illustrate this: 
(6-30) (He hears her stirring). Does she want something? (Mansfield, The Man 
Without A Temperament: 18) 
(6-31) (Charles stared at her). This was his daughter, speaking to him. His 
daughter. (Oates, Wild Saturday: 138) 
(6-32) (He laughed and shook his head): He knew... Good Lord, exactly like - 
(Gordimer, The Soft Voice of the Serpent: 24) 
(6-33) (Her heart gave a plunge.) Was the woman actually taking her upstairs 
to his room? (Wharton, Atrophy: 32) 
(6-34) ([...] and her stomach churns.) Are they having a row? If they are not 
having a row that is possibly even worse. (Lively, Moon Tiger: 49) 
(6-35) (She forced herself to lie down again.) The room was freezing but such 
air was good, it cleared the senses. (Oates, Wild Saturday: 106) 
(6-36) (She wandered back into her room.) Why was she up here?... Was she 
supposed to get something? (Oates, Wild Saturday: 116) 
(6-37) (Aggie nods, although June is turned away from her.) How thin June 
is, especially from the back. It's almost possible to make out her shoul- 
der blades and the stepping stones of her spine, not to mention her ribs, 
beneath her dress. (Barfoot, Duet for Three: 250) 
(6-38) ([...] she lifted her hand to her face and sniffed): yes, it was as she re- 
membered, not as chemists pretend it in the bath salts, but a dusty green 
scent, vegetable rather than flower. It was clean, unhuman. slightly sticky 
too; tacky on her fingers.] (Gordimer, Is There Nowhere Else Where We 
Can Meet?: 18) 
(6-39) (She admitted, when he revealed that he knew about the children's stories, 
to a general literary ambition.) She was trying to write a novel, it was so 
slow, you had to destroy so much and start again. (Fowles, The Enigma: 
224) 
The state complexes in all of the above examples contain one or more subject-oriented features 
and are therefore interpreted as subjective irrespective of the perspectival sentence which 
precedes it. In other words, the perspectival sentence contributes to the identification of 
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their subject-of-consciousness. If a perspectival sentence is sequenced with a state or state 
complex which does not contain any subject-oriented features, however, it will often highlight 
its subjective mimetic potential. The following examples illustrate this: 
(6-40) (She raised her hand [...] and smoothed her hair); it was wet at the 
hairline. (Gordimer, 18 There Nowhere Elbe Where. We Can Meet: 20) 
[PF: ?female protagonist] 
(6-41) (Then the boy saw the buck.) It was coming down the ridge, as if it were 
walking out of the very sound of the horn which related its death. It was 
not running, it was walking, tremendous, unhurried, slanting and tilting 
its head to pass the antlers through the undergrowth. (Faulkner, Go Down 
Mo8e8: 69) [PF: ?the boy] 
(6-42) (Claudia hesitates. She walks quickly down to the wreckage.) The man 
is lying face down. His hair is fair, his tin hat lies beside him, part of his 
head is in black bloody shreds, the sand too is blackened, one leg has no 
foot. (Lively, Moon Tiger: 98) [PF: ?Claudia] 
6.6.4 Pragmatic inferences 
In the previous section we saw that the reader will often be inclined to identify the subject-of- 
consciousness of a state or state complex as the semantic subject of a neighbouring perspectival 
sentence. This option, however, may be rejected in favour of another potential subject-of- 
consciousness on the basis of pragmatic factors. 
One possible restriction on the selection of a subject-of-consciousness obviously concerns the 
fact that its identification has to make immediate contextual sense. Thus in (6-43) 
(6-43) (Caroline poured coffee for her.) In the morning light Caroline's face was 
kindly, but marred with wrinkles. It was a human face, aging. A man had 
loved that face, had rubbed his own against it for twenty years, and had 
abandoned it for another face. And now what? A woman, abandoned, 
meticulous at pouring coffee out for her niece, her trim body bound up in 
an expensive woollen robe [...] (Oates, Wild Saturday: 111) 
it would clearly be nonsensical to attribute the observations in the state complex to the 
semantic subject of the sentence which precedes it. Similarly in (6-44) 
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(6-44) ("You look a little tired, dear.") Suddenly she was tired, yes. But she 
hated these adults with their observations, seemingly so casual, running 
her through. (Oats, Wild Saturday: 110) 
the semantic content of the state complex cannot plausibly be assigned to the character who 
utters the previous sentence. 
To account for the reader's capacity to reject potential subjects-of-consciousness and to give 
others a higher degree of plausibility, we assume that throughout the reading process the 
reader constructs and continuously expands a number of belief spaces, which form part of 
a knowledge base type entity, and which contain information about the beliefs of potential 
subjects-of-consciousness in the narrative (which include the text's narrator, characters, and, 
potentially, more abstract entities such as particular ideological viewpoints), plus the reader. 
These beliefs take the form of propositions. 
A more detailed discussion of the concept of belief spaces can be found in found in Rapaport 
(1986) and Wiebe & Rapaport (1987), where it is applied to general reference resolution in 
narratives. The relevance for our discussion lies in the fact the reader, in the process of the 
text, stores textual information in belief spaces, and that the content of these spaces will play 
a role in assigning a subject-of-consciousness to states or state complexes. If the perceptions 
or observations described by a state or a state complex are to be plausibly attributed to a 
particular character, they have to be in line with the reader's construction of the character's 
belief space at that particular point in the text. This consideration will obviously affect the 
interpretation of the subject-of-consciousness of the state complexes in examples (6-44) and 
(6-43,) where the the teenager protagonist becomes the most salient individual to occupy the 
perspectival focus. 
Another relevant pragmatic factor concerns the overall structure of the text in which the 
sentence occurs. If a character has functioned as subject-of-consciousness at earlier stages in 
the text, there is a higher plausibility that it will do so again. If various characters have been 
identified as subject-of-consciousness, the character which was most recently singled out as 
subject-of-consciousness for a represented perspective will be most the most salient individual 
to occupy a current perspectival focus. And finally, a quantitative effect applies: if a particular 
character has been identified as subject-of-consciousness significantly more frequently than 
others, or even exclusively, it will be the most prominent individual to occupy a current 
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perspectival focus. 
6.7 Perspectivally non-situated states of affairs and subject- 
oriented features 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to a phenomenon which we have not considered so far. 
Although subject-oriented elements occur, in the majority of cases, in sentences exhibiting a 
state profile (or perspectivally situated sentences), they may, in rare instances, occur in sen- 
tences which exhibit a non-stative profile, or perspectivally non-situated sentences. Consider, 
for example: 
(6-45) Then he shook hands with that good fellow his host, who had quite 
as much wine as was good for him. (Woolf, The Years: 287) 
(6-46) She [...] saw in the living terracotta those divine babies whom no 
cheap reproduction can ever stale. (Forster, A Room with a View: 23) 
(6-47) [...] at that moment Father turned towards her and said: [...} (Mansfield, 
Six Years After: 345) 
(6-48) Months, perhaps years later, she woke up in a small, bare cell. (White, 
The House of Clouds: 57) 
(6-49) Someone, Louis perhaps, carried her up flights and flights of steps. 
(White, The House of Clouds: 55) 
In such cases the sentence is both subjective (the subject-oriented element can only be in- 
terpreted with reference to a subject-of-consciousness) and perspectivally non-situated (no 
perspectival focus is introduced, because the sentence is not a state). As a result the per- 
spectival status of the sentence will be contrastive: although the aspectual structure of the 
sentence does not invite the construction of a perspectival focus, the existence of a perspecti- 
val focus has to be assumed for the interpretation of the subject-oriented feature(s). Because 
of the aspectual structure of the sentence (which creates the impression that the described 
state of affairs is a fact rather than a subjective observation), it seems natural to ascribe 
its subjective content to the narrator in her role as fiction-creating authority. But there is 
cause for hesitation: the emotional or subjective colouring of the subject-oriented feature(s) 
is at odds with the objective role the narrator assumes, and it is, on the basis of pragmatic 
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inferences, more plausible to attribute it to a character in the scene. 
This impression is usually reinforced by the fact that the character concerned has functioned 
as subject-of-consciousness at earlier points in the narrative (this is the case in all the above 
examples). Moreover, the narrative will often proceed to the introduction of a perspectival 
focus by means of a state, with the character concerned being the most salient subject-of- 
consciousness. The following example illustrates this: 
(6-50) And Lisa [...] sees them standing together in the middle of the room 
[...] and her stomach churns. (Are they having a row?) ( Lively, Moon 
Tiger: 48) [the italicised item here occurs in the original text and serves 
as subject-oriented feature] 
Perspectivally non-situated sentences which contain subject-oriented features thus contain 
indications of two differently-oriented perspectives: that of the narrator as narrative authority, 
and that of a character as subject. Those conflicting perspectives are maintained in a structure 
of undecidability. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this dissertation we have advanced the idea that the perspectival characteristics of sentences 
in narrative fiction can be captured more precisely if their a8pectual type is taken into account. 
We have argued that highlighting a contingency relation between consecutive sentences creates 
a distancing effect, while making salient some kind of topical coherence between them conveys 
a sense of perspectival immediacy. 
We have also argued that sentences which exhibit a state profile always introduce a perspec- 
tival focus. This means that, upon encountering a state, the reader has to determine which 
individual in the text occupies its perspectival focus. She will try to do so on the basis 
of intrasentential and contextual information and pragmatic inferences, which may make a 
particular individual in the text the most salient subject-of-consciousness for a state. 
Nevertheless the question as to whose perspective is being represented often cannot be an- 
swered decisively. We have shown that the perspectival focus of a state (or state complex) 
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will not exhibit any perspectival ambiguities if the state or state complex encodes the present 
tense and occurs in a narrative with a personalised narrator; in this type of narrative per- 
spectival foci are always occupied by the narrator. In all other types of narratives, however, 
perspectival foci are in principle ambiguous: even if context and pragmatic inferences make 
one potential subject-of-consciousness more salient than others, the underlying perspectival 
ambiguity is never completely eliminated. 
Sentences in narrative thus need not commit themselves to the identification of one subject 
responsible for their semantic content: within the same sentence, various perspectives may 
exist in a structure of unresolved plurality. 
The main emphasis in our approach was on theory. A fuller exploration of its implications 
would involve a more detailed analysis of longer passages from novels and short stories, to 
establish how a writer may exploit various ways of introducing and refracting perspective to 
create various stylistic effects. 
At another level, the analysis proposed here could be tested against particular texts by ex- 
ploring how perspectival ambiguity may constitute a major thematic concern of an individual 
work of fiction. Sentences which represent perspective incorporate a more general quality 
of literary texts which is often viewed as essential to their genre-viz. the fact that they 
need not commit themselves to one definite meaning. Literary texts specifically highlight the 
capacity of language to present itself as not exclusively belonging to a particular subject, and, 
because of this, to reveal the doubling of the speaking subject. It would be interesting to 
investigate how a pre-occupation with this problem manifests itself at various other levels of 
individual novels and short stories. 
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